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Abstract

John Rawls, in Political Liberalism, acknowledges that justice as fairness, as it
stands, “may fail” to deliver justice to people with severe cognitive impairment. He
continues, “How deep a fault this is must wait until the case itself can be examined.”1
The intent of this work, then, is to revisit Rawls’s justice as fairness in light of
intervening decades of disability consciousness and the emergence of competing
theoretical constructs pertinent to the lives of people with impairment, specifically to
people with an inability to reason or to reason fully, and determine whether new
perspectives can expand its scope into a more comprehensive model.
A fully democratic theory of justice cannot exclude the “hard cases,” so in
addition to Rawls’s two principles of justice, the author will argue that a third principle of
justice must be included to assure true democratic outcomes. The new principle will
state: All structures arising from the first two principles must be open to all human
beings—fully inclusive—without exception. The author expects that this third principle
will be embraced by the reasonable and rational designers because it is in their selfinterest to do so. The concept of self-interest—that interest, which might sway a person’s
choices toward personally favorable outcomes—is seen, by this author, as inclusive of
favorable outcomes for all people with whom the designer self-identifies. Arenas of self1

John Rawls, Political Liberalism: With a New Introduction and The “Reply to Habermas” (New York,
New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 21.
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interest expand past the boundaries of an individual’s actual person and past the confines
of time, to encompass others, including one’s future self, whose well-being is of such
importance to the designer as to define her own well-being.
Rawls means to assure a form of empathetic behavior when he constructs the veil
of ignorance. In the original position, because the designer is veiled from all of his
individual characteristics, Rawls forces consideration of the circumstances of every
possible person the designer could be. The designer must consider those of all possible
ethnicities, cultures, genders, classes, economic brackets, endowments, and other
individual characteristics. Yet, the veil can never hide from the designer the fact that she
can reason, and, if the designer were to make choices based on a narrow version of selfinterest, the circumstances of people with cognitive impairment would remain
unconsidered. Yet, people actually act within a broader definition of self-interest. The
veiled designer cannot know if impairment affects his child or others with whom he
identifies, nor can he know, given the nature of impairment, whether he will become
impaired imminently or in the future. The unpredictable and non-discriminating nature
of impairment means that its lack of consideration in the original position will expose
participants, who all have impairment in a potential state, to the consequences of policy,
which fails to address circumstances that might define anyone’s future. Within an
expanded notion of self-interest, the circumstances of people with severe cognitive and
physical impairment will be represented because, among many reasons, it is personally
advantageous for participants to do so.
The social relevance of people with cognitive impairment, the author will argue,
highlights the need for a theoretical restructuring of concepts of contribution and value,
iii

beyond rationality, that would lead to a reconceived notion of rights-bearing status and
positions of respect. Can theory redefine personhood in a non-traditional way that can,
but need not, include the ability to make moral choices, in order to extend value to
previously excluded individuals, who nonetheless benefit society through extra-rational
contribution? The author will explore the contributions and subsequent value to society
of people with cognitive impairment (and all impairment, for that matter). Notions of
value should not be confused with ideas of intrinsic human worth. Acceptance of the
latter does not lead individuals seeking community, based on mutual advantage, to court
the participation of a non-contributor. Only social valuing can uproot the entrenched
notion of worthlessness inherent in terms like “useless eaters.”
For all people, life as a human being involves living inside a vessel, which is
subject to entropy, disease, injury and imperfection. Historically, society has sequestered
those who provide reminders of the frailty of the human body and mind, and in so doing
has doggedly clung to a chosen, comfortable illusion. What has been lost in this
collective behavior is the opportunity to lead truly authentic lives, to embrace and
incorporate the complete human experience. People with impairment can lead us in
claiming our full humanity and in so doing make an invaluable contribution.

iv

Author’s Note
The author realizes that the distinction between the terms impairment and
disability is not always clear in other works or in society’s lexicon. Following much of
the scholarship in the disability community, as well as the definition of the World Health
Organization, the author uses the term impairment to describe a physical or mental
condition, while the term disability, on the other hand, refers to the consequences of the
intersection of an impaired mind or body and a society, which is constructed without
consideration for those with impairment.
The author would also like to explain the extensive use of block quotations within
the work. Often, works in philosophy and related disciplines truncate quotes or
paraphrase in ways that support their objectives. In researching this work, the author
looked up a vast number of citations and was astonished to find that his reading of the
original and complete quote had little in common with the way in which it was cited in
the secondary text. By providing more complete quotes, the author hopes to give the
reader the actual flavor of the original. More importantly, the author has provided quotes
of substantial length when citing the words of his fellows with impairment. For so long,
people with impairment have been shut up, literally and figuratively, and in
acknowledgement of the important history that has only begun to be told, the author feels
a strong need to let those, who are the subject of this work, tell their own stories without
edit or manipulation.
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Prologue
Identification of the Problem

Life is like a box of chocolates. You never know what
you’re gonna get.--Forrest Gump
A family rushes to the hospital, full of anticipation and a little trepidation. “As
long as it’s healthy.” Never are human beings more at the mercy of fate than just before
a baby is born. Families and friends wait while the woman, who has carried, dreamed
about, and talked to the developing fetus for nine months, struggles with the birth, her
husband at her side. Finally, the new baby arrives. He seems robust, with a strong
tendency to voice his opinion. A nurse wraps him and gives him to his mother to hold.
She cannot quite meet the mother’s eye. The delivering doctor talks to the new parents,
offering congratulations, but with no joy in his expression. Birth photos show a gowned
man, shaking hands, who might as well be delivering the news that someone has died.
The mother and father find themselves in a hazy, stunned reality. The neurosurgeon
arrives to sit with the family and determine whether to save the baby’s life. The doctor
outlines every possible negative outcome and explores each possible deficit. The parents
should think about allowing the baby to die. They are to give it consideration. The
doctor will return in a couple of hours. Neither mother nor father can recall exactly
what the doctor said, what he called their baby’s anomaly, or what they must take under
1

consideration, but both are clear that life will now change forever and neither is
prepared to be a passive executioner. One bit of information to hold tight to—the baby’s
diagnosis generally does not include cognitive impairment. He still might go to college;
he still might fulfill family traditions of academic excellence.
This is the author’s birth story and though the challenges of a learning disability,
leg paralysis, and less than fully functional arms make his journey somewhat more
laborious, he has achieved a level of academic success and looks forward to getting up in
the morning. People patronize the author, using words like “amazing” and “inspiring”
when describing him, as if his accomplishments are miraculous given his impairments.
Had he not possessed the intellectual tools to “overcome” his disability, would he still be
considered a contributor, or would the mantle of “burden” accompany him throughout
life?
A second birth story begins in about the same way as the first. This time,
however, doctors immediately identify the baby as having a syndrome, the components of
which include severe cognitive impairment. The new parents are also overwhelmed and
sadness pervades the hospital room. When it comes time to go home, the paternal
grandmother pulls the new mother aside and articulates society’s assumptions and
prejudices. How can the mother think of making a life with this child? He will ruin their
lives, deflect all attention away from his typical toddler sister, destroy his father’s social
standing, and he will suffer. She should instead put him “away” where he will not be
able to destroy their family. There is absolutely no expectation that this baby has
anything to contribute. His grandfather refers to him as “poor kid.”

2

When a child is born with a condition known to cause severe cognitive
impairment, is parental suffering simply a result of the current condition of the baby or
preconceived social notions of future deficits concerning beauty, success, and
acceptability? In what ways do philosophical conceptions contribute to this family’s
pain? How have centuries of theory conditioned society in acceptance of the notion that,
without reason, individuals are less than human or fail to merit life, or are more removed
from the divine than their rational neighbors?

The gods plant reason in mankind, of all good gifts the
highest.2
--Sophocles

Stranger: And in the soul there are two kinds of evil.
Theaetetus: What are they?
Stranger: The one may be compared to disease in the
body, the other to deformity.
Theaetetus: I do not understand.
Stranger: Perhaps you have never reflected that disease
and discord are the same.
Theaetetus: To this, again, I know not what I should reply.
Stranger: Do you not conceive discord to be a dissolution
of kindred elements, originating in some disagreement?
Theatetus: Just that.
Stranger: And is deformity anything but the want of
measure, which is always unsightly?
Theaetetus: Exactly.
Stranger: And do we not see that opinion is opposed to
desire, pleasure to anger, reason to pain, and that all these
elements are opposed to one another in the souls of bad
men?
Theaetetus: Certainly.
Stranger: And yet they must all be akin?
Theaetetus: Of course.
2

Sophocles, “Antigone” trans. Sir George Young in World Drama: An Anthology, Vol.1: Ancient Greece,
Rome, India, China, Japan, Medieval Europe, and England, ed. Barrett H. Clark (New York, New York:
Dover Publications, 1960), 31.
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Stranger: Then we shall be right in calling vice a discord
and disease of the soul?
Theaetetus: Most true.
Stranger: And when things having motion, and aiming at
an appointed mark, continually miss their aim and glance
aside, shall we say that this is the effect of symmetry
among them, or of the want of symmetry?
Theaetetus: Clearly of the want of symmetry.
Stranger: But surely we know that no soul is voluntarily
ignorant of anything?
Theaetetus: Certainly not.
Stranger: And what is ignorance but the aberration of a
mind which is bent on truth, and in which the process of
understanding is perverted?
Theaetetus: True.
Stranger: Then we are to regard an unintelligent soul as
deformed and devoid of symmetry?
Theaetetus: Very true.3
--Plato

Contemplation is both the highest form of activity (since
the intellect is the highest thing in us, and the objects that it
apprehends are the highest things that can be known)...4
--Aristotle

To disparage the dictate of reason is equivalent to
condemning the command of God. 5
--Aquinas

3

Plato, The Dialogues of Plato: Translated into English with Analyses and Introductions vol. 3, ed. and
trans Benjamin Jowett (London, United Kingdom: MacMillan and Company, 1892), 488-489 (228 A-B).
4

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed. and trans. Martin Ostwald (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice
Hall, 1962), 1177a12- 23.
5

Thomas Aquinas. Thomas Aquinas: Philosophical Texts, ed. and trans Thomas Gilby (Oxford, United
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2003), 284.
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Man is obviously made for thinking. Therein lies all his
dignity and his merit…6
--Pascal

(God gave the World) to the use of the Industrious and
Rational…7
--Locke

Without doubt there is a universal justice emanating from
reason alone…8
--Rousseau

Nature gave man reason, and freedom of will based upon
reason, and this in itself was a clear indication of nature’s
intention as regards his endowments.9
--Kant

In fact, it is a farce to call any being virtuous whose virtues
do not result from the exercise of its own reason.10
--Wollstonecraft

6

Blaise Pascal, Pensées, ed. and trans. A.J. Krailsheimer (London, United Kingdom: Penguin Books Ltd,
1995), 207. (Section II, Part XXIV, n. 620 (Brunschvig no. 146)).
7
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), 291.
8

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and the First and Second Discourses, ed. Susan Dunn and
trans. Lester Crocker and Susan Dunn, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2002), 178.
9

Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, ed. Hans Siebert Reiss and trans. Hans Siebert Reiss and H.B. Nisbet
(Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 43. sefjaeger@comcast.net
10

Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, ed. Miriam Brody (London, United
Kingdom: Penguin Books Ltd., 2004), 31.
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The irrational in the human has something about it
altogether repulsive and terrible, as we see in the maniac,
the miser, the drunkard, or the ape.11
--Santayana

11

George Santayana, The Life of Reason; Or, The Phases of Human Progress: Reason in Society (New
York, New York: Scribner and Sons, 1906), 69.
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Introduction
The Democratic Society, Equal Consideration, and People with Severe Cognitive
Impairment

It will be seen how in the place of the wealth and poverty of
political economy, come the rich human being and rich
human need. The rich human being is simultaneously the
human being in need of a totality of human life-activities—
the man in whom his own realization exists as an inner
necessity, as need.-- Karl Marx, The Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.

Western philosophical tradition has identified the quality of rationality as that
which uniquely delineates personhood or moral personhood. A moral person possesses a
self, defined as that which is conscious of its own identity, and this inherently rational
ability is the essential characteristic used in conferring value and subsequent status
allowing democratic participation. Because theory has largely understood participation
as rational contribution, it has separated reason from, and elevated it above, what is, in
reality, a compendium of physical, emotional, spiritual, and relational components in
synergy within a human being. Professor Eva Feder Kittay states:
…personhood marks the moral threshold above which
equal respect for the intrinsic value for an individual’s life
is required and the requirements of justice are operative and
below which only relative interest has moral weight.12
12

Eva Feder Kittay, “At the Margins of Moral Personhood,” Ethics 116 (Oct. 2005): 101.
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The philosophical tradition of dividing people into persons and non-persons based on
rationality speaks to society conferring status based on the potential for understanding
one’s ends and the means to reach them and for choosing actions in conformity with
socially determined ethical behavior. If an entity is a person, his existence places
limitations on the actions of other persons insofar as their freedoms are concerned. If an
individual lacks rationality, his existence places no such limitations. He is a non-person
devoid of social responsibility because he is unable to perform duties—unable to discern
what is moral from what is not and therefore unable to participate in a reciprocal
(cooperating) relationship. Historically he has been demeaned as a “useless eater,”
“idiot,” “moron,” “imbecile,” or “retard.”
The twenty-first century is witness to a contentious theoretical and real-life
struggle waged by a group, inclusive of individuals with cognitive impairment who have
never, in the history of the world, been embraced as fellows, as part of a human matrix
seeking self-knowledge and justice through a balancing of liberty and equality. Instead
they have been feared, reviled, imprisoned, tortured, and murdered because, instead of
being seen as part of the human cooperative, demonstrating the potential future state of
any currently rational human being, they are seen as freaks of nature, burdens on society,
and generators of ontological anxiety. Because the non-impaired vaguely sense that
people with impairment reflect the potential state of any human being, yet cannot bear to
look into this mirror of future possibility, they disown their own potential selves by
“othering” people with impairment, thus denying the corporeal fragility inherent in the
human condition. If those with impairment represent that which is alien, it is easier to
8

condone their institutionalization, sterilization, euthanizing, and sequestration. It is easier
to deprive them of liberty, authority, self-determination, and control. Society need not
extend democratic principles to “sub-humans” and there is a history of denying
participation to various outlier groups, whose participation in some way threatened the
status quo. Thus, substantive democracy has never existed. Society has slowly and
painfully moved ever closer, but until people with impairment are considered part of the
human family, instead of unfortunate anomalies, society cannot be considered truly
democratic.
A theory of justice that seeks to be universal must provide all members of society,
including those who lack rationality, with a means toward consideration of their wellbeing and a procedure through which they might play a role in the design of a just
society. Retention of a rights-based approach is essential to ensure against infringements
by the majority, who heretofore have offered charity rather than surrendered control to
the person with impairment and her allies.13 The receipt of charity, by definition
dependent on the beneficence and pity of others, will never lead to the primary good of
respect. Is it possible to transform a rights-for-duties model, wherein people consciously
undertake duties, into a rights-for-contribution model, wherein extra-rational action that
benefits society satisfies the criterion? Could a shift in perception of value open areas of
participation heretofore closed to people with severe cognitive impairment? This work
will reevaluate the importance of considering the needs of people with cognitive

13

The author acknowledges the existence of impairment, so severe as to preclude the ability to self
determine, but insists that in these cases, power over policy should reside in allies who have intimate
knowledge of the individual with impairment’s best interests and this will be discussed in detail in the
summary chapter of this work.
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impairment in any original design and will focus on a reworking of Rawls’s justice as
fairness in order to preserve a rights-based model, inclusive of the useful thought
experiment referred to as the veil of ignorance.
Rawls is concerned that Kant’s categorical imperative, a version of the golden
rule, be assured and uses a mechanism, which eliminates a social designer’s individual
desires and prejudices. Just as Lady Justice wears a blindfold, Rawls’s designers enter
into consideration of what a just society must be founded on, a state known as the
original position, under theoretical constraints. Rawls’s designers possess two moral
powers, reasonableness and rationality, and are blinded in part by the veil of ignorance.
The idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure
so that any principles agreed to will be just. The aim is to
use the notion of pure procedural justice as a basis for
theory.14 Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific
contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to
exploit social and natural circumstances to their own
advantage. Now in order to do this I assume that the
parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance. They do not
know how the various alternatives will affect their own
particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles
solely on the basis of general considerations.
It is assumed, then, that the parties do not know certain
kinds of particular facts. First of all, no one knows his
place in society, his class position or social status; nor does
he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and
abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor,
again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the
particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the special
features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or
liability to optimism or pessimism. More than this, I
assume that the parties do not know the particular
circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not
know its economic or political situation, or the level of
14

Pure procedural justice refers to the notion that if the procedure under which principles are designed is
just, the succeeding principles will also be just.
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civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The
persons in the original position have no information as to
which generation they belong.15
Though he himself does not mandate any particular outcome, Rawls believes that
designers will formulate two guiding principles of justice under the veil, which will
constitute the rules under which legislators will construct the foundations of law. Rawls
describes the first principle: “Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”
Rawls calls this the principle of equal liberty. He continues with the second principle:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both: a) to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and
b) attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.16
This, Rawls refers to as the difference principle. As compelling as Rawls’s justice as
fairness is and as inclusive of most of humanity, the goal of this work is to refashion
several components to expand its scope to cover all people and discover a system of
complete democracy.
The author would argue that a third principle of justice must be included to assure
true democratic outcomes. The third principle states: All structures arising from the first
two principles must be open to all human beings—fully inclusive—without exception.
The author expects that this third principle will be embraced by the reasonable and
rational designers because it is in their self-interest to do so. The concept of self15

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of the
Harvard University Press, 1999), 118.
16

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 266. The “just savings principle” governs the consumption of goods
with sustainability and even growth of these for future generations in mind.
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interest—that interest, which might sway a person’s choices toward personally favorable
outcomes—is seen, by this author, as inclusive of favorable outcomes for all people with
whom the designer self-identifies. Arenas of self-interest expand past the boundaries of
an individual’s actual person and past the confines of time, to encompass others,
including one’s future self, whose well-being is of such importance to the designer as to
define her own well-being.
Rawls means to assure a form of empathetic behavior when he constructs the veil.
In the original position, because the designer is veiled from all of his individual
characteristics, Rawls forces consideration of the circumstances of every possible person
the designer could be. The designer must consider those of all possible ethnicities,
cultures, genders, classes, income brackets, endowments, and other individual
characteristics. Yet, the veil can never hide from the designer the fact that she can
reason, and, if the designer were to make choices based on a narrow version of selfinterest, the circumstances of people with cognitive impairment might remain
unconsidered. Yet people actually act within a broader definition of self-interest. The
veiled designer cannot know if impairment affects his child or others with whom he
identifies, nor can he know, given the nature of impairment, whether he will become
impaired imminently or in the future. The unpredictable and non-discriminating nature
of impairment means that its lack of consideration in the original position will expose
participants, who all have impairment in a potential state, to the consequences of policy,
which fails to address circumstances that might define any human future. Within an
expanded notion of self-interest, the circumstances of people with severe cognitive and
physical impairment will be represented because, among many reasons, it is personally
12

advantageous for participants to do so. Yet, without the inclusion of people with
cognitive impairment in the model—if they are held apart and deemed anomalies—how
will consideration of their circumstances enter the consciousness of the designers?
The social relevance of people with cognitive impairment, the author will argue,
highlights the need for a theoretical restructuring of concepts of contribution and value,
beyond rationality, that would lead to a reconceived notion of rights-bearing status and
positions of respect. Can theory redefine personhood in a non-traditional way that can,
but need not, include the ability to make moral choices, in order to extend value to
previously excluded individuals, who nonetheless benefit society through extra-rational
contribution? It seems essential to the author to explore the contribution and subsequent
value to society of people with cognitive impairment (and all impairment, for that
matter). Notions of value should not be confused with ideas of intrinsic human worth.
Acceptance of the latter does not lead an individual seeking community based on mutual
advantage to court the participation of a non-contributor. Only social valuing can uproot
the entrenched notion of worthlessness inherent in terms like “useless eaters.”
Yet, changing recalcitrant understandings is far from easy. Problematic
perceptions not only involve notions of value, they also involve notions of what
constitutes life with impairment. In the author’s experience, most people without
impairment do not understand the experience and have vast misunderstandings and
deeply rooted prejudices. The author will endeavor to explore these misunderstandings
in depth in an effort to reveal the truth, as experienced by those who live with impairment
and the disability created by society’s ill-conceived “othering.” Without social
familiarity and the attendant awareness of everyone’s potential for impairment, even a
13

new, maximally comprehensive and inclusionary model of Rawlsian democracy will not
succeed. Before embarking on this journey, which will conclude with a rethinking of
Rawls, it seems necessary to address questions surrounding whether basic Rawlsian
theoretical tenets are valid. The author has not infrequently been asked to defend the two
discussed below and if he cannot satisfactorily address these concerns, using justice as
fairness as a foundation is doomed before the project is undertaken.
If one questions whether a Rawlsian system of justice including an original
position can actually exist, the author believes that it can—not just as a standpoint from
which original designers determine the principles that will guide society’s development,
but as an ongoing perspective, which if assumed will encourage just outcomes in all
decisions that have an impact on the governance of society. If one questions whether a
social contract can actually exist, the author believes that it can as well. Rawls is setting
forth a construct that, if employed by social designers, maximizes the potential for justice
within society. He is calling for people to assume the perspective of the original position
as they create and then adhere to, or challenge, the basic principles of a community or the
interpretation of these principles.17 Unlike earlier contract theorists, Rawls focuses
beyond an anthropological origin of justice and constructs what is capable of becoming
an ongoing ideal viewpoint from which individuals can participate in the formulation of
just decisions. Each time the author participates in political organizing, votes, pays taxes
without cheating, follows the law, or accepts the consequences of breaking the law, he
affirms his participation in the contract. If he chooses to accept the basic tenets of his
society (a constitution) or chooses to participate lawfully in changing those tenets, he
17

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 120.
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affirms the contract. Each time he votes to fund services for people with cognitive
impairment, to assure equal pay for women, or to allow same-sex marriage, he votes with
the veil of ignorance as a perspective. The veiled perspective Rawls outlines encourages a
moral thought process based on identification with each and every member of society.
If one questions whether humans are actually risk-averse, an important
assumption in accepting the value of the original position, the author argues that there is a
difference between being risk-averse when choices can be reversed or losses, due to
choices, recouped, and when, as is the case in the original position, choices have
consequences that are irreversible without revolutionary activity. In the original position,
one is deciding fundamental rights, opportunities, and social foundations for society.
Even if one knew in the original position that the citizen
one represents enjoys risk-taking, this would still not be a
reason to gamble with his or her rights, opportunities, and
starting position in society; for if she were born into a
traditional, repressive, or fundamentalist society, she might
well have little opportunity for risk-taking, gambling,
entrepreneurship, and the like. It is rational then even for
the risk-taker to choose conservatively in the original
position and guarantee her future opportunities to take
risks. (And assuming that the parties are trustees, then it
would be not simply irrational but a dereliction of duty to
choose otherwise.) 18
Even if one accepts the possibility of a veil of ignorance, sees the merits of
making decisions from the perspective of the original position, and accepts that from such
a foundational position, designers would be risk averse, it is impossible to deny that
justice as fairness, as it stands, continues in the tradition of previous moral theories
requiring rationality for participation and implementation and the exclusionary outcome
18

Samuel Freeman, “Original position,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last modified Dec. 20,
2008, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/
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of that criterion. Rawls describes his participants as “free and equal…fully cooperating
members of society over a complete life…”19 As a consequence of the relationship
between cooperation and intent, this description of participants excludes people lacking
rationality. In Political Liberalism, Rawls acknowledges that justice as fairness, as it
stands, “may fail” to deliver justice to people with severe cognitive impairment. He
continues, “How deep a fault this is must wait until the case itself can be examined.”20
The intent of this work, then, is to revisit Rawls’s justice as fairness in light of
intervening decades of disability consciousness and the emergence of competing
theoretical constructs pertinent to the lives of people with impairment, specifically to
those with an inability to reason or reason fully, and determine whether new perspectives
can expand its scope into a more comprehensive model. By marrying Kantian confidence
in the human potential for self-examination, creative choice, and a desire for the justice,
fairness, and freedom fostered by an ethic of reciprocity with the social contract
perspective of individual voices finding common ground and designing a society
inclusive of mutually beneficial structures, Rawls successfully challenged the
predominance of utilitarian theory in the post-Enlightenment era. He resurrected the
relevance of the unique thinker, as opposed to a statistical individual, and this thinker’s
reasoned contribution to the construction of a model, which leads to social justice. His
brilliant effort provides a model for democracy, which deserves reconsideration, as Rawls
himself anticipated. Heretofore, the incompatibility of an inability to reason and selfdetermination, the historically acknowledged nature of contribution as singularly reason19
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based, as well as the question of rights-claiming for people with severe cognitive
impairment have encouraged contemporary theorists, in their attempts to amend
perceived exclusionary deficits in Rawls, to abandon a “rights-for-duties” model.
Proposed theories, inclusive of people with impairment have been offered by care theory
philosophers and proponents of the capabilities approach. The author seeks to investigate
and understand these perspectives and discover potentially beneficial material, but his
work will endeavor to preserve a procedural framework, which possesses the authenticity
and authority inherent in a social design that incorporates the participation of each
member in society, and to argue the benefits of a theory predicated on rights and the
essential redress they afford the most vulnerable. The author will also interrogate
contemporary utilitarian theory, especially as envisioned by Peter Singer, both for its
interest in impairment and for its provocative misunderstandings, which heavily
contribute to injustice.
While justice as fairness provides a foundational respect for humans essential to
an inclusive theory, changes, and at times incorporation of Rawls’s underemphasized
understandings, will need to take place. The author views Rawls’s focus on David
Hume’s circumstances of justice as exclusionary and he will introduce possibilities for
participation, beyond the constraints of rough equality. He seeks to replace a notion of
personhood, based on autonomy and rationality, which Rawls attributes to Kantian
influence in section forty of A Theory of Justice, with a highly social conception of
participation derived from Rawls’s later discussions of social unions. The concept of
social unions allows for individuals to contribute their strengths and abilities to the
community and for the community to make resources available to its members, which
17

they individually lack. Some contributions will involve the production of great ideas,
debate, and innovation while other contributions will involve the demonstration of
empathy and caring. The provision of a reality check on issues of corporeal fragility and
the intrinsic human need for care will also be understood as contributory. The author will
clarify ways in which people with severe cognitive impairment and the injustices they
encounter illuminate the unresolved imperfections of society and provide a catalyst for
the work of elimination of still-existent faulty structures of hierarchy that will lead to a
more mature and just society. He will also investigate opportunities for social
development available to those in society who engage in the challenges of building
community inclusive of individuals with severe impairment and explore ways in which
the disability community illuminates important aspects of what it is to be truly human.
This work will challenge theorists to justify why contribution, made possible
through rational acts, has received exclusive acknowledgement, while relational
contribution elicits a more dismissive response. Theorists must acknowledge that without
relationship, humans lack context and thus, self-definition. Being a party to the social
contract, or any other social construct, requires choosing relationship. Relationship can
certainly engage reason, but it can also encompass affective bonds and the thought and
action ignited by those bonds. When an individual, with whom allies share strong bonds,
encounters social barriers that deny freedom and happiness, and when removal of those
barriers challenges society’s status quo on a daily basis, advocates and self-advocates
find their identities conflated with the quest for justice. They become more engaged,
more thoughtful, and more aware—in other words more human. Another characteristic
of being human involves living inside a vessel, which is subject to entropy and disease—
18

injury and imperfection. Historically, society has sequestered those who provide
reminders of the frailty of the human body and mind, and in so doing has doggedly clung
to a chosen, comfortable illusion. What has been lost in this collective behavior is the
opportunity to lead truly authentic lives, to embrace and incorporate the complete human
experience. People with impairment can lead us in claiming our full humanity and in so
doing make an invaluable contribution.
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Chapter Two
Investigation of Theories that Consider People with Severe Cognitive Impairment

Care Theory

Can I translate myself to you?
Do I need to?
Do I want to?
When I say crip I mean flesh-proof power, flash mob sticks
and wheels in busy intersections, model mock.
When I say disability I mean all the brilliant ways we get
through the planned fractures of the world.
When I say living in America today I mean thriving and
unwelcome, the irony of the only possible time and place.
When I say cure I mean erase. I mean eradicate the miracle
of error.
When I say safe I mean no pill, no certified agency, no
danger to myself court order, no supervisory setting, no
nurse, can protect or defend or save me, if you deny me
power.
When I say public transportation I mean we all pay, we all
ride, we all wait. As long as necessary.
When I say basic rights I mean difficult curries, a fancyknotted scarf, a vegetable garden. I mean picking up a
friend at the airport. I mean two blocks or a continent with
switches or sensors or lightweight titanium, wellmaintained and fully-funded. I mean shut up about charity,
the GNP, pulling my own weight, and measuring my
20

carbon footprint. I mean only embrace guaranteed can
deliver real equality.
When I say high-quality personal assistance services I
mean her sure hands earning honorably, and me eating and
shitting without anyone’s permission.
When I say nondisabled I mean all your precious tricks.
When I say nondisabled privilege I mean members-only
thought processes, and the violence of stairs.
By dancing I mean of course dancing. We dance without
coordination or hearing, because music wells through
walls. You’re invited, but don’t do us any favors.
When I say sexy I mean our beautiful crip bodies, broken
or bent, and whole. I mean drooling from habit and lust. I
mean slow, slow.
When I say family I mean all the ways we need each other,
beyond your hardening itch and paternal property rights,
our encumbering love and ripping losses. I mean
everything ripples.
When I say normal I don’t really mean anything.
When I say sunset, rich cheese, promise, breeze, or iambic
pentameter, I mean exactly the same things you mean.
Or, when I say sunset I mean swirling orange nightmare.
When I say rich cheese I mean the best food I can still eat,
or else I mean poverty and cholesterol. When I say promise
I mean my survival depends on crossed digits. When I say
breeze I mean finally requited desire. When I say iambic
pentameter, I mean my heart’s own nameless rhythm.
When I say tell the truth I mean complicate. Cry when it’s
no longer funny.
When I say crip solidarity I mean the grad school exam and
the invisible man. I mean signed executive meetings,
fighting for every SSI cent.
When I say challenges to crip solidarity I mean the colors
missing from grant applications, the songs absent from
laws. I mean that for all my complaints and victories, I am
still sometimes more white than crip.
When I say anything I know the risk: You will accuse me of
courage. I know your language all too well, steeped in its
21

syntax of overcoming adversity and limited resources.
When I say courage I mean you sitting next to me, talking,
both of us refusing to compare or hate ourselves.
When I say ally I mean I’ll get back to you. And you better
be there.—Laura Hershey, “Translating the Crip”

What do current theorists, who work at the intersection of theory and impairment,
offer? Which new concepts are useful and which are detrimental? Beginning in 1982,
Carol Gilligan explored a dichotomy between the moral development of boys and girls.
In In a Different Voice, she posits that gender identity, formed before a child turns three
years old, is established differently for girls than it is for boys. Primary caregiver parents,
being mostly female, experience their girl children in a same-as-self way, while
experiencing their male children as gender opposite. Thus, while boys must pull away
from their mothers in order to develop their masculine personas, girls have no need to
separate in developing their gender identity. Girls often grow to become most
comfortable with attachment and close social bonding, while boys often identify with
autonomous, independent behaviors. For future problem solving, boys will rely on
impersonal, abstract principles (the golden rule, justice, and democracy), while girls will
make choices based on desired interpersonal outcomes (harmony, maintenance of
relationship, and responsibility for each other).21
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Gilligan quotes the replies given by, first, a man and then a woman in response to
questions asked by Lawrence Kohlberg in his research into the nature of moral problem
solving. Kohlberg queried the twenty-five year old man on the meaning of morality. The
man answered:
I think it is recognizing the right of the individual, the
rights of other individuals, not interfering with those rights.
Act as fairly as you would have them treat you. I think it is
basically to preserve the human beings right to existence. I
think that is the most important. Secondly, the human
being’s right to do as he pleases, again without interfering
with somebody else’s rights.
Kohlberg then asked the twenty-five year old woman if there is any absolute correct
moral choice or “is everybody’s opinion equally right.” She answered:
No, I don’t think everybody’s opinion is equally right. I
think that in some situations there may be opinions that are
equally valid, and one could consciously adopt one of
several courses of action. But there are other situations in
which I think there are right and wrong answers, that sort of
inhere in the nature of existence, of all individuals here
who need to live with each other to live. We need to
depend on each other, and hopefully it is not only a
physical need but a need of fulfillment in ourselves, that a
person’s life is enriched by cooperating with other people
and striving to live in harmony with everybody else, and to
that end, there are right and wrong, there are things that
promote that end and that move away from it, and in that
way it is possible to choose in certain cases among different
courses of action that obviously promote or harm that
goal.22
Gilligan goes on to cite many instances where male and female responses cleave along
autonomy versus relationship and responsibility lines. Gilligan’s construct of the relative
importance of relationship in female choice-making spawned multiple investigations
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among feminist theorists in a myriad of fields dealing with the importance of relationship,
as opposed to the singular importance of rationality in human, and especially feminine,
motivation.
Feminist philosopher and care theorist, Eva Feder Kittay’s statement that every
person is “some mother’s child” speaks to her understanding of the authority of human
relationship as a basis for personhood (perhaps relational personhood is an appropriate
term) and equality of standing. She speaks to the reality of identification with progeny
without regard for intellectual capacity, and to a desire to acknowledge human
commonality, regardless of degree of intellect. The author finds agreeable material
within Kittay, while taking issue with other aspects of her theory.
While acknowledging rationality and autonomy as useful characteristics for
participation in a moral community, she sees them as neither essential nor exclusive,
stressing emotional connection instead.23 Other human capacities critical to a moral
community might be absent in some with both rationality and autonomy. Kittay uses the
example of Nazi doctors to describe persons who not only fail to make a moral
contribution, but manifest acts of evil incarnate, despite their rationality. She sees their
behavior as devoid of important extra-rational traits including empathy, fellow feeling,
and a capacity for and appreciation of kindness, harmony, and love.24 She is, of course,
right in this observation. Rawls, too, acknowledges that rationality alone fails to promote
moral personhood and includes the property of being reasonable when delimiting this
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status.25 He would see the decisions of Nazi doctors as unable to be universalized and
therefore unreasonable. It is likely that even those monsters—humans devoid of feeling
when subjecting individuals from certain delineated groups to torture—went home and
demonstrated fellow feeling, empathy, and kindness to their families and friends. They
did not, however, demonstrate an interest in universalizing their actions. Unlike Kittay,
Rawls does not invoke the emotional realm in his criteria for moral personhood. Acting
reasonably, like rationally, is an intellectual and not emotional exercise. It is,
nonetheless a relational exercise. Many, who dwell solely on the rational, self-interested
aspect of choice making in Rawls, overlook the association between reasonableness and
relationship. Self-interest, for Rawls, incorporates an interest in the well-being of the
general other, as a healthy commons facilitates the flourishing of individual expression.
Rawls is not dependent on reciprocal caring between specific individuals, a caring that is
responsive and thus changeable and not assured. His theory survives individuals who
lack empathy and altruism, and that is good as such people surely exist.
The author agrees that beneficial human traits, beyond rationality, exist and
wonders if Kittay’s person can find a place within a reconceived Rawlsian model. Kittay
thinks not. Instead of reconceiving Rawls, she prefers to replace rationality with
dependence, a natural, universal, human experience, as an alternative, more inclusive,
descriptor of the human condition. The author will later elaborate on alternate solutions
to Rawls’s rationality problem because he finds many of Kittay’s assumptions and their
consequences troublesome for people with impairment. He would like to insist, in
advance, that he is a feminist and acknowledges the interdependency of human beings.
25
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Yet, for people living with severe impairment, the concept of dependence carries such a
historical, political, and emotional charge that it is impossible to comfortably sit next to
the word and act dispassionately. For the disability community, to be dependent is to be
at the mercy of. To be dependent is to be powerless. The disability community has
slowly and painfully dragged itself past notions of dependence into a place of agency and
it is not going to willingly give ground. There seems to be a difference between the
acknowledgement of humans as social animals and the interdependency of human
existence, where periods of the same person’s life might include both care-giving and the
receipt of care, and finding any comfortable association with acceptance of life-long
dependency with its attendant loss of power as a replacement for the concept of
autonomous control over one’s life wherever possible.
Kittay criticizes the liberal tradition where independence is “hypervalorized” for
“stigmatizing” dependency and therefore relegating people with severe cognitive
impairment to non-participant status. The author is not convinced that sidelining selfdetermination is the answer. Autonomy, to whatever degree possible, belongs in the first
tier of goods. Until people have no desires, preferences, priorities, or volition, the
expression of their wills requires the honoring of whatever autonomy is within their
capability. People with severe cognitive impairment have their own individual authentic
selves, and the full expressions of these are bound to society’s recognition of their
autonomy. Calculative rationality may be necessary for the understanding of long-term
ends and the most advantageous means to achieve them, but a sort of rationality (it might
be called preferential rationality) determines more immediate desires and choice making.
Most humans possess this capacity. All have dependencies and interact in personal and
26

professional ways to address these through relationship, but the quality of these
relationships relies upon respect for one another’s autonomy. The author acknowledges
that some people, at the farthest end of the rationality continuum, lack the ability to selfdetermine to any degree, but is most comfortable suspending this reality and approaching
all people with a respect for their autonomy, to whatever degree possible, as a position
that assures that erroneous assumptions never deny the possible.
Some care theorists, including Jennifer Nedelsky, criticize the liberal tradition as
incapable of merging the role of the social with that of the rational, because the tradition
assumes a “dichotomy between autonomy and the collectivity.” According to Nedelsky,
in mainstream liberal theory, one achieves autonomy “by erecting a wall (of rights)
between the individual and those around him…the most perfectly autonomous man is
thus the most perfectly isolated.”26 This author hastens to point out that individuals only
invoke their “wall” of rights when others violate these rights. This state is not
continuous, nor is it ubiquitous. If an individual asserts his right to equal protection and
due process (under the 14th amendment) because he desires to testify at the state capitol,
which lacks wheelchair accessibility, while he is suing the state, he nonetheless continues
to go to work, visit with family and friends, and enjoy recreational activities. He does not
live as a lone entity, isolated by his rights, but rather in a community, where social and
political access depends upon the exercise of these rights. Would he be less isolated if he
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was unable to lend his testimony to the creation of a bill, discuss his position with his
representatives, or listen to the arguments of others?
The author wonders about Nedelsky’s conflation of autonomy and isolation. He
questions the nature of autonomy in isolation. It seems that autonomy, meaning,
according to Webster, “functioning independently without control by others” lacks
meaning without an external challenge. Furthermore, the exercise of rights promotes
inclusion within society, not isolation. Trisha Fisher is an individual with cognitive
impairment as the result of a brain injury sustained as an infant. In July of 2006, Fisher
gave birth to a son at Exempla Medical Center in Wheatridge, Colorado, and within
hours, at the request of her guardian/parent, underwent a tubal ligation, which rendered
her sterile. Though she signed a consent form, her position is that she believed she was
consenting to an epidural to ease the pain of childbirth, not a sterilization procedure.27
Fisher’s former emergency guardian, aware that Fisher wanted more children, helped her
bring a complaint, along with and through the Colorado Cross Disability Coalition doing
business as Center for Rights of Parents with Disabilities’ legal department, against the
doctor, the doctor’s practice, the hospital, and the corporation that owns the hospital.
The complaint contends that medical personnel had a duty to comply with the
Colorado Developmental Disabilities Act prior to performing any sterilization procedure
upon Fisher by obtaining her free and voluntary informed consent, which would require
that a non-interested professional would explain and ensure her understandings of the
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repercussions of the surgery. The lawsuit charges the defendants with failure to do so.28
Though Fisher lost her complaint, its filing was essential to the ongoing fight against
society’s preconceived notions regarding the ability of persons with impairment to parent.
Her decision to assert herself in the face of the belief that she was incapable, positioned
her within an activist community, which assumes she is capable and autonomous until
proven otherwise. This community includes rather than isolates her.
Another interesting aspect of this story is that Fisher’s guardian/mother removed
her son from Fisher after his birth and was in the process of raising him herself when
Fisher successfully sued for emancipation and subsequently won custody of her child.
She currently is engaged in raising her son herself with community supports.29 Did
Fisher erect a wall between herself and society by exercising her rights? Is she more
isolated than she would have been if she had silently acquiesced to her mother’s belief
that she was unable to be a parent? She has community support in her parenting efforts
and friends who have advocated with her for her autonomy. The author contends that she
would be far more isolated within the limited, directed, and circumscribed world her
mother had envisioned for her. While he sympathizes with the fears Fisher’s mother
suffered at the thought of the risks involved in Fisher’s exercise of her autonomy, he
encourages everyone who worries about a loved one with impairment to acknowledge the
essential role risk-taking assumes in the ultimate growth and maturation of every human
being.
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Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Kenan Professor of Philosophy at the University of North
Carolina, in concordance with the author, takes issue with the argument that autonomy is
incompatible with human dependency—that self-determination requires isolation. In
defense of his modified Kantian model of moral autonomy, he argues that social and
relational behaviors, such as taking the needs of others into consideration when making
important life decisions, do not assume one’s giving up self interest. Hill states that his
version of autonomy, “does not assert, with Kant, that basic moral principles are
grounded in pure reason, independent of all contingent features of human nature, that
they admit no exceptions, or that they command only our wills and not our feelings.”30
Autonomous action based on self-interest may involve accounting for one’s relationships
with others and society as a whole. He states:
…accepting this right of autonomy does not mean that we
must accept more extreme views that are sometimes
associated with the word ‘autonomy.’ For example, we can
acknowledge the right without in any way implying that
self-sufficiency, independence, and separation from others
are goals worth pursuing. Respecting people’s autonomy
requires resisting the temptation to ‘take charge’ of their
lives without their consent, but it does not deny anyone the
choice to share with others, to acknowledge one’s
dependency, to accept advice, or even to sacrifice for the
interest of others.31
Theorists, such as Kittay and Nedelsky, who deny that the states of dependence and
autonomy can coexist, unnecessarily sacrifice the rights and self-determination of those
with severe impairment.
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Rights, however, under current understanding, must always occur in the company
of duties.32 For that reason, the rights of those who lack traits, which hold the potential
for traditional contribution, are, at least from a classical theoretical standpoint,
unclaimable. Yet, in order to live lives of dignity and fulfillment, people with severe
cognitive impairment must have enforceable access to basic human goods. The answer
lies in a shift in public and personal perceptions of value and contribution. With their
integration, many previously marginalized groups have contributed their unique
perspectives and processes and society has benefited from their contributions. This is not
to say that integration came free from angst and without cost, but the enrichment of the
community and its steady movement toward justice argue for its value.
Integration of people with severe cognitive impairment will require an expanded
concept of contribution. Because the exercise of duty requires conscious choice, society
must consider whether unconscious contribution might also confer rights-bearing status.
If society is better for the presence of people with severe cognitive impairment, the
experiences and perspectives of their parents, friends, and allies, the challenges they
present, and the lessons they teach, is it conceivable that they contribute, even if they are
unable to perform a duty? And, though people with impairment who can reason qualify
as performers of duties, their contributions could be expanded if, instead of categorizing
them as burdensome, society acknowledged the benefit of their full inclusion, and the
access to their unique perspectives and processes that inclusion could provide. Both the
unintended contributions made simply because a participant has a unique nature,
32
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circumstance, and experience and the reasoned performance of duty demonstrated by the
independent person with impairment offer heretofore-untapped riches.
As for the notion that no severely impaired individual can lay claim to
independence, Kittay offends this author with her tone in a lecture delivered in San
Francisco in 2004 at the Care Matters Symposium and later published with some
emendation in conjunction with Bruce Jennings and Angela Wasunna. She states:
The clarion call of the disability rights movement that
emerged in the early 1970’s was the demand for
‘independence,’ resulting in the ‘Independent Living
Movement.’ The idea behind this movement was that
dependency of disabled people was socially constructed.
People with impairment become disabled not by virtue of
the intrinsic nature of the impairment but because of
physical and social constructions that become a barrier to
living independent lives. Yes, the activists and
theoreticians of the movement concede, many people with
impairment need assistance, but this does not constitute
dependence. With assistance and control over the aid they
receive, persons with impairment can live ‘independent’
lives.33
The quotations around independent, interjected by Kittay, bespeak both her
disdain for the position of the independent living community and a lack of understanding
for the difference in experience between receiving care as the recipient of personal or
societal charity and purchasing needed services. The difference between how it feels to
be someone’s charge (and often, burden) versus someone’s employer is immense. The
Independent Living Movement that Kittay derisively speaks of in the past tense is neither
past nor some delusion. The author, for one, venerates the courage and fortitude of the
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early activists who redefined the landscape and made possible many aspects of his life
that are dignified and powerful.
To those who would challenge the use of the word independent by those who
purchase their independence with public monies, the author acknowledges that if
independence equates with self-reliance, people who utilize public programs, such as
Medicaid are not demonstrating full independence. But, under justice as fairness, the
monies used by a society are not the property of Joe or Jane; they are the property of the
commons, equally available to whoever requires them to maintain a position of equal
liberty. These monies are not “given” to those who need care by the rest of society, they
are the equal property of all, available for use when the exercise of equal liberty requires
them.
Traditionally, social contractors have been expected to perform duties requiring
rational contribution and often contribution in an economic sense. In justice as fairness,
people with cognitive impairment and even all those with extraordinary needs, which
require high economic expenditure, are excluded from the original position, on the
grounds that they stand outside a rubric of mutual advantage. If, however, society
accepts the notion that people who cannot make a rational and economic contribution,
contribute in other meaningful and even essential ways, notions of the singular value of
rationality and the income generation it affords, as a ticket to entitlement, rights, or the
benefits of the social contract, cannot stand.
Kittay further asserts that the aforementioned independence of the employer with
severe impairment comes at the price of the “invisibility” of the personal assistant. She
asserts that the illusion of independence depends on the sacrifice of the careworker’s own
33

authentic self. She describes the careworker as only an instrument of the will of the
employer.34 Kittay refers to a former personal care assistant, now a professor of
sociology at Rider University, Lynn May Rivas, who writes about the relationship
between people with impairment and their personal care assistants. Rivas states:
…the transfer of authorship (inherent in being invisible) is
a negative phenomenon even for those who consciously
work to make it happen. To be made invisible is the first
step toward being considered nonhuman, which is why
making another person invisible often precedes treating
them inhumanely. To use Marxist terms, invisibility is the
most extreme form of alienation—the ultimate
manifestation of self-estrangement.35
The author does not see the job of personal care assistant as unique in its
requirement of subsuming some portion of one’s individual will in the fulfillment of
one’s job description. While he agrees that any employer benefits from drawing on the
good ideas and creative solutions that might flow from the employee, the employer,
particularly when it is her personal care in question, has the right to dictate job
parameters based on personal preferences. Living in a society necessitates subsuming
personal choice in certain situations, while allowing its full expression in others. The
employer’s expertise or tastes also dictate degrees of employee autonomy. The author
does not envision having an opinion on how a personal care assistant would organize
their workspace, while anticipating concerns if his personal care assistant insists on
saving his soul. Kittay’s daughter, Sesha, who, though she has severe cognitive
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impairment, has a strong preference for classical music, particularly Beethoven, per
Kittay, should not have to endure only country music simply because that is the
preference of her personal care assistant.
Does an individual’s desire to direct his or her life, to whatever degree possible,
translate into Kittay’s criticism that “invisibility” is a job requirement for his personal
care assistant? This author thinks not. A caregiver’s workday, like most people’s
workdays, mixes tasks and relational interface. If the author’s personal care assistant is
helping him get up in the morning, he does not expect silence, rather a conversation—
interesting to both parties. Does he also expect the assistant to be on time so that he can
empty his bladder before he is in pain, to dress him in the clothes he desires, or to prepare
a breakfast of his choosing? Absolutely!
Would people with impairment, as Kittay charges, prefer assistants to be robots?
If the author could compensate for his inability to walk or inefficient fine motor skills
with robotics, he would be delighted to do so. If Kittay judges his perspective as
evidence that he would require an employee to be an automaton, the author is nonplussed
and sees no connection whatsoever. To conflate an interest in robotic assistance with an
expectation that a human should act robotically is illogical. To judge a desire for
independence, whether that independence reflects effective functioning or control of care,
because such a choice must evidence a desire to submerge another’s essence is unfair. If
Kittay judges a desire for independence as uncooperative to the Acknowledgement of
Dependency Project, be assured that the author is clear that he needs help to function. He
nonetheless thinks of the relationship with his personal care assistant not as one of
dependency and inequality, rather as one of interdependency (he needs a service, they
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need a job) and equality, where his ability to pay for care and his caregivers’ ability to do
a good job of facilitating his independence result in an agreement between equals. The
author feels that living with functional limitations must be a prerequisite for judging
whether dependency and autonomy are incompatible. He believes that those with
permanent impairment have a unique perspective on this subject, and that it is possible to
treat an employee as an authentic other without losing one’s own expression of
independence.
If the reader will allow a transition from academic language to the vernacular of
storytelling, the author offers a brief story by Mike Ervin, disability rights activist,
prominent playwright, and contributor to New Mobility magazine. It should put to rest
any concerns that personal care assistants, even those whose employers are fervent
independent living advocates, are, by necessity, in danger of losing their authenticity:
We’re riding in an Amtrak sleeper car. I’m eating crab
cakes and drinking cognac. Chris, my attendant, eats prime
rib. And it’s all free because Amtrak screwed up big and I
bitched up a storm.
We were trying to get to a wedding and the once-a-day
train from Chicago to Indianapolis was cancelled and all
passengers were transported to Indy on buses. Of course
the buses were not accessible, so Chris and I were the only
ones left behind.
I bitched until I practically frothed. The best solution from
the Amtrak woman: put us on the soon departing City of
New Orleans…
The cornfields roll by and Chris says, ‘Remember that first
time we took Amtrak?’ We have traveled a lot of places
since I hired Chris in 2000. He holds the record for most
consecutive years of hauling my ass out of bed and wiping
my butt. We’ve traveled around the United States, to
Canada and Germany.
36

‘Remember?’ Chris says. ‘I just started working for you.
You wanted me to moon Bush.’
Now I remember! It all rushes back—the passing trains,
the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity, the tidal wave of
regret…
Late summer, 2000. Chris and I are returning to Chicago
from St. Louis. Out amidst the farmland, the train slows to
a halt. An announcement says we’re stopped to allow
another train to pass.
But the delay drags on. There’s a buzz among the
passengers: It’s that damn Bush and Cheney. Of course! It
was on the radio that morning. Bush/Cheney whistle-stop
tour coming to Springfield.
That means, I say to my suddenly wound-up self, that any
minute their train will shoot right past our window. I’m
overcome by a subversive urge. I blurt out to Chris, ‘When
Bush goes by, moon him!’
Chris looks at me with a combination of fear, pity,
amusement, and even a little admiration. And there it is, a
19th-century train, Abe Lincoln funeral style. In 10
seconds, it’s gone. Chris doesn’t move.
And Bush and Cheney pass into and out of my life,
unmooned….36
Relationships between employer and personal care assistant might be as varied in
character as relationships between any two human beings. It seems impossible, however,
to imagine any two people who interface on such intimate terms maintaining a
completely impersonal, robotic relationship. The author offers another Ervin
masterpiece: The columnist opens his article with a quote that epitomizes how many in
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society construe the need for assistance inherent in situations of severe impairment and
then offers his perspective:
Pain is not the main reason we want to die. It’s the
indignity. It’s the inability to get out of bed or get onto the
toilet, let alone drive a car or go shopping without
another’s help…Every client I’ve talked to…they’ve had
enough when they can’t go to the bathroom by themselves.
Most of them say ‘I can’t stand my mother—my husband—
wiping my butt.’ People have their pride.
--Janet Good, Founder,
Michigan Hemlock Society
Ervin responds:
With apologies to whoever wrote the biblical Beatitudes,
I’d like to offer a friendly amendment: Blessed are the
butt-wipers.
Having said that, let me now attempt to break the silence on
a topic that has been taboo for far too long. I can’t wipe
my own butt. There! I said it! And furthermore, I haven’t
been able to wipe my own butt for 20-some-odd years
now. And every day over all those years I’ve always
figured out a way to get it done. Some would be surprised
to know that I still manage to lead a pretty fun life…
In fact there is often a very special kinship between wiper
and wipee. It can be quite spiritual. It’s hard to describe.
But for those of you who haven’t experienced it, there’s an
experiment you can conduct that simulates the feeling.
First make a list of the close friends and family in your
life. Now make a list of the close friends and family in
your life you could call upon if you suddenly needed to
have your butt wiped (the same applies for bowel
programs). The second list sure is shorter than the first,
isn’t it? It is with those folks on the second list that you
share something deeper. The longer the list, the richer you
are.
I have a friend like that. Her name is Carolyn. We’ve been
buddies for a long, long time. And one of my fondest
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memories of her was the time I drove my wheelchair
through some doggie refuse. It got all in the ridges of my
tires and she had to scrub and scrape and scrub and scrape.
At one point she interrupted my repeated apologies by
saying, ‘Hey, shit is a part of life.’
That’s what I mean. That’s the kinship. I almost proposed
to her then and there. Carolyn is definitely on my list of
people I could call in the event of a butt-wiping emergency,
and I hope I have earned a place on hers…37
The author fails to see any compelling argument in the concern for the visibility
of his personal care assistants that would justify any diminution of his autonomy. There
are despotic employers in all work arenas and there are those who acknowledge the
humanity, talents, and needs of their employees. This is not a unique artifact of work as a
personal care assistant and therefore not a reason to wholly redefine the foundations of
ethical theory.
In another instance of particularizing, with which the author disagrees, Kittay
criticizes the liberal tradition for universalizing moral duty. The author assumes she is
challenging the categorical imperative and its fellow notions of moral reciprocity,
including Rawls’s insistence on reasonableness as a moral power derived from utilization
of the veil. She states:
Just as the selves of dependency relationships are not the
selves of contracting parties, neither can ties between a
dependency worker and her charge be represented as
contractual relations. Ties of affection and concern bind
the dependency worker and her charge. The ties are not
between generalizable others, but between non-fungible,
concrete others. The relations and moral obligations
between the parties are not the general obligations we bear
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to another person, whoever they may be, but special
relations.38
The author wonders why any particular relations would require a departure from
one’s standard application of duty. Whether one’s relational partner is unable to
reciprocate seems irrelevant to one’s own behavior. If one establishes a relational code
toward others, based on how one would like to be treated, it would most likely include
interaction based on respect, consideration, kindness, patience, and, very importantly,
without condescension. What qualities does a person with a severe cognitive impairment
possess that demand a deviation from that general code? The golden rule states, “Do
unto others as you would have others do unto you.” It does not say, “Do unto Joe as you
would have Joe do unto you.” The author likes the Hillelian version of the notion best for
describing his perspective. Rabbi Hillel says, “That which is hateful to you, do not do to
your fellow.”39 This perspective requires only that one knows her own desires in order to
demonstrate moral treatment toward others. It does not suggest that if one’s relational
partner cannot reciprocate, one need not heed the directive. If the ethic of reciprocity
changed depending on whom one was interacting with, one could not behave morally
with others until one intimately knew each one’s likes and dislikes. It would be
impossible to interface appropriately with any but one’s most intimate fellows. Is it ever
moral to judge another’s ability to understand or act consciously? The author thinks not
and is most comfortable with suspending assumptions and basing his behavior on the
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possibility that he and the other have more in common than they do not. Even if the other
is severely cognitively impaired, behavior based on an assumption of inequality contains
the potential for causing harm, if not to the person with impairment, then to that person’s
loved ones who experience pain when others fail to demonstrate respect for the value of
their friend or family member.
Care theory acknowledges extra-economic value in the social bonding generated
by the dependent relationship, but does not sufficiently emphasize the contribution of the
individual with impairment. Though Kittay finds value in the creation of connections
fostered by dependent relationships, she stresses the contribution of the caregiver and
caring in general. She is concerned with society’s responsibilities to the caregiver,
especially where a cared-for individual is so impaired as to, in her estimation, render
reciprocation impossible.40 She becomes more concerned for the careworker the more
the relationship “diverges from relations among equals.”41 The thrust of her argument
focuses on the relative diminution of reciprocity available from the cared-for individual
as his or her intelligence decreases. Kittay seems to value people like her daughter,
Sesha, not for the contribution they make to society, but solely because they are a part of
the human family—part of the dependency cooperative. The author fails to understand
this position, especially in Kittay’s case, as she describes many instances of beneficial
interaction with her daughter and believes that even those with little ability to reason
often empathize with their caregivers and loved ones.42 She describes her daughter:
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…Sesha's loveliness is not (only) skin deep. How to speak
of it? The capacity for joy. The babbling-brook laughter at
a musical joke. The starry eyed faraway look as she listens
to Elvis crooning "Love Me Tender," the excitement of her
entire soul as the voices blare out "Alle Menschen werden
Bruder" in the choral ode of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony,
and the pleasure of bestowing her kisses and receiving the
caresses in turn. All variations and gradations of joy.
Spinoza characterized joy as the increase in our power of
self preservation and by that standard, Sesha's is a very
well-preserved self. Yet she is so limited. She cannot
speak. She cannot even say ‘Mama’—though sometimes
we think she says ‘Aylu’ (our translation, ‘I love you’).43
Kittay clearly includes relational properties as qualification for personhood and
attributes such properties to people with severe cognitive impairment, while ignoring that
these relational abilities constitute contribution. The author insists that individuals with
severe cognitive impairment positively affect those in direct relationship with them, while
also often having a wider impact. Kittay’s scholarship has clearly integrated her
experience with Sesha into her academic worldview. The relationship has informed her
thinking and no doubt enriched the pool of experience through which she is attracted to
and works on philosophical problems. Kittay’s work carries this enrichment to many
others.
The author feels withered by Kittay’s focus on Sesha’s deficits. He worries that
all of Sesha’s vibrancy is made pale in comparison to her dependence. If dependence is
accepted as the defining descriptor of what it is to be human, as care theorists would
prefer, the author fears that autonomy, and the self-respect it engenders, will cease to be
considered as a worthy goal. The author knows that each and every person is to some
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degree dependent every day of their lives and during some episodes, profoundly so, but,
in the case of people with severe impairment, just as in the case of those without,
autonomy must be pursued. Furthermore, he is hesitant to assume the inevitability of
uninterrupted dependence for people born with severe impairment, when there is
evidence that underestimation of ability leaves many unschooled in self-determining
skills. Henry McCarthy, PhD, professor of rehabilitation counseling at Louisiana State
University, writes about the dangers of underestimating the potential of people with
severe intellectual impairment that inevitably lead to failure in the workplace and a
subsequent lack of autonomy:
Our potential for employment is seeded and nurtured from
early childhood experiences that seem merely to be the
pragmatic requirements of immediate situations, but which
cumulatively teach us to follow instructions, accept
feedback, cooperate with peers, and stick to a task. Such
early work socialization begins the development of two
ingredients essential for eventual employment: generic
work skills and self-concept as a capable person. As
previously noted, these are in large measure shaped by the
environments, expectations, and experiences to which we
are exposed by family, teachers, and friends.
Unfortunately, many youths with disabilities have been
controlled by agents of socialization whose well-meaning
but defeating psychological influence stunted the
development of their work skills and self-concepts.44
Despite these impediments, many individuals, often with
the help of others in the disability community, have grown
beyond their early, formative, restricted self-concepts to
demonstrate the power of self-advocacy. Philosopher
Bernard Williams states, ‘Oppressed human groups come
of age in the search for emancipation when they speak for
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themselves, and no longer through reforming members of
the oppressive group…’45
The disability rights movement has sought to change a public mindset, which
produced isolation and poor self-concept into one that fosters inclusion and maximization
of autonomy. This has involved reformers within the non-impaired community as well as
people with impairment themselves. One such reformer is William Bronston, M.D., who
worked as a physician at Willowbrook State School, situated on Staten Island, New York,
beginning in 1970. Bronston determined to bring down the system, which he considered
to be a perpetrator of “crimes against humanity.”46 Robert F. Kennedy described the
Willowbrook wards as, “less comfortable and cheerful than the cages in which we put
animals in a zoo.”47 Bronston describes Willowbrook:
A resident at Willowbrook was statistically more likely to
be assaulted, raped, or murdered than in any other
neighborhood in New York City… I had never seen
anything like it. I just stood there and tears welled up in
me. I’d never seen such squalor. The wards were all
concrete, with no furniture, nothing to soften the sound.
There was a day room in each ward that was a big terrazzofloored place with these wooden chairs and benches that
were too heavy to lift. There were also some fiberglass
chairs but those would constantly fly, people would throw
them around. It was absolutely like something out of
Dante’s Inferno. These were wretched ‘shades’ in every
form of disrepair, misery, withdrawal.
At first you don’t get the full magnitude of it. It takes you
day after day to fathom this hell. No programming going
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on, the most token schooling happening, no support of
continuity for the schooling. The minute the kid reaches
beyond school age, they go deeper into the institution. No
school, no future, no exit. They’ve got to die to get out…
The place was rampant with tropical diseases, some of
which had been instilled purposely for study purposes, like
inoculating kids with Hepatitis A in order to study how to
develop a hepatitis vaccine. They also had every kind of
intestinal parasite that you only see in the center of
Africa…
The place smells like excrement all the time. Or this
incredible sickening odor of Pine-Sol disinfectant, which
comes in industrial cans of twenty, thirty, fifty gallons. It’s
mopped out on the floor by the inmates because there aren’t
enough staff to clean the place.
The place operates just a cellophane’s width above absolute
chaos. Shrieking, physical outbursts, people struggling
against the imposition of the tranquilizing drugs that are
car-loaded into them. Any excess movement, any
resistance, any human anything is immediately met with a
two hundred or three hundred milligram shot of Thorazine
to knock them out.
The only heat in the place comes from radiators that are
built into the walls with metal sheets in front of them.
People get their drugs, which they are forced to take…Then
they …drag themselves over to the radiators, and fall asleep
in heaps against and in front of them. So they’re laying on
the floor, which has this veneer of caustic, chemical
disinfectant that’s not being cut or diluted, this thick,
gummy, slimy film, and it eats away at the residents’ skin,
so that they have these huge swaths of terrible rashes and
psoriatic-kinds of crusts on them. They have burns on
them because they fall asleep against the radiator, because
they are drugged out…
I had a situation where I had a number of people with
extremity amputations in their thirties. What was
happening…was that these people were developing these
incredible fungal infections from the athlete’s foot that was
just on the floor everywhere, coupled with the erosion of
their skin from the caustic detergents used on the
45

floors…They would develop cellulitis of their feet and legs
and then superficial vein thrombosis and then deep vein
thrombosis, until the leg was destroyed within a decade
from being in these buildings.
They had a disease that they called ‘Mongoloid
Dermatitis,’ which was supposed to be some kind of
strange skin disease associated with Down syndrome. This
stuff would cause this heaped-up, intertriginous rash, like
the spaces in between your fingers and on your chest and
legs and shoulders, these scaly, terrible, psoriatic kind of
crusts and rashes…Thousands of people in Willowbrook
had been treated improperly for years by professional
dermatological specialists who never made the diagnosis
that the problem was environmental infestation with skin
mites…
…What I did find out, little by little, was that there was a
whole economic, big money aspect to what the hell was
going on. That the institution at Willowbrook, that
institutions in general, were major economic centers that
hired thousands of people, purchased millions of dollars’
worth of stuff, paid very handsome salaries to the
concentration camp managers. That these were all
‘professionals’ who had to be properly ideologized in order
to be complicit with this scheme and believe that they were
doing ‘good,’ to operate in compliance with policies of
deprivation and reduction of resources…There was just
wretchedness. Wretchedness and suffering and insanity
and inhumanity. Short of Dachau, or a concentration camp
in Germany where they were actually burning people every
day—they didn’t have to burn people here. They needed to
keep them alive because they needed to make money off
them. 48
Bronston and other courageous reformers ultimately did cause the disintegration
of the institutional system by leaking information to journalists and inviting them on
unsanctioned tours of the abysmal facilities. The journalists, in turn, unveiled the
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conditions to the outer public. Parents and parent groups, who had been encouraged to
disengage from their children, to leave them in institutional hands and resume their lives
and who, therefore, had been unaware of the conditions under which their children had
been kept, joined the project. The breakdown of accepted, established and profitable
institutions required massive advocacy, but by the middle of the 1970s, institutions were
giving way to community living projects. Former residents of institutions were moved
into group and foster homes and while the exodus marked the end of an intolerable past,
it was not without traumatic aspects.
Another reformer, Dennis Heath, a trained minister and social worker worked
within Fairview Training Center, an institution in Salem, Oregon, in the early 1970s.
When the residents began to move into the community, he became a field-worker, who
established outreach to observe and assist with the transition process. Heath initiated
group meetings for the former residents. In the institutions Heath remembers the
residents who were ready to go into the community still asking the staff for guidance on
every tiny aspect of their activities. Once they moved out of the institutions, Heath
invited them to group meetings to work out the problems they were encountering in
integrating into society. His goal was to “help them learn how to be more powerful in
and of themselves. They could run the group, they could choose what they wanted to talk
about, and they could ask each other for opinions.”49 Heath was invited to facilitate the
participation of several of the group members in a convention hosted by the ARC. It was
to be run by the “retarded” themselves. Heath describes the conference:
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…during the two-day event, not one identified person, not
one—as they called them in those days ‘mentally retarded
person’—said anything. The teachers, parents, the ARC
members, they did all the talking and the ‘mentally
retarded’ people sat and rocked and looked at each other.
…we broke out into little clusters, into little groups that
talked…And I asked, ‘How come none of you have gotten
up and said anything?...I read the brochure and it said
people from group homes, and wherever you were from,
were going to run this convention.’ And this one guy
laughed and he said, ‘Well, you can see how much we’re
running it.’ And since it was billed as from the Association
for Retarded Citizens, I said, ‘What do you all think of the
name ‘retarded’?’ And there was like a unison of people
who said, ‘We hate that name! We hate that!’ And I said,
‘Have you ever told anybody? Have you ever said
anything?’
…when the session was over the people went out into the
general meeting. And a teacher said, ‘Well, I’ll
summarize’ what happened in our little group, and I said,
‘Why don’t we let this gentleman here, who’s got some
strong feelings, summarize?’…And he said, ‘You know,
we were kind of wondering in our group why none of us
have said anything yet.’ And then he said, ‘We also said
that we don’t like the word ‘retarded,’ and we think the
Association for Retarded Citizens should change its name.’
Oooh, did that ever—they really got pissed at me then.
This guy that was the head of Bevin Lodge on Vancouver
Island, he said that he didn’t appreciate me stirring things
up. And I said, ‘Oh, I didn’t realize that that’s called
‘stirring things up,’ getting the people involved in their own
lives, and speaking for themselves. I didn’t realize that that
was such a problem.’50
When they returned to Salem, the people living in the community, as well as some
people from the institution, began meeting in earnest. The core group grew and evolved
into a completely self-run entity and one night everyone voted to try another convention.
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The group planned everything without Heath’s advice and ran into the predictable
problems inherent in producing such a large meeting. They decided that no helper would
ever attend a People First convention. Though it took many months, the planners worked
through the issues, problem solving the logistics of venue, meals, sleeping, and
economics. Eventually, the first People First convention hosted about five hundred
participants and was covered by the local media.
After the convention, they received inquiries from all over the United States, as
well as Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, Germany, India, China, and Russia. They
published a small instruction manual for starting a self-governing group, for establishing
an autonomous, self-advocacy center. People First groups now meet around the world.
Individuals with intellectual impairment often ask People First members, instead of
parents or other family members, to act as advocates in disputes with professionals. Selfdetermination is being achieved through the collective problem-solving abilities of the
group, a concept affirmed by Rawls in his discussion of the benefits of social unions.
According to Rawls, an individual’s attributes are never as enriching as the community’s
experience, ideas, and support. Collaboration is the prime motivator in the formation of
society and the prime benefit of affinity groups like People First.
Nancy Ward, a self-advocate with People First, when asked to describe what
factors most influence her quality of life in the community, states:
Becoming a self-advocate and seeing myself as a person.
Because in seeing myself as a person that started me to start
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questioning things that were going on in my life and to
develop a better life for myself…51
This self-sense of ability was difficult to achieve because Ward’s parents, fueled by fear
of any risk, resisted her independence. Ward states
…when I became an adult, of course the natural thing to
want to do was to move away from home so this is what I
wanted to do, but my parents wouldn’t let me move away
until I was 25, and then I had to move into the system…I
couldn’t understand why my parents were telling me I
needed to be in this kind of structured setting…52
Ward worked in a sheltered workshop during the period she lived in the large
group home mentioned above. Her supervisor became ill and Ward would take over her
supervisory duties when doctor appointments required her absence. When the supervisor
finally had to quit her job, Ward was encouraged by people within her workshop to apply
for the supervisory position. She says, “…but no matter how hard people tried to do that,
they couldn’t convince me, because even though I was doing it, I didn’t see that, because
of how people in the sheltered workshop are treated.”53 Finally, she was convinced to
apply, but upon arriving at the employment office, she was prohibited from filling out an
application. To the administrators, it was inconceivable that a sheltered workshop
employee could possibly become a supervisor.
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When a new supervisor was hired a few weeks later, Ward was required to train
her. She says, “Well, that really pissed me off, so I quit and went and got my own job.”54
She was hired by the social service system in Nebraska, called the Service Advisory
Committee. At that time, efforts were underway to teach self-advocacy skills to the
clients. Ward says, “…it’s hard to have the person you see as your boss teaching you
how to advocate for yourself, because of course you’re not going to talk back. And so
that’s why they thought that it would be a good idea to hire me.”55 Ward was to teach
clients how to advocate ultimately for the closure of the sheltered workshop system. She
laughs, “I loved having that kind of power.”56
In another instance of self-reporting, Connie Martinez from People First Capitol
Group, states, “I’d like to say a few things about the quality of life of people like me. We
can have—and now I do have—a good quality of life, but we still have to fight for it. We
have to take back control of our lives from the KEEPERS, from the professionals.”57 She
continues:
When I was little, the doctor told my parents that I would
never be able to take care of myself and that they could put
me away…even to this day, my mother doesn’t believe that
I have control of my life…I’ll always be ‘pobrecita Connie’
to her. She’ll always pity me and always be angry at me
because she still believes the doctor even when she sees
different.
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My parents didn’t put me away, and finally I’m taking back
my life, after losing years of it to the wrong information.
But I wonder how many people are under lock and key
because that doctor thought he could play God?
My parents always had a dream for my brothers and sister
for when they grew up, but nobody ever had a dream for
me, so I never had a dream for myself. You can never have
a good life if nobody ever has a dream for you unless you
learn to have a dream for yourself. That’s what I had to do,
and now I have a dream for myself: a little casa, a garden
with flowers and peppers and tomatoes, a loved one to
share my life with—and more. Even if I don’t get all those
things, I know I’m alive now.58
Many people with cognitive impairment are not supported in developing a notion
of desired ends and thus are robbed of the seed, which blooms into a sense of self for
typical children. All but the virtually vegetative need a dream and withholding this
psychological nutrition constitutes an immoral act just as surely as withholding food and
water. Dreams are not withheld by hateful people, rather by parents and educators who
have absorbed the deeply held, societal belief that dreams, particularly dreams on the
edge of possibility, lead to disappointment as risk leads to danger. This notion is true, but
dreams and risk also lead to growth and freedom and must be instilled in each and every
child so that a maximization of autonomy can occur.
Recalling an instance of initially frustrated self-determination, which, when
handled appropriately, became a door to self-knowledge and freedom, Martinez says:
I went home (from school) and told my mom, ‘Mom, there
is going to be a high school trip to the ocean. I have never
been there before and I want to go…I want to be with
people, and with nature.’ And my mother said, ‘No, you’re
going to get lost. You’re not going out by yourself. We’d
be too concerned and worried.’ …The doorbell rang and
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my mother answered. It was the teacher. She had flowers
and a card from the other students and a list of names of
people who wanted me to be able to go on the trip. She
told my mother she wanted me to come on the trip. She
said she would take responsibility for me. At first, my
mother said, ‘No, no.’ And then the teacher came back
again, and she convinced my mom to let me go…My
mother took me shopping to get new clothes for the trip.
The day (of the trip) I got up early. I would never get up
early, but I did this time. My mom fixed my lunch and she
and my father took me to the school and watched me get on
the bus. They called my name on the bus. I figured the
teacher was going to babysit me like they always did at
church and wherever else I went; but it was better than not
to go to the trip. Even as they watched over this little
retarded girl, I would be happy. So half of me was happy,
half was not.
And then we started to get near and I saw gorgeous things
I’d never seen before in my life—mountains and big trees
and everything green, green, green. And the sky was so
blue! I just enjoyed it all and my heart was beating fast.
And we finally got there. And the door to the bus opened
and the teacher said, ‘Connie, the door is opened. Go enjoy
yourself and be with your friends.’ I thought she was going
to watch over me and instead she said go out there. So I
jumped into the sand and ran in the sand and just felt good.
I took off my shoes. I forgot my lunch.
Did you ever see a bird in the cage? I was that bird. That
teacher opened the door to the cage and I flew—it was the
first time I was free…And when I came home to
Sacramento I wasn’t the same anymore…I had changed.
There was something inside me hungry to be free.
I couldn’t accept that my mom would watch over me, that
they were going to watch over me, that they know best for
me. I couldn’t accept that any more. I tried to fight it, but
it was too strong, and it got stronger and stronger. I’m not
saying that my mom didn’t love me, but I couldn’t live the
negative. I knew I had to be on my own, to fall down on
my face if I had to (and I have, plenty, and yes, I’ve been
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hurt), but I knew I would get up and start over again. And
I’ve done that.59
The author does acknowledge that all will at some time lack autonomy and that
some will never be self-determining, but insists that such an assumption has no place at
the foundation of a theory, halting, as it does, possibility in its tracks. Furthermore,
education can minimize the risks inherent in dependence. David Goode, professor of
sociology and anthropology at City University of New York, acknowledges the
importance of risk taking in the education of people with cognitive impairment. He says,
“Most educators agree that risktaking is crucial in the educational process. Special
education curricula should actively and systematically address independence and
integration as goals.”60
Robert Edgerton, professor emeritus of anthropology at the University of
California at Los Angeles addresses the issue of risk taking as well:
When I describe the lives of some of the mentally retarded
people we have studied for almost 30 years to audiences of
nonretarded people, the reaction is often one of horror or
revulsion and demands that I as a ‘responsible scientist’
take action to remove these people from their deplorable
life circumstances. When I protest that I have no such right
and that the people involved are quite satisfied with their
lives—and themselves—the reaction is typically one of
frank disbelief.
One of these mentally retarded people whose quality of life
worries others is a 58 year-old man with an IQ of 54. He
lives in a single room occupancy hotel in a rundown and
crime-ridden part of downtown Los Angeles. He has a
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dangerous yet personally rewarding job as the night
manager of a laundromat frequented by homeless people,
prostitutes, and drug dealers. His sexual partners are drugusing prostitutes, one of whom recently contracted AIDS.
There is no doubt that this man works very hard for the
money he makes, that he is frequently in physical danger,
and that his repeated exposure to AIDS could be life
threatening. Yet he lives in a network of friends and
acquaintances who value his friendship and help, and who
do not know or care that he can neither read nor write. To
many people he is loved and respected. He is as satisfied
with the quality of his life as anyone I know.61
Degrees of dependence exist along a continuum, so most can achieve some level
of autonomy, even if that autonomy is unconventional. Acknowledgement of this fact,
rather than an immediate negation of this possibility, will allow deeper examination
during which, in addition to education and its potential for autonomy generation, theory
might find other avenues leading to participation, contribution, and representation.
Furthermore, determinations of inability must be deferred until appropriate educational
opportunities are available to all children with impairment and, even at that point, might
be inappropriate. And most importantly, regardless of a person’s position on the
continuum of autonomy—regardless the degree or manner of his contribution—theory
must assure the availability of rights. Whether those rights are claimed by an individual,
a surrogate, or as a class action, the author feels most secure with a rights-based system.
People with severe impairment, with their social history of mistreatment must have
nothing less.
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Care theory, as well as an offering of Anita Silvers and Leslie Pickering Francis
referred to as justice through trust, with their marginalization of rights, depend—
dangerously, the author believes—on people acting kindly and responsibly in interactions
with people with severe cognitive impairment. Because Silvers and Francis assume that
people with severe impairment are incapable of reciprocity and therefore “outliers”
within the realm of the social contract, they, in investigating ways that all might
participate in contracting, imagine a unique contribution to the act of contracting itself.
Rather than seeing contracting as necessarily adversarial, they focus on the benefits
inherent in contracting parties operating from a position of mutual trust, rather than fear
and expectations of selfishness. If a history of trust can be established, with each
successful leap of faith manifesting in a positive outcome and therefore a progressive
deepening of trust, enforcement of the contract will be less costly and society will
become progressively better off. Trust can also act as a lubricant for future agreement
and the workings of society will progress with less friction. If people with severe
cognitive impairment can trust that their wellbeing will be assured, contracting can
commence within that dynamic, rather than the atmosphere of bargaining, to which they
cannot be a party. Silvers and Francis say:
Unlike bargaining, trusting is a human interaction that
neither requires sophisticated ratiocination, nor relies on
others’ material contributions, to compel constancy. Small
children can sense the consequences of being inconstant,
unreliable, or dishonest—that is, of being untrustworthy—
well enough to be deterred by them. So can most people
with reduced cognitive capacities. Trusting is essential to
contracting but, unlike bargaining, is accessible to almost
everyone, whether disabled or nondisabled. Even the most
vulnerable individuals may be parties to trust. The
trustworthiness of their social and political situations will
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affect whether trusting is easy for them or is, instead,
terrifyingly difficult in virtue of their vulnerability.62
The author finds himself longing for a world where society would merit the trust
of people with severe cognitive impairment and their allies. To require blind trust, as a
condition of participation, from such a vulnerable and historically neglected and abused
population, is asking for the suspension of innate human internal guidance. Instinctive
caution is a basic survival tool and therefore only once the powerful have established a
strong history of reliability might they be trusted, and never, the author believes, should
trust be required as a precondition of participation or a sole measurement of value.
Silvers and Francis believe that their system will encourage the powerful to act
honorably. They state that if a potential bargaining partner observes another person
acting in a trustworthy way toward a much more vulnerable individual, that observer will
be more inclined to trust in the other’s faithfulness and honor when making their own
agreements with him. Thus, the powerful have a strong inducement to be trustworthy in
their dealings with people with severe cognitive impairment who are “unable to proffer
material incentives or impose penalties.”63
While this idea has merit in certain circumstances, the fact that its success
depends on voluntary behavior is problematic. The author’s observations of some of the
powerful in society lead him to believe that their opinion of an individual acting
honorably in dealings with a vulnerable other might just as well describe a fool. The
author, again, is further concerned that a theorist—Silvers—who herself is physically
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impaired, would be unable to see other ways in which people with severe cognitive
impairment contribute to society without the need of stripping individuals and their allies
of caution and often well-placed skepticism. In fact, he is entirely dismayed. Silvers and
Francis continue:
…the mutual deference elicited by the dynamic of trusting
and being trusted should induce contractors to deal
respectfully rather than paternalistically with whoever
becomes dependent, for however short or long a time.
Indeed, a principle calling for the most capable to give, or
give over, to the least capable and describing the
circumstances thereof well might be called for to nourish a
climate of trust by strengthening fairness and extending
justice to everyone.64
One problem here, as the author sees it, is that Silvers and Francis are imposing a
substantive rule that the powerful alone among the contractors must observe in order for
the construct to be successful. The system must be gamed to function justly. This is not
a universal requirement. Rawls, on the other hand, rather than impose, expects that the
principles of justice will be a likely outcome of operating under a veil of ignorance. The
veil is a procedural constraint, applicable to all (including those with impairment in the
author’s revised model) as a moral imperative leading to a just outcome. Additionally,
people with severe cognitive impairment can do nothing but be deferential, while the
deference of the other is voluntary, or worse, charitable, and can be withdrawn without
redress. The delivery of essential goods cannot be capricious and for this reason, the
neglect of a rights-based approach is dangerous.
Even well meaning individuals, in a rights-deficient atmosphere, may pose a
threat to vulnerable populations. People, even those with benign intentions, may have
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erroneous ideas about life with severe impairment and may infuse interaction with pity
and patriarchal behavior rather than empowerment. This is the legacy of isolation. Even
an endowed chair at Princeton University, who has directed his abundant intellect
towards the elimination of cruelty to animals, poses a threat to people with severe
impairment, due to profound misunderstandings.

Peter Singer Knows I Suffer
I’m going to tell my kids a bedtime story
A play without a plot
Will it have a happy ending?
Maybe yeah, maybe not
I tell them life is what you make of it
So beautiful or so what—Paul Simon, So Beautiful or So
What
In Practical Ethics, Singer says of a child born with spina bifida, the author’s
impairment:
When the life of an infant will be so miserable as not to be
worth living, from the internal perspective of the being who
will lead that life, both the ‘prior existence’ and the ‘total’
version of utilitarianism suggest that, if there are no
‘extrinsic’ reasons for keeping the infant alive—like the
feelings of the parents—it is better that the child should be
helped to die without further suffering.65
Singer’s position persists, whether the impairment is physical, cognitive, or combined in
nature. He justifies the use of euthanasia, as a solution to the problem of “suffering,” by
the fact that a newborn does not have preferences as to his or her long-term ends, and his

65

Peter Singer, Writings on an Ethical Life (New York, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), 188.

59

or her euthanizing is non-voluntary rather than involuntary. Following this premise, he
also finds acceptable the euthanizing of anyone, even an adult, whom he determines to be
suffering, who is also unable to conceive of his or her own ends, and if once rational,
never expressed preferences.66
Singer’s reliance on the lack of self-awareness in a newborn, as to his or her
future circumstances and preferences, to morally excuse euthanasia, in conjunction with
his unwillingness to see beyond his own ableist notion of the inevitable suffering of those
with severe impairment, renders his argument specious. Though many adults with severe
impairment have offered their personally experienced perspectives, which challenge his
assumption of suffering, Singer’s position continues to fail to consider the many variables
within lives lived with impairment, focusing, instead, exclusively on pain. All lives
contain pain, but when considered holistically are also filled with pleasure and certainly
worth living. Harriet McBryde Johnson, whom Singer invited to Princeton University, as
a member of the disability community, to represent opposition to his position, reveals a
discussion that took place, which demonstrates Singer’s thought-path in her book Too
Late to Die Young. She asks why Singer singles out infants with impairment for death.
Singer offers that both biological and adoptive parents prefer healthy babies. Johnson
counters with the fact that adoptive parents also statistically fail to embrace mixed-race
babies. “Wouldn’t a law allowing the killing of these undervalued babies validate race
prejudice?” Johnson asks. Singer agrees that that would be an unacceptable outcome.
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Johnson continues, “What’s the difference? Preferences based on race are unreasonable.
Preferences based on ability are not. Why?” Singer’s answer speaks to a dangerous
misunderstanding about people with impairment. The reason Singer singles out babies
with severe impairment is that they are intrinsically “worse off.”67 He makes pernicious
assumptions here, which are patriarchal in their imposition of perspective and simply
wrong. Johnson states, “…I have trouble with basing life-and-death decisions on market
considerations when the market is structured by prejudice.”68 The author would like to
offer what he believes is an interpretation of Johnson’s language. Parental preference
based on the difficulties a child with severe impairment might be expected to encounter
cannot be seriously considered until the concept of “being a burden” ceases to exist. If
infanticide is on the table, the pressure to eliminate a future “burden to society” will
become a socially coercive element in that parental decision.69
The author believes that the usefulness of a theory stems from the degree of truth
in its basic assumptions and for this reason, huge pieces of Singer’s offering suffer from
his unnecessarily faulty premises. Because his position threatens the disability
community, the author believes it requires analysis and rebuttal, despite the position of
many within the community that attention to Singer’s views risks legitimizing them. The
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author wishes to clarify that he in no way finds Singer’s views on infanticide legitimate;
in fact he finds them morally repugnant. They, unfortunately, do coincide with and
encourage many, less visible, but equally disturbing perspectives about lives lived with
impairment. The author fears that if Singer’s “reasoned debate” fails to receive
appropriate criticism, the many books, lectures, and articles offered by this popular
intellectual will solidify an already generally unspoken public mindset, which has
catastrophic social and political consequences.70
Singer states, “…My views in no way threaten anyone who is, or ever has been,
even minimally aware of the fact that he or she has a possible future life that could be
threatened.”71 Singer definitively states on many occasions that it is a kindness to assist
with the death of severely impaired babies because they cannot have meaningful
existences. This position encourages society in the belief that people are justified in
determining the quality of life for another as well as judging the potential of that life.
Unfortunately, policy, both social and medical, moves in an increasingly utilitarian
direction and the fact that Singer is involved in practical applications of his philosophical
positions, unquestionably makes his arguments dangerous. Furthermore, despite the fact
that utilitarian arguments are based in quality of life issues, the author questions whether
the driving force behind utilitarian decisions is truly concern for the quality of life
experienced by the person with impairment and not a concern for the quality of life,
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defined by the weight of the wallet, of the unimpaired members of society. The author is
in agreement with Rawls when he says:
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice
that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.
For this reason, justice denies that the loss of freedom for
some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It
does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are
outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by
many.72
Singer condemns various German academic institutions, disability rights groups,
and political activists who have sought to bar him from discussing euthanasia on German
soil. He is, at once, appalled both by what he considers a violation of his freedom of
speech and by what he refers to as a misconstruction of his ideas. He says:
…it is easy to imagine that the shadow of Nazism prevents
any rational discussion of anything that relates to
euthanasia. It avails little to point out that what the Nazis
call ‘euthanasia’ had nothing to do with compassion or
concern for those who were killed but was simply the
murder of people considered unworthy of living from the
racist viewpoint of the German Volk.73
In fact, in Nazi Germany, arguments surrounding the killing of people with impairment
were entwined with the idea of “mercy killings” in much the same way Singer constructs
his proposals. Like Singer’s arguments, German eugenics justifications are peppered
with quality of life references. In the first case of euthanasia of a baby with impairment,
in 1938, Gerhard Herbert Kretschmar’s father sought help from the Füehrer in
authorizing a “mercy killing” of his infant. Hitler ordered his personal physician, Karl
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Brandt, to verify the veracity of the father’s description of his child as blind, with missing
limbs, and with mental deficiencies, and if accurate to compel the physicians at the
University of Leipzig Hospital to euthanize the baby under Hitler’s orders.74 This
behavior continued under the supervision of the Reich Commission for the Scientific
Registration of Hereditary and Constitutional Severe Disorders. Registered children,
reported by their doctors, were moved to “children’s divisions” where “they were killed
either by barbiturate poisoning—Luminal or Phenobarbital was mixed into their food—or
by starvation. In both cases, it took many days for each child to die.”75 Prosecution of
complicit doctors was implicitly forbidden by Hitler and their immunity was guaranteed
by Brandt on Hitler’s orders.76 By the fall of 1939, the program was formally recognized
and named T-4 after the address of the Patient Transport Corporation, the conduit through
which the euthanasia and eventually Final Solution programs emanated. By this time,
adults with physical and intellectual impairment as well as those with mental illness
joined children as targets for elimination. In 1939, there were an estimated 300,000
“undesirables” housed in holding psychiatric hospitals and clinics. By the end of World
War II, less than 40,000 remained.77 The annihilation of people with impairment was
alternately termed “help for the dying,” “destruction of life devoid of value,” “killing the
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incurable,” and the more forthright abomination—“destruction of useless eaters.”78 Thus,
a failure to draw distinct delineations between Singer’s “compassionate” euthanasia and
the programmatic removal of the burdensome as a social good is completely rational in
the author’s view.
Singer does not draw a line at eliminating an individual’s suffering. He widens his
concern for quality of life to encompass parents and family. Decisions about life and
death are not the sole prerogative of the individual, whose life is in question. Parents
make decisions of life and death for their child in cases where the child is unable to state
a preference as to her continued existence. But on issues of life and death, which hinge
on organ transplants or expensive procedures, decisions are made by boards of doctors
and ethicists using criteria established by strangers, not by the individual patient or her
parents, and Singer approves of this as well. How far removed is that from German
doctors making determinations as to who will live and who will die, who is deserving of
life and who is not?
While the Nazi regime took judgment of human worth to singularly horrendous
conclusions, they were not the initiators. The long history of eugenic practices began
with British scholars, Sir Francis Galton (Charles Darwin’s cousin), and separately,
Herbert Spencer (originator of the term survival of the fittest) who, in the late nineteenth
century, took the work of Charles Darwin, and transformed the idea of natural selection
into a project for the “improvement” of the human race. Galton, along with colleagues in
the United States such as psychologists Alfred Binet and Lewis Terman, began the use of
intelligence testing to measure individual “fitness” and to create laws enforcing both
78
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sterilization and immigration restriction. By 1907, Indiana led the way by introducing a
mandatory sterilization law which was upheld by the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell. In
his majority opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may
call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be
strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the
strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt
to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being
swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world
if, instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind…Three generations of imbeciles are enough.79
Eventually thirty-three American states passed mandatory sterilization laws. By
the 1920s, it is little wonder German eugenicists looked to their colleagues in the United
States for inspiration and called American law one of the most advanced in the area of
eugenics.80 The publication of Die Freigabe der Vernichtung Lebensunwerten Lebens
(The Release and Destruction of Lives Devoid of Value) in 1920 by law professor Karl
Binding and Dr. Alfred Hoche began the transformation of the use of eugenics in
sterilization and its connection to intelligence testing into a movement of
“compassionate” killing.81 Peter Singer, who the author quotes in this work as stating
that people with reasoning ability are worth more than those without the ability to
reason—that unimpaired people are more worthy of medical treatment than those with
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impairment—that a child born with Down Syndrome is a critical disappointment to her
parents, and that society should assume suffering in cases where there may be none—is
either unaware of this history or self-servingly naive in failing to understand why his
ideas are anathema to modern Germans.
In his Writings on an Ethical Life, Singer offers “simple claims” that ground his
theory. Among these are:
Pain is bad, and similar amounts of pain are equally bad, no
matter whose pain it might be. By ‘pain’ here I would
include suffering and distress of all kinds. This does not
mean that pain is the only thing that is bad, or that inflicting
pain is always wrong. Sometimes it may be necessary to
inflict pain and suffering on oneself or others. We do this
to ourselves when we go to the dentist, and we do it to
others when we reprimand a child or jail a criminal. But
this is justified because it will lead to less suffering in the
long run; the pain is still in itself a bad thing. Conversely,
pleasure and happiness are good, no matter whose pleasure
or happiness they might be, although doing things in order
to gain pleasure or happiness may be wrong, for example, if
doing so harms others.82
Since determination of the degree of suffering and anticipated suffering, for
assessing the appropriateness of infanticide, must take place before a child acquires a
desire to live, Singer does not address any emotional suffering felt by a newborn over the
idea of being held unworthy of life. While a baby, unaware of herself and her
circumstances, may not anguish over Singer’s position, emotional suffering is precisely
what Singer inflicts on the disability community and its allies with his intellectual
contemplations. If he would open himself to the experiences of others, he would find that
factors like respect, appreciation, and inclusion effectively modulate the difficulties

82

Peter Singer, Writings, xv.

67

inherent in physical or cognitive impairment. A variety of modalities can mitigate
physical pain, but the pain born of social exclusion, ossified misunderstandings, and the
treatment they engender, as well as the withholding of respect (as in ignoring input from
the disability community) are harder to overcome.
Research into factors influencing self-perceived quality of life in groups of people
with intellectual impairment finds that those whose locus of control is external report the
lowest quality of life while others, who feel empowered by self-determination and the
self-respect it engenders, describe their lives as having higher quality.83 Singer’s refusal
to replace his own perceptions with the authentic perceptions of those who live with
impairment is deeply disrespectful and disempowering. Those among the readers who
have experienced patronizing comments about how they do not really feel the way they
think they feel, and instead feel in another suggested way, know how this behavior seeks
to dominate and demean. The author wonders what Singer achieves by insinuating his
opinions in an arena where he has absolutely no experience, while denying the validity of
authentic experiences.
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Singer states, “…pain is still, in itself…a bad thing.”84 How can he imagine that
the misconceptions he encourages and the damage he inflicts by questioning whether
people with severe impairment are worthy of life and, in the case of severe cognitive
impairment, worthy of personhood, are not pain generating? When a new parent greets
with anguish the birth of a baby with impairment, does it occur to him that the position he
and other theorists posit with cold and rational civility are, at least in part, at fault? Does
Singer fail to see that what matters in the determination of whether a new baby is a
person is not whether it has potential for reasoning, but rather that parents experience
their new baby as one of their own, a member of their family. This intuitive response
must find acceptance and precedence over any coldly rational criteria, which determines
the child’s status, if one holds that the infliction of pain is bad.85 The emotional pain
Singer and others inflict in the name of academic argument is far more egregious than the
physical pain people with impairment suffer. Physical pain generally can be mitigated,
while the denial of self-authorship and the pain that it generates is without a
pharmaceutical, naturopathic, or surgical remedy. Yet, Singer is not alone in his
destructive ideology.
Until he began research for this work, the author had no idea that his impairment
caused “hopeless suffering with no means of alleviation.”86 According to Eduard
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Verhagen, co-author of the Groningen Protocol, the Dutch national guidelines, which
outline circumstances meriting euthanasia of infants, between the years 1997 and 2004,
twenty-two cases of “deliberate termination of life,” took place in the Netherlands. All
cases involved babies with spina bifida with hydrocephalus.87 Verhagen and his coauthor of the Groningen Protocol, Pieter Sauer, divide newborns and infants for whom
they consider the discussion of euthanasia appropriate into three categories. The first
group includes infants with no chance of survival. The second, infants considered to
have a very poor prognosis who are also dependent on intensive care services. The third,
and most stunning to the author, involves infants deemed to be suffering unbearably with
a hopeless prognosis, but who are not dependent on intensive medical treatment, such as
those with severe spina bifida who, according to these utilitarians, will have a “very poor
quality of life even after many operations.”88 Singer states:
Many doctors and theologians, including those who are
quite conservative in their moral thinking, agree that when
a patient's prospects of a minimally decent quality of life
are very poor, and there is no likelihood of improvement,
we are not obliged to do everything we could to prolong
life.89
The author wonders who should make the determination about whether a life contains
potential quality.
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Singer comments:
…parents of severely disabled newborn infants should be
able to decide, together with their physician, whether their
infant should live or die. If the parents and their medical
advisor are in agreement that the infant's life will be so
miserable or so devoid of minimal satisfactions that it
would be inhumane or futile to prolong life, then they
should be allowed to ensure that death comes about
speedily and without suffering. Such a decision might
reasonably be reached, if, for instance, an infant was born
with anencephaly (the term means ‘no brain’ and infants
with this condition have no prospect of ever gaining
consciousness); or with a major chromosomal disorder such
as trisomy 18, in which there are abnormalities of the
nervous system, internal organs, and external features, and
death always occurs within a few months, or at most two
years; or in very severe forms of spina bifida, where an
exposed spinal cord leads to paralysis from the waist down,
incontinence of bladder and bowel, a buildup of fluid on
the brain and, often, mental retardation.90
To solidify his point, he continues:
Spina bifida means, literally, a 'divided spine'. In serious
cases, the baby is born with a part of its spine split and the
spinal cord exposed. The nerves which run along the spine
will then be damaged. The result is partial or complete
paralysis of the legs, and no ability to control the bowel or
bladder. The spine may also be deformed. Intellectual
disability is often present in people seriously affected by
spina bifida…Until the 1950s, almost all babies born with
spina bifida died soon after birth. Sometimes this was
because midwives and family doctors made sure that they
did not live; but even if the doctors did their best, the open
wound over the spine was sure to become infected, and in
the days before antibiotics, this was likely to prove fatal.
Operating on the baby to close the wound on the spine only
meant that the cerebro-spinal fluid which would have
leaked out of the wound now built up in the brain, where it
caused the baby's head to swell, and often led to brain
damage.
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In the 1950s, however, antibiotics became available, and a
way was found to drain the cerebro-spinal fluid into the
bloodstream. Suddenly it was possible to save the lives of
thousands of children who would otherwise have died.91
Singer refers to a reversal in opinion by a physician, John Lorber, who pioneered
this new approach to the treatment of spina bifida. Lorber expected babies to have drastic
improvement in health outcomes if they received treatment to close the
myelomeningocele (the cyst containing neural material that forms outside the body due to
a failure of the spine to close over the spinal cord) and underwent shunting.
Lorber was at first enthusiastic about the new mode of
treating these babies with spina bifida. In 1963, together
with two colleagues, he published an influential paper
stating that every infant with spina bifida must be operated
on as soon as possible since otherwise further nerve
damage could occur. In Sheffield and in many other
centres in Britain and America this was the way spina
bifida was handled for the next few years. The parents
were rarely consulted about this decision—they were
simply told that their baby needed an operation, and given a
form to sign. But the operation to close the wound on the
back of the spine was only the beginning of the treatment.
After that a tube with a one-way valve was installed to
drain the excess cerebro-spinal fluid from the head into the
bloodstream. Then orthopaedic operations were needed to
correct deformities of the spine and hip. Some children
needed thirty or forty orthopaedic operations before they
had finished school.92
After a decade of universal active treatment of all babies
with spina bifida, Lorber began to have doubts about what
he and his colleagues were doing. He analysed the records
of the 848 children they had treated in Sheffield. Half had
died, most of these during the first year of life. Of those
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who had survived, only six had no handicap, and seventythree were only moderately handicapped. More than 80
percent were severely handicapped: that is, they had at least
two, but usually more, of the following conditions: no
bowel and bladder control, or a urinary bypass with
frequent kidney infections and progressive chronic kidney
damage which sometimes led to kidney failure; paralysis to
such a degree that they were unable to walk without caliper
splints, crutches, or other appliances and had to rely on a
wheelchair for part of the day; pressure sores on feet,
knees, or buttocks; hydrocephalus which was treated by a
drainage tube, requiring new operations to deal with
frequent complications. In addition to these physical
problems, approximately one-third of the surviving
children were intellectually disabled.
In the light of these figures, Lorber decided that the initial
enthusiasm for the new mode of treatment had led to its
being used without sufficient reflection. He called for a
reassessment of priorities ‘to insure that, with all the
intensive effort and good will, we shall not do more harm
than good’.93
Singer in the paragraph above, from Rethinking Life and Death, published in 1994
is recounting Lorber’s reconsideration, which took place in 1972. He neglects to update
the improved outcomes experienced by aggressive and improved treatment over the
intervening twenty-two years. Why does Singer present outdated information? Surely,
he has access to modern outcomes.94 This is not to be considered merely a failure of
scholarship, but a moral failure, as well. Moral philosophers, like Singer, by the nature of
their work, are to be held responsible for the political and social consequences of their
ideas.
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The author does not suggest that his experience is universal, but he would like to
point out that he has never experienced kidney problems, pressure sores, or spinal or hip
alignment surgeries. He controls his bowel and bladder functions with medications and
although he has undergone eighteen surgeries to date, uses a wheelchair, and requires the
support of a personal care assistant, he has never been clinically depressed, has
successfully completed his formal education with this work, and has fulfilling
relationships with friends and family.
The author anxiously awaits requests for his opinion on quality of life with spina
bifida. He has many friends with a variety of impairments, who enthusiastically
anticipate quality of life questions along with him. If the reader questions the
appropriateness of comments about physical impairment in a work that seeks to
investigate personhood and citizenship for people with severe cognitive impairment, the
author finds commonality among all experiences of disability. All experiences are
misconceived and all individuals with impairment experience reduced expectations.
When people with cognitive impairment reflect on factors that influence their
quality of life, not surprisingly, they see it as “composed of those same factors…that are
important to those without disabilities.”95 People without impairment, however, lack the
experience to determine how people with impairment experience these factors and
relationships. “An individual with mental retardation need not have the cognitive
capacity to appreciate ‘meaning’ in order to have a life of satisfying quality. This sense
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of satisfaction is understood best from the individual’s point of view.”96 No human being
can authentically determine the experience of another, and certainly not to the degree
necessary to make life-ending decisions. The author finds it strange that scientists rarely
analyze quality of life in the case of people without impairment or other health concerns,
though surely factors outside of health and intellectual status affect one’s quality of life.
Well-positioned people have their hearts broken, lose things they value, and feel
misunderstood. Others may be undereducated and have economic challenges; they may
have experienced poor parenting or bigotry. They may have addictions. To solely focus
on impairment seems blatantly prejudiced.
Singer is the founder of The Center for Human Bioethics at Monash University in
Melbourne, Australia. One of its primary missions is the education of health care
professionals in making decisions dealing with bioethical dilemmas. The reader can be
certain that the professionals there are learning how to determine the quality of life of
people based on a very limited view of what constitutes a life and without considering
valid perspectives.97
The author rejects one such methodology for determining quality of life, which is
nakedly cold-blooded in its formulaic nature and used practically within the medical
ethics community, notably in Europe and Australia, to assist with life and death
considerations. If the author ultimately requires a donated liver to save his life from the

96

David L. Coulter, “Home is the Place: Quality of Life for Young Children with Developmental
Disabilities,” in Quality of Life: Perspectives and Issues, ed. Robert A. Schalock (Washington, D.C.:
American Association on Mental Retardation, 1990), 61.
97

For examples of medical ethics positions held by professors at Monash University see “After birth
abortion: why should the baby live?” by Alberao Giubilini with Francesca Minerva and “Critical Notice:
Why Killing is Not Always Worse—and is Sometimes Better—Than Letting Die” by Helga Kuhse.

75

consequences of a lengthy association with hepatitis C, under this system, the quality of
his remaining life might be judged against that of others waiting to receive the same
organ. A medical ethics team might assess his life in terms of Quality Adjusted Life
Years (QALYs).98 As someone with impairment, each of his remaining years, using
QALYs, adjusts to some portion of a year. If the committee expects that he will live for
thirty more years, his QALYs, unlike his able-bodied competitors, will be, perhaps,
fifteen. For the defender of QALYs, those with a lower tally are less deserving of goods
than others with a higher number. From the perspective of someone with impairment, the
hubris involved in scientifically certifying that one year of the author’s life is worth less
than that of a non-impaired person’s is misguided at best, and immoral, destructive, and
simply evil at worst. Singer is a proponent of the use of QALYs as evidenced in his
article “Why We Must Ration Healthcare.”99
The methodology used in formulating QALYs aggrieves the author. Several
approaches may be used, but all involve the indifferent application of formulae based on
the preferences of research subjects. These subjects include a preponderance of people
who have never experienced impairment:
…researchers seek to find the point at which subjects are
indifferent between two options. Under one option,
subjects have a normal life expectancy, but in a reduced
health state—for example, paraplegia. Under the second
option, subjects have a probability p of normal life
expectancy at normal health and a probability (1-p) of
instant death. Researchers vary p until subjects are
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indifferent between the two options. When a subject is
indifferent between the two options, p represents the utility
that he has assigned to the reduced health state. Suppose,
for example, that a subject is indifferent between (1)
normal life expectancy as a paraplegic and (2) a probability
.75 of normal life expectancy at full health and a
probability .25 of instant death. He would then have
assigned the paraplegic health state a utility of .75….After
subjects select utilities for states of reduced health,
researchers average those individual utilities to reach a
social utility. The social utility of a state of reduced health
represents the reduced value of life in that state. Therefore,
if the value of one year of life at full health is 1.0 and the
utility of paraplegia is .75, the value of one year of life as a
paraplegic is nine months of a typical life. The value of
two years of life as a paraplegic is 1.5 years and so on. The
value of a year of life at reduced health has been adjusted
downward to reflect a lower quality of life—hence the term
‘Quality-Adjusted Life Year’ or QALY.100
These research results will influence the chances of a person with impairment
receiving a scarce organ or expensive procedure. The subjects who contributed their
opinions about lives lived with impairment, people who base their beliefs on myths and
fictions instead of actual experience, affect decisions of life and death for people like the
author.
When Johnson describes common reactions on the street to her impairment as
“decidedly negative” she describes the viewpoints that might inform the opinions of
people who participate in setting the value of Johnson’s and the author’s lives. She
describes the comments that she has encountered, including, “I admire you for being out;
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most people would give up.” “God bless you! I’ll pray for you.” “You don’t let the pain
hold you back, do you?” and, “If I had to live like you, I think I’d kill myself.”101
The author submits that he has experienced very similar comments. While
visiting the Sanctuario de Chimayo, the Lourdes of New Mexico, a well meaning, but not
sought out, resident priest assured him that he would pray for the author’s recovery from
his pitiable affliction. When he discussed the long and difficult course of chemotherapy
treatment needed to eradicate his hepatitis C infection with his doctor, the hepatologist
was shocked that he would choose to prolong a life of misery and suffering with
additional painful treatment. The prospect that a committee may evaluate the author for
treatment based on melodramatic stereotypes terrifies and angers.
Even without the use of QALYs, transplant committees take a prospective
patient’s impairment status into account when evaluating their qualification for an organ.
In January, 2012, the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, met with Amelia Rivera’s
parents about her need for a donor kidney to save her life. According to her mother,
Chrissy Rivera, Amelia, a three-year-old with Wolf-Hirschhorn Syndrome, was turned
down for transplantation because she is “mentally retarded.” When the doctor entered the
conference room where Amelia’s parents waited, he placed two sheets of paper on the
table. Rivera describes her reaction to the papers:
I can’t take my eyes off the paper. I’m afraid to look over
at Joe (Amelia’s father) because I suddenly know where the
conversation is headed. In the middle of both papers he
(the doctor) highlighted in pink two phrases. Paper number
one has the words, ‘Mentally Retarded’ in cotton candy
pink right under Hepatitis C. Paper number two has the
phrase, ‘Brain Damage’ in the same pink right under HIV. I
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remind myself to focus and look back at the doctor. I am
still smiling.
He says about three more sentences when something sparks
in my brain. First it is hazy, foggy, like I am swimming
under water. I actually shake my head a little to clear it.
And then my brain focuses on what he just said.
I put my hand up. ‘Stop talking for a minute. Did you just
say that Amelia shouldn’t have the transplant done because
she is mentally retarded? I am confused. Did you really
just say that?’
The tears. Oh, the damn tears. Where did they come from?
Niagara Falls. All at once. There was no warning. I
couldn’t stop them. There were no tissues in the
conference room so I used my sleeve and my hands and I
keep wiping telling myself to stop it.
I point to the paper and he lets me rant a minute. I can’t
stop pointing to the paper. ‘This phrase. This word. This
is why she can’t have the transplant done.’
‘Yes.’102
Rivera says that, during the conference, the doctor would not even consider a kidney
donation from a family member, citing Amelia’s “quality of life”, or lack thereof.103
Pediatric Transplantation, in 2009, published the results of a study on the use of
information about developmental delay in determining qualification for a solid organ
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transplant in children. 43 percent of programs “always” or “usually” consider intellectual
impairment when making transplant decisions.104
Entirely different ways of measuring quality of life come from arenas familiar
with impairment.
It would be fair to say that Americans (with or without
mental retardation) are concerned in rating the quality of
their own lives with relationships, work, general material
standard of living, opportunities for learning, the
neighborhoods/communities/homes in which they live,
health and safety, recreation/social activities, and
perception of self.105
The author finds greater merit in these areas of measurement than in the simplistic and
inadequate methodology employed in determining QALYs or using single issue criteria.
Amazingly, a rationing protocol developed in New York in 2007 and adopted in
2009 by hundreds of hospitals across the nation, including the Veterans Health
Administration facilities, proposed the withholding of scarce ventilators from H1N1
patients with serious chronic conditions including “severe, irreversible neurological
conditions that are likely to be deadly.”106 This would include veterans with traumatic
brain injuries or spinal cord injuries, as well as individuals with neurological impairment
like spinal muscular atrophy and severe cerebral palsy. The author wonders if people,
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already using ventilators for impairments that affect their ability to breathe
independently, would be divested of their mechanical support if they were hospitalized at
the time of a critical respiratory epidemic. While the law prohibits the removal of life
support at the discretion of medical authorities, the pervasive attitude, that people with
severe impairment live inferior lives, leads the author to question. For those who would
label his concern “paranoia,” he offers the results of a survey reported in the New
England Journal of Medicine.107 A 1996 mail survey, sent to 1600 ICU nurses who
subscribed to Nursing Magazine, with responses from 852 full time nurses, revealed that
“one out of five have hastened the death of critically ill patients at least once in their
careers, occasionally without explicit permission (author’s italics) from patients, doctors,
or family.”108
As further evidence for concern, Willard Gaylin, a Harvard psychologist/medical
ethicist and a founder of the Hastings Center, in the October 1993 edition of Harper’s
Magazine, states:
It is often difficult for laypeople to appreciate that good
medicine does not reduce the percentage of people with
illnesses in our population (what is called the morbidity
rate); it increases that percentage. There are more people
wandering around with arteriosclerotic heart disease,
essential hypertension, and other expensive chronic
diseases than there are in Iraq, Nigeria, or Colombia. Good
medicine keeps sick people alive thereby increasing the
number of sick people in the population; patients who are
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killed by their diseases are no longer part of the population.
Even outright cures of diseases ultimately add to medical
costs. We no longer talk about diphtheria rates or
whooping cough rates, even though those were the two
leading causes of death in children for many generations.
Those diseases have ceased to exist. But they were rarely
expensive. The child either lived or died, and, for the most
part, did so quickly and cheaply.109
Even if one accepts the basic premise that rationing is necessary and desirable due
to the high cost of medical intervention, no one can successfully argue that people with
severe cognitive impairment alone, experience health or pain problems that either affect
their quality of life or impose the expenditure of medical dollars on society. Nonetheless,
if the impairment affects rationality, Singer and other utilitarians believe that the “value”
of that individual is measurably less than his rational neighbor. Singer states,
It is not arbitrary to hold that the life of a self-aware being, capable
of abstract thought, of planning for the future, of complex acts of
communication, and so on, is more valuable than the life of a being
without these capacities.110
Medical ethicists and wrong-thinking medical personnel generally fail to consider
any other criteria of intrinsic “value.” Singer does take into account the value individuals
with severe cognitive impairment have for their families, but this does not transfer into
the calculations of value used in medical rationing and he does not contemplate
infanticide in cases of unimpaired, yet unwanted, children. Impairment, low health
status, and/or lack of reasoning capacity are Singer’s requirements when justifying the
termination of a life.
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Consider the only other circumstance wherein society takes the life of an
individual—capital punishment. The death penalty is meted out for extreme crimes
against society—usually murder, often a relational act—a morally reprehensible act.
Society demands that its members behave in civilized ways toward each other, honoring
the irreplaceable value a human life holds, at least the value it holds for the possessor of
that life. In the ultimate punishment, however, society takes the life of a person who still
desires to continue living when that person has committed extreme relational crimes.
Yet, in reviewing medical rationing criteria, the quality of one’s relational capacities is
not even mildly considered. The author sees inconsistencies here.
Singer’s second “simple claim” is:
Humans are not the only beings capable of feeling pain or
of suffering. Most nonhuman animals—certainly all the
mammals and birds that we habitually eat, like cows, pigs,
sheep, and chickens—can feel pain. Many of them can also
experience other forms of suffering, for instance, the
distress that a mother feels when separated from her child,
or the boredom that comes from being locked up in a cage
with nothing to do all day except eat and sleep. Of course,
the nature of the beings will affect how much pain they
suffer in any given situation.111
If Singer is willing to acknowledge that suffering can occur without the infliction
of physical pain, must he not accept responsibility for increasing the sum of experienced
misery in the world as much as the farmer who removes the calf from its mother in order
to gather her milk? What of the human mother who is in despair over her newborn’s
perceived inability to have a quality life, perceived lack of value, and probable lack of
social acceptance due to her exposure to the perverse assumptions of Singer and others?
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The author does not suggest that his inability to cook a gourmet dinner does not
diminish his life in some small and infrequent way. He does not suggest that abilities
driven by intellect are not life enhancing, even the “chief glory of man.”112 What he does
insist upon is that components of an individual’s life, which contribute to that
individual’s happiness and pleasure, are so many and varied, so individual in their
hierarchical standing, that Singer’s severely focused criteria fail utterly to encompass that
which is pleasure and happiness generating. They might define what is pleasure and
happiness generating for him…but not on any generalizable level.
Many disability rights activists have, for years, targeted Jerry Lewis’s Labor Day
Telethon for protest actions. Some are astonished that people with neuromuscular
disorders, living themselves with the “ravages” of these diseases, would demonstrate
such anger at the Telethon. The problem is pity. Pity is not something you feel for an
equal. Instead it is a response to helplessness in another. To use pity to raise money for
the Muscular Dystrophy Association is to condone paternalism, ableism, and the
misconception of suffering. In a response to the Telethon protesters, on the May 20,
2001 edition of CBS Sunday Morning, Jerry Lewis stated, “Pity? You don't want to be
pitied because you're a cripple in a wheelchair? Stay in your house!” No mouthy adults
with impairment, who might have important points of view about whether they find pity
helpful, are held within the loving embrace of the savior of “Jerry’s Kids”! Issues of pity,
and pity must be behind the “compassionate killings” endorsed by Singer, leave no room
for the public’s acceptance of people with impairment as happy, fulfilled, or valuable.
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Another “simple claim” grounding Singer’s theory is:
When we consider how serious it is to take a life, we
should look, not at the race, sex, or species to which that
being belongs, but at the characteristics of the individual
being killed, for example, its own desires about continuing
to live, or the kind of life it is capable of leading.113
Having read Singer’s Animal Liberation, the author agrees that the cruel and
heartless use of animals for food, medical experimentation, and other forms of human
profit requires a strong and unacceptable commitment to compartmentalization and
rationalization—one that the author has used on many occasions. Humans demonstrate
such arrogance in subjugating the natural process of procreation and life to animal
husbandry. The raising of lab rabbits for their use and eventual destruction in the
unnecessary service of humanity seems so full of a hubris missing in the wolf that kills
the wild rabbit for food. Nonetheless, the evils of animal subjugation do not justify
Singer’s position.
If he is only proposing the killing of babies with impairment as a consciousness
raising tool to force acknowledgement of the philosophical inconsistencies that permit
animal abuse, his method is egregious in its generation of suffering within the disability
community. Its encouragement of those who devalue the lives of people with impairment
is dangerous and inflammatory—monstrous in light of his declaration that pain is bad. If
he makes his statements about infanticide out of genuine conviction, and the author
believes he does, he operates from ignorance about the nature of lives lived with
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impairment and demonstrates a self-serving refusal to modify his position, even in the
face of overwhelming testimony.
Would Singer assume the suffering, and advocate the annihilation, of a baby girl,
born in a fundamentalist state, who, one might argue, will have a less powerful and more
difficult life than her male counterpart, or assume the suffering, and advocate the
annihilation, of a baby of color who will deal with entrenched racism sometime during
his lifetime? Why single out babies with impairment for his patronizing assumptions?
Singer uses the phrase “meaningful life” repeatedly throughout his many works. The
author insists that the definition of “meaningful” is highly personal and for that reason,
invalid when applied to another’s existence.
Robert Schalock, professor and chair of the department of Psychology at Hastings
College and acknowledged expert in quality of life issues for people with cognitive
impairment references a statement made originally by David Goode. He states,
“Ultimately, it is how the individual perceives and evaluates his own situation rather than
how others see him that determines the quality of life he or she experiences.”114
Edward Keyserlingk, a Canadian professor and medical ethicist argues that
quality of life should be, “…a notion purged of any trace of relativizing human worth and
the lives of persons, or any hint of ‘social utility’ as a necessary qualification for
treatment.”115 He also places the determination of what constitutes a quality life, in
deciding termination of life issues, with the individual. He states:
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…in the medical/health context, quality of life need not
involve a comparison of different human lives as the basis
for decisions to treat some and not others. Ideally, at the
heart of quality of life concerns in this context should be
only a comparison of the qualities this patient now has with
the qualities deemed by this patient (or, if incompetent or
irreversibly comatose, by the patient’s agents) to be
normative and desirable, and either still or no longer
present actually or potentially.116
The author reiterates that only the individual and, in fact, only the non-coerced,
pain-mitigated individual is in a position to determine whether his or her life is worth
living. This is especially true because the experience of severe impairment is foreign to
most people without impairment due to a history of isolation and exclusion.
Without personal experience, it is not possible to understand fully something that
is difficult to articulate, but common within the disability community. There is a certain
grace in acceptance of the challenges of life. Acknowledging difficulty, without a sense
of justice denied and absorbing the information gleaned from the experience might lead
to a type of satisfaction. While the author does not understand passive acquiescence to
injustice and finds meaning in resistance to that which is unfair, he does insist that
pleasure and pain have a self-defined aspect to them. Meaning can be derived from
experiences, regardless of their initially perceived nature. Yet, Singer inserts his own
individual perspective in making assumptions about the experiences of the other. He
comments on the disappointments he assumes all parents experience when parenting a
child with impairment, in this case Down syndrome:
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To have a child with Down syndrome is to have a very
different experience from having a normal child. It can still
be a warm and loving experience, but we must have
lowered expectations of our child's abilities. We cannot
expect a child with Down syndrome to play the guitar, to
develop an appreciation of science fiction, to learn a
foreign language, to chat with us about the latest Woody
Allen movie, or to be a respectable athlete, basketballer or
tennis player. Even when an adult, a person with Down
syndrome may not be able to live independently; and for
someone with Down syndrome to have children of their
own is unusual and can give rise to problems.117
Not all parents experience dissatisfaction with the abilities of their child with
impairment. In fact, experiencing a child’s hard won mastery of a skill taken for granted
in the non-impaired community is the categorical opposite of dissatisfaction. Renee
Walbert, moderator of the listserv for Parent 2 Parent of Colorado writes:
My children are all grown now and so I do try to ask
permission before sharing their stories, because they are
their stories, not just mine. So with permission from our
youngest daughter Deidra, I share this today.
Deidra is 22 and has many disability labels, including a
vision and hearing disability and being a little person.
Technically she is deaf/blind and practically, she looks like
she is 12.
Today she did something for the first time. She is flying
back to NYC today where she attends school at the Helen
Keller National Center. Today for the first time, she went
through security and got herself to her gate by herself.
This is not the first time she has flown alone. Last summer
she was one of 2 delegates from Colorado to the National
ADAPT Youth Summit in Chicago. She was 21 years old
and I got a gate pass to walk with her down to the gate and
waited till she got on the plane. My husband's cousin met
her at the gate in Chicago when she arrived. Reversed the
process with her uncle when she returned home. In July
117

Peter Singer, Rethinking, 213.

88

she attended the Little People of America convention in
southern CA. Again, we walked her to check in and she
met some other folks who were traveling to the convention
that we knew and they helped her get where she was going,
and cousins helped through the return process. In August
she left to attend school in NY and I walked her to the gate,
and folks from the school met her at the gate in NY. Same
story when she came home for Christmas break. So she's
had 4 round trips in this last year. It's not like she is a flying
newbie…
Understand, when I share stories of my children's
independence, some folks's response is, oh, well, they don't
really have intellectual disabilities, they are high
functioning (whatever that means!) Yes, they are
independent, yes they do function very well. And yes,
Deidra and Aaron both really do have intellectual
disabilities. They easily qualified, meaning their IQ's are
pretty low. But IQ just doesn't tell the whole story.
Their whole lives we have pushed them to be as
independent as possible. And that has meant taking some
risks. Risks in baby steps all along the way. It meant letting
them go to the mall together and then alone, starting in late
middle school, early high school when their peers also
began learning those independent moves. It meant teaching
them to ride a bus. Slowly, and with a lot of
encouragement, but persistently.
It meant letting them try things on their own, assuring
them, cheering them on, telling them they could do this,
that they were amazing young people with lots of skills—
even if we didn't necessarily believe it or trust that to be so!
It meant when they got lost or something didn't go quite
right making sure they knew how to use a cell phone or
where to ask for assistance, helping them through it, not
letting our own panic show in our voices, and then
congratulating them on how even though they made a
mistake or something went wrong, ‘Look at how awesome
you were! Look how you got through that. Look how we
helped/someone helped you/you figured out...’ whatever
the circumstance warranted. It meant talking with them
regularly, always about potential situations and asking them
to think through, 'what would you do if....' and then helping
them with possible choices if they couldn't project out what
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they would do. Sometimes it meant practicing, sometimes
it meant just sending them off and seeing if they'd fly or
fall, sink or swim. Really, not all that different than the
opportunities and encouragement that we gave our oldest
daughter who didn't have an intellectual disability! That's
part of parenting, helping them along the way. Giving
them opportunities to practice…
So today my daughter is proud of herself and justifiably so.
I walked with her to check her bag and then walked her
down to security. But at security she kissed me goodbye,
asked the gentleman standing there which line to walk
through and headed up to TSA to start the process. I stood
outside the barrier and watched her all the way through
taking off her shoes, folding up her cane, taking her laptop
out and placing everything in the bins and then walking up
to wait her turn to go through the scanner. At that point I
ran upstairs and I looked down to watch her finish the
process (she'd already gone through the scanner) to wait till
they told her she could get her things. I stood there
watching while she set her boarding pass down on her
backpack to put her shoes on thinking, 'don't forget your
boarding pass, don't forget your id, don't forget your laptop,
don't forget your cane!' Silly mommy, she did fine! She
didn't forget a thing.
I watched her go down the escalator to the trains and then I
left. I admit I did ask her to call me when she found her
gate. I was on the road on the way home when my phone
rang. Yes, she found her gate. I asked if a gate agent was
there yet and she said no, but she'd asked a fellow
passenger sitting there if this was the gate for LaGuardia
and was told yes. And she asked the passenger to let her
know if there were changes before a gate agent arrived
since she couldn't see very well or hear announcements
well. So I reminded her to tell the gate agent when s/he
arrived that she would like to pre board and would need
some assistance to find her seat. And then I asked her to
call me when she was on the plane (hey I'm all for
independence but I'm still a mommy!)
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She just called me and not only is she proud of herself...I'm
PROUD OF HER!!!118
Frankly, in any case, the author finds objectionable Singer’s premise that a child’s
worth depends on whether she fulfills preconceived parental notions of “acceptable”
levels of ability or type of ability. Life might be lived with more contentment, with a
relinquishment of entitlement or an expectation of the level of entitlement that must be
delivered in order to stave off dissatisfaction. Is the avoidance of obvious manholes
wrong? Not necessarily, but the author finds the contemplated killing of a child that even
Singer describes as warm and loving, not suffering unduly, and with compensatory
positive elements, as challenge avoidance in the extreme.119 In addition, making
determinations as to the future nature of a newborn or his or her potential contribution
seems impossible. As Johnson simply states, “Parenthood is in its essence a leap into the
unknowable. When you eliminate a life of supposed suffering, you also eliminate the
possibility of transcendence for that individual and for the people around him or her.”120
Jason Kingsley, author, musician, and artist, writes, in a high school essay, a
response to the obstetrician who delivered him and who advised the Kingsley family to
place him in an institution because he would never grow up to have a “meaningful
thought.” Jason says:
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He never imagined how I could write a book! I will send
him a copy . . . so he’ll know. I will tell him that I play the
violin, that I make relationships with other people, I make
oil paintings, I play the piano, I can sing, I am competing in
sports, in the drama group, that I have many friends and I
have a full life.
So I want the obstetrician will never say that to any parent
to have a baby with a disability any more. If you send a
baby with a disability to an institution, the baby will miss
all the opportunities to grow and to learn . . . and also to
receive a diploma. The baby will miss relationships and
love and independent living skills. . . .
I am glad that we didn’t listen to the obstetrician. . . He
will never discriminate with people with disabilities again.
And then he will be a better doctor.121
In attempting to debunk the contention, held by many, including those speaking
above, in the disability community, that impairment is not a “lesser” position from which
to lead life, Singer points out:
If disabled people who must use wheelchairs to get around
were suddenly offered a miracle drug that would, with no
side effects, give them full use of their legs, how many of
them would refuse to take it on the grounds that life with a
disability is in no way inferior to life without a disability?
In seeking medical assistance to overcome and eliminate
disability, when it is available, disabled people themselves
show that the preference for a life without disability is no
mere prejudice.122
This comment seems to be beside the point to the author. Many people desire to,
in their view, improve aspects of their lives with interventions like cosmetic surgery, the
purchase of a bigger house, education, exercise, or dieting. Is the fact that they choose
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these “improvement” generating activities an indication that they perceive their lives to
be “inferior” to people who are, without interventions, beautiful, able to effectively live
in their dwelling, exposed to meaningful information and experience, fit, and thin? The
choice to seek to improve one’s lot does not necessarily translate into feeling inferior to
others. Improvement might be a purely self-generated absolute desire rather than a
relativistic one. There are people with impairment who choose to seek a “cure” and those
who do not. The author will leave individual choice and individual considerations to the
individual. Singer, however, in additional statements, questions the validity of selfreported contentment with quality of life among people with impairment:
Since we are dealing only with reported happiness levels,
however, it is possible that, as (professor of economics,
Tyler) Cowen suggests, people with severe disabilities
‘adjust their expectations’ or ‘lower their aspirations in
life.’ They may then be reporting how well their life meets
their expectations, and this could make it misleading to use
their reports to compare their idea of happiness to that of
people with normal expectations. The third reason for
doubting that the studies show what (professor of
philosophy, Harry) Gensler claims they show is that the
method they use—obtaining people’s own reports of how
happy they are—skews the sample of people with
disabilities, since it omits those who have intellectual
disabilities severe enough to prevent them understanding
the question they are being asked.123
The author would like to assert that any individual’s sense of contentment exists
within the matrix of their experienced life. Would Singer question the validity of a
response that life is well worth living from a refugee in Darfur, with the dismissive
comment, “But they have no idea what it’s like to live in America?” Rich or poor,
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confident or fearful, educated or unschooled—it is elitist to make assumptions about the
validity of another’s perspective. Furthermore, would Singer find it equally easy to
euthanize a smiling, cooing baby as a baby screaming in obvious distress? If non-verbal
signals are invalid indicators of misery or contentment, there should be no moment of
question, no human hesitation. Anyone who knows a person with severe cognitive
impairment knows when that person is content. While utilitarians may find it impossible
to quantify happiness in non-verbal people, the author finds the quantification of such
ephemeral states as happiness or contentment invalid in any case, in so much as such
states derive from the internal perspectives of individuals and are based on individually
derived criteria that cannot be reflected in any standard survey.
It must also be noted that professionals, or parents under the influence thereof,
often coerce decisions on active treatment of impairment instead of medical intervention
being a choice, instigated by the person with impairment themselves. In addition, there is
an elusive perspective that the author sometimes gets a glimpse of, which promises peace
through a certain sort of surrender. Not surrender to injustice, rather surrender to the
nature of life. This is not a perspective solely found within the disability community, but
evident in many who have experienced challenges. If individuals approach life like a
game of paintball, where each new challenge must be thwarted by constant vigilance and
where, if one is “hit,” the game is lost, a state of constant stress and discontent prevail.
Without doubt, all individuals will be “hit” no matter the degree of attention and constant
caution maintained. For the author, it is better to proceed with good intentions and fellow
feeling, with thought-through choices and whatever wisdom one can muster, rather than
proceed with fear and rigid expectations. Is disappointment inevitable from time to time?
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Yes, but one can, at least, choose to escape a state of self-indulgence that leads to
omnipresent dissatisfaction and a constant maintenance of high alert that leaves little
opportunity for creative solutions and growth.
The author asserts that many in society, like Singer, fail to completely observe
and accurately understand people with impairment. Their initial perception is that the
person is different and lacks some valued aspect of being human. Upon closer
evaluation, it would become clear that many other aspects of the person’s life are
flourishing and that, overall, the person with impairment is an amalgam of happiness and
pain, strength and weakness, contribution and need, as is any human being. Having
grown up insulated from people with severe impairment, however, the able observer has
pre-programmed misconceptions and the fears they engender. This truncates one’s
observational capacity.124

Fear of Difference, Avoidance, and the Legacy of Isolation
Our very human essence is so damned undignified and so
uncontrollable. We spend most of our life working like
fiends to maintain the illusion that we are in control, that
we can tame and tidy nature. Let’s face it: nature always
has the last laugh. Nowhere does the old girl laugh louder
than with disability and death. God forbid we human
beings should ever have to get up close and personal with
our unwieldy, messy, smelly humanness. In every way
possible, this culture’s rules and values distance us from
the realities of our own bodies in all their glorious
imperfection.--Cheryl Marie Wade, Thoughts on the “Right
to Die with Dignity” for Ragged Edge Magazine
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When contemplating a life lived with impairment, the non-impaired observer
might envision his life in an impaired body and mind, a position assumed to be
necessarily outcast, burdensome, and non-productive, without redeeming positive
characteristics. He may fear becoming the object of the pity and revulsion he experiences
when encountering those with impairment. What is unnerving about encounters with
people with severe impairment that leads to avoidance, sequestration, the consequent lack
of familiarity and the misunderstandings these engender? What must occur for society to
experience a desire for integration? Many factors lead to fear and aversion; many are
long established and present strong resistance to change.
When the inexperienced individual meets a person with impairment, which
includes learning disabilities or other conditions that involve a deficit of theory of mind,
he is immediately on unfamiliar and uncomfortable ground. Theory of mind involves the
ability to understand the mental states of others, including their intentions, desires,
beliefs, and emotions without their verbal input. When interacting with someone who is
theory-of-mind-deficient, one experiences a certain lack of acknowledgement. Lack of or
impaired theory of mind occurs in, among a variety of impairments, autism and nonverbal learning disabilities. How is one to act when his relational counterpart violates
personal space, does not make eye contact, or cannot ascertain when a topic has outlived
the listener’s interest? Human interaction depends in large part on the unconscious
processing of social cues. If this skill is impaired and interaction with the other results in
confusion, the uninitiated individual wants to escape to familiar ground where one can
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expect one’s communication partner to behave “appropriately,” reading one’s needs and
desires, without verbal instruction.
Another, yet related, discomfort accompanies the non-impaired person’s
interaction with someone who is cognitively or communicatively impaired. In the person
with intellectual impairment, mental illness, or poor verbal abilities, a lack of expected
rationality or an inability to demonstrate rationality expressively, means that conventional
expectations for behavior are futile and the uninitiated individual experiences anxiety.
“Will this person touch me?” “Will she draw attention to me?” “What does she want?”
“What should I do?” The unimpaired individual can become so anxious that staying
present becomes impossible.
While problems arise from an inability to perceive and honor the unspoken needs
and desires of a conversation partner and from a lack of expected rationality, to have
one’s physical appearance or movement offend the other is to lead just as segregated and
marginalized an existence. People without impairment, who have little exposure to
human differences, are frequently uncomfortable meeting the eyes of someone who
utterly fails to comply with socially and culturally valued norms and customs that hinge
upon physical integrity, beauty, and health.125
Society rewards physical perfection and athletic achievement with popularity. It
punishes non-compliance with shunning and isolation. Children, who lack social graces,
stare with curiosity. Adults, uncomfortable with the rudeness of staring and the act of
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questioning, attempt to appear at ease, but escape as soon as possible. Lezlie Frye, a slam
poet who addresses this phenomenon, dressed in sleeveless black to accentuate her
asymmetrical hands, raps:
Don’t stare here
Fix your eyes on your fear
Check yourself
Inspect yourself for
Whatever it is that’s so alarming
That you won’t look me in the eyes stop
Telling me lies
About who I am
Look I can feel it when we meet
Inside, discomfort
Outside, grin
It’s confusing these two faces
Digesting my image…
And how I feel is tired.126
Yet, if a “normal” interaction is desirable and necessary to integration, what are
the lookers to do about their, as Susan Sontag in her 2003 book Regarding the Pain of
Others calls, “repulsive attraction.” “Staring is an ocular response to what we don’t
expect to see. Novelty arouses our eyes. More than just looking, staring is an urgent eye
jerk of intense interest.”127 People need to understand and try to order that which is noncompliant with their ingrained sense of correctness. Regular exposure to human variance
will lessen, and eventually dispel, the shock initiated by difference, but is there more to
the escape impulse?
Rosemarie Garland Thomson, a disability historian states:
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…viewed from the perspective of…the normate, disability
has always been the object of a negative comparison to
what is typically construed as corporeal normality.128 The
attitudes that have historically attended people with
disability have varied over time, but reiterated in all epochs
is the idea that they carry an excess of meaning and
therefore offer an insistent invitation to a series of
interpretative…framings.129
Children’s books throughout the ages have invented the dwarfish troll, or the
deformed ogre, the pirate with a patched eye and wooden leg, the hunched back witch,
and Peter Pan’s nemesis, Captain Hook. They have conflated disability with depravity
and evil. In a similar way, society focuses hatred on a symbol and when marginalized,
that symbol becomes a “scapegoat.”
The initial concept of the scapegoat appears in the Bible in Leviticus 16:20-22:
And when he hath made an end of reconciling the holy
[place], and the tabernacle of the congregation, and the
altar, he shall bring the live goat:
And Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the
live goat, and confess over him all the iniquities of the
children of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their
sins, putting them upon the head of the goat, and shall send
[him] away by the hand of a fit man into the wilderness:
And the goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities unto a
land not inhabited; and he shall let go the goat in the
wilderness.130
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Here, a priestly individual invests an animal with all of society’s evils and banishes it into
the wilderness, leaving in its wake a ritually cleansed community.
Historically, the identification of a human scapegoat, an individual who
symbolizes a community’s ills and evils, has fallen upon the ugly, ill, different, taboo,
and outcast. The exile of the scapegoat renders the village free of “contagion” for a
period. In Wole Soyinka’s 1967 play The Strong Breed, the ritual scapegoating, called
egungun in Yoruba, of a boy with cognitive impairment, is to take place in an effort to
cleanse the tribe of impurity and contagion. The tribe chooses Ifada, because of his
disability, to be the ritual carrier of the village’s ills, which will disappear with the boy
upon his expulsion.131 Modern society exiles people with impairment with scapegoating
behavior as well. For a variety of reasons, it reviles and exiles to the margins people with
both severe physical and intellectual impairment.
Andrew Kania, theologian and director of spirituality at Aquinas College at
Manning in Australia suggests that it is fear that drives scapegoating:
In the end, if a person is to be known, (according to the
adage) for the friends and the enemies that he or she makes,
should not yet another criterion be made, that he or she
should be known by the scapegoats they create? For a
simple equation does exist that whoever bears the brunt of
our ‘scapegoatism’ must in some way serve as an indicator
as to a particular deficiency that exists deep within
ourselves…The fundamental drive of scapegoatism is thus
a strong sense of being threatened…Thus the individual we
seek to scapegoat is in reality a distorted mirror of all we
most despise of in ourselves; they look back at us —
peering deep into that part of our ego, that is insecure,
incompetent and frightened. They seem to know us, more
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than we wish to be known — they seem to know the extent
to which we lie and the extent to which we tell the Truth.132
Could this be because they expose to us some hidden compartment, individual or
collective, where fears lie buried and boogiemen abound? Could the investigation,
understanding, and excision of these psychic infections lead to greater health and
wellbeing and, if this is true, could people with impairment prove to be valuable magic
looking glasses that deliver, if only one allows them to, insight and healing?
Julia Kristeva recognizes this phenomenon and refers to the impaired body as a
generator of ontological anxiety—a reminder that “the clean and proper body” is transient
and uncontrollable. She uses the term “abject” for all states, which a person must deny in
order to continue the comforting yet fraudulent expectation of undisturbed perfection.133
Tobin Siebers, a disability theorist at the University of Michigan, in discussing the
ontology of the Ugly Laws (statutes in many major American cities from 1867 to 1974
that targeted the confluence of impairment and poverty by making “unsightly” begging
illegal) discusses a “primordial obsession with perfect, public bodies.”134 Edward
Slavishak writes about prosthetic limbs, popular during the period of endemic industrial
accidents at the turn of the twentieth century, which manufacturers advertised as
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camouflage for the “unsightly” and “embarrassing” impaired body.135 Displayed
impairment makes one outcast, for if the unimpaired person accepts an individual with
physical or cognitive impairment as a normal variance within the human condition, it
holds that she must accept the possibility or even the inevitability of also becoming
impaired—be it by disease, accident, or age. Many “typicals” in society push people
with impairment into the margins—see them as social outcasts, economic burdens, and
moral pariahs for all of the above reasons. They pretend that they will never join the
ranks of those with impairment. They refuse to investigate individual and cultural disease triggered by interaction. Yet, they are aware subconsciously of the lack of justice
involved in such behavior. Ambivalence, between compassion and sympathy, on one
hand and aversion and distaste on the other, triggers “intense feelings of guilt and
anxiety” that affect self-esteem. Thus, the non-impaired observer feels the need to get
away from or denigrate the individual with impairment (thus removing the sympathy
factor).136 If the person with impairment can be kept at arm’s length, responsibility
surrounding possible duties and obligations owed to that individual, triggered by guilt
over the unjust nature of the relationship, can be ignored. A transcript of Chicago’s 1881
version of the so-called Ugly Laws states:
Any person who is diseased, maimed, mutilated, or in any
way deformed, so as to be an unsightly or disgusting object,
or an improper person to be allowed in or on the streets,
highways, thoroughfares, or public places in this city, shall
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not therein or thereon expose himself to public view, under
the penalty of a fine of one dollar for each offense.137
Such visceral verbiage exposes the lengths to which people were willing to go to
avoid the feelings triggered by an encounter with a person with impairment. Archaic
though the Laws seem today, the discomfort engendered by impairment is still alive and
well in the human psyche, including the deep-seated acculturation of many people with
impairment themselves who, if they have not done intensive work to free themselves,
carry the burden of both society’s prejudices and their own internalized judgments. Here,
too, in the language of the Chicago Ugly Laws one can detect a whiff of the notion of
contagion linked with impairment discussed above as scapegoating. Martha Nussbaum
discusses the implications of identifying something or someone as disgusting,
This act (or, more often and usually inseparably, this
person) is a contaminant; it (or he or she) pollutes our
community. We would be better off if this contamination
were kept far away from us.138
When society dismisses, sequesters, avoids, and denies the right to participate to
“different” individuals, communities fail to experience their reality or value. Rights that
promote equal participation, as well as bodily integrity, exist to mark the arenas, agreed
upon by society, which are sacrosanct in their essentiality to a minimally decent human
life for everyone, including those people with impairment. Historically, political theory,
including contemporary human rights theory, links rights to human characteristics, which
define the qualifier—personhood.
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Chapter Three
Reasonably Confused: Human Rights and Cognitive Impairment

Plato had defined man as an animal, biped and featherless,
and was applauded. Diogenes plucked a fowl and brought
it into the lecture room with the words, ‘Here is Plato’s
man.’ In consequence of which there was added to the
definition, ‘having broad nails.’—Diogenes Laertius, Lives
of the Eminent Philosophers

In a conversation the author had in 2008 with Laura Hershey, friend, disability
rights activist, and participant in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (CRPD), he brought up the problem of rights, personhood, and
rationality. The author wanted to know why, when the working group, of which she was
a member, designed the CRPD, they did not explicitly address a redefinition of the notion
of personhood to describe the status of all human beings, without consideration for
reasoning ability. Hershey was surprised that the author would suggest any implicit
exclusion existed in previous documents or that people without the ability to reason
currently hang in limbo within important primary human rights documents and political
theory in general. Her understanding was that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), true to its name, was universal in its scope and that the CRPD followed
in its sentiment.
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Unfortunately, for her view, much of political theory, from that of Socrates to
Rawls and, in current human rights theory, contributors including Donnelly, Gewirth, and
Pettit, has conflated rationality with recognition and inclusion in the political system.
The UDHR, as the primary document of human rights theory, is seemingly irreconciled
on the status of people with severe intellectual impairment and therefore not clearly
universal in its application. The language is conflicted, leaving unaddressed questions.
What does the term human mean? Does everyone really mean everyone? Is there a
difference between human being and person?
Within human rights language, one understanding of the meaning of “human,” in
contention with other more reason-centric conceptions, assumes, as did Hershey, that it
describes those who simply share the DNA of Homo sapiens. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights considers members of the “human family” beneficiaries of rights. In
the preamble, it states, “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice, and peace in the world…” What, however, does the term “human family” mean?
Later in the Declaration, in Article 1, it states, “All human beings are born free and equal
in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” Article 2 states:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth
in the Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status (all italics the author’s).
If the intention is to be fully inclusive, the ambiguity as to what constitutes a human in
this primary human rights document is frustrating.
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The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, assuming, the author
believes, that there is no confusion in the UDHR and ignoring a history of exclusion in
political theory, fails to clarify the term “persons.” Unfortunately, while it does not
specifically refer to rationality as the defining human characteristic, it does refer to itself
as a supplement to the UDHR, which does, both in the above assumption that all humans
have rationality and later, in Article 29, Section 1, where it states that all recipients of
human rights must perform duties (which require reason to understand and undertake).
When researching discussion minutes and reports published by working groups for the
major human rights documents, as well as committees clarifying the documents and
reporting on their implementation, the author found no actual grappling with the
historical problem of rationality and personhood. Instead, he found an approach, which
assigns rather than debates definitions. Several instances affirm that the term “disability”
in the CRPD is inclusive of cognitive or intellectual impairment. The Human Rights
Council and the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights say,
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term
physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments
which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their
full and effective participation in society on an equal basis
with others.”139
In agreement with this definition, the Network of African National Human Rights states,
“Thus disability is a phenomenon, reflecting an interaction between features of a person’s
139
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body and features of the society in which he or she lives…Such impairments may include
physical, sensory, and cognitive or intellectual impairment.”140 Many documents also
exist, which deal with the implementation of specific rights for persons with impairment
enumerated in the CRPD, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, including voting,
education, due process, health-care, property, expression, and reproductive rights—all as
pertain to people with intellectual impairment.141
Considering the obvious intent in secondary human rights documents to include
people with intellectual impairment, the author must conclude that despite the reference
in the UDHR claiming that reason and conscience are universal human traits, this is more
a statement of the potential for human compassion and dignity than a statement of criteria
for personhood or participation. If the terms “human family” or “human” in documents
pertaining to human rights refer to all Homo sapiens, as Hershey believed, this definition
offers rights-bearing status to people with severe intellectual impairment, as there is no
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criterion of rationality. This approach does universalize human rights theory, but,
unfortunately, conferring personhood in this way might not adequately promote the goal
of full acceptance and integration necessary for substantive rights acquisition.
Because the criteria for membership in this model are undefined, this
understanding fails to explain what about a human (assuming this is not limited to
rationality and the traits it engenders) is valuable. Generalizing by fixed categories
(human being) assigns rather than observes value and so does not adequately contribute
to the notion that people with intellectual impairment are valuable members of society,
only that they are human and, as such, worthy of rights. Defining a person in terms of
valuable human attributes seems necessary, but limiting who is valuable based solely on
the ability to reason is exclusionary.
Making choices and understanding one’s ends and the best means for their
achievement requires reason and defining political participants or “persons” as rational
choosers has historically been a basic notion of most theory. The requirement of rational
capability clearly excludes people with severe intellectual impairment and finding
additional human characteristics to augment previous notions of personhood seems a
worthy goal. This achieved, people with severe intellectual impairment might find
acceptance within the human family instead of their human rights status, without defined
value, leading to the mantle of burden. Law may mandate rights, but the feeling of
receiving goods grudgingly as an imposed obligation is not optimal. For people with
severe intellectual impairment to be included as rights-bearers because one’s contribution
(even if lacking intent) is valued would lead instead to goods that cannot be mandated,
including genuine substantive inclusion. The profound difficulty of this challenge lies, in
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part, in the stature of the proponents of ratio-centrality, its long standing supremacy, and
the appropriate veneration of the potential of human reason. What would be the
consequences if this monolithic structure is found wanting? Due to these impediments,
even if the documents aim for universality, people with severe intellectual impairment
hold morally ambiguous status within rights models and the singular importance of
reason persists for most rights theorists.
Some theorists conceive human rights as catalytic in the fulfillment of human
potential in that they clear the way for chosen action to advance and provide a template
for moral development. Humans who interact within a rights structure are encouraged by
a united human consensus on basic social practices to choose socially beneficial actions.
As Kant notes:
The concept of right, insofar as it is related to an obligation
corresponding to it (i.e., the moral concept of right), has to
do, first, only with the external and indeed practical relation
of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as deeds,
can have (direct or indirect) influence on each other.142
According to Jack Donnelly, Andrew Mellon Professor of International Studies at the
University of Denver, human rights are a “prescriptive moral account of human
possibility.”143 He continues:
Just as an individual’s ‘nature’ or ‘character’ arises from
the interaction of natural endowment, social and
environmental influences, and individual action, human
beings create their ‘essential’ nature through social action
on themselves. Human rights provide both a substantive
142

Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. Mary Gregory (New York, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 23-24.
143

Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 2003), 14.

109

model for and a set of practices to realize this work of selfcreation.144
Does Donnelly intend the scope of his human rights model to include people lacking the
ability to self-create—seemingly an act that requires intent? Does he believe that human
rights bearers must be able to claim rights? He says, “…the ability to claim rights, if
necessary, distinguishes having a right from simply being the (rights-less) beneficiary of
someone else’s obligation.”145 The long-standing charity model of goods-delivery to
people with severe impairment seems to fall within this description.
Per Donnelly, the rights-bearing citizen also holds duties.146 Article 29, Section 1
of the UDHR states, “Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and
full development of his personality is possible.”147 Can a person, lacking reasoning
ability, understand these obligations and choose to perform them? The answer seems to
be that they cannot and so, lacking an ability to perform classical duties intentionally,
people with severe intellectual impairment remain non-participants. If the actual intent of
the UDHR is to be fully inclusive, the word “contributions” should replace the word
“duties” and society must consider whether it is necessary that intent accompany
contribution.
Donnelly’s comment that rights are “universal” and that “we consider all
members of the species Homo sapiens ‘human beings,’ and thus holders of human rights”
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appears to be in contradiction with his discussion of issues of self-creation, claiming, and
the performance of duties.148 The latter statements seem to lead to the conclusion that he
sees no opening for people with severe intellectual impairment. If this second
interpretation is correct, it may be based on Donnelly’s intended position or it may be an
artifact of the lack of attention paid by the community of human rights theorists to the
tension between claims of universality and continued reliance on actions, which require
the exercise of reason.
Alan Gewirth, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago, conflates
rationality with rights-bearing status, though he leaves an opening for partial status. He
maintains that human rights are created to guard “the freedom and well being which are
respectively the procedural and substantive necessary conditions” that allow for
purposive human action.149 He continues:
All the human rights, those of well being as well as of
freedom, have as their aim that each person have rational
autonomy in the sense of being a self-controlling, selfdeveloping agent who can relate to other persons on a basis
of mutual respect and cooperation, in contrast to being a
dependent, passive recipient of the agency of others. Even
when the rights require positive assistance from other
persons, their point is not to reinforce or increase
dependence but rather to give support that enables persons
to be agents, that is, to control their own lives and
effectively pursue and sustain their own purposes without
being subjected to domination and harms from others.150
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In this statement, Gewirth posits a continuum of rationality and capability of selfdetermination, leading to the consideration of degrees of rights. His linkage of human
rights and purposeful action replaces the idea of equal distribution of rights and their
universality with the “Principle of Proportionality.”151 Per Gewirth:
All humans have the human rights in full to the extent that
they are inherently capable of exercising them. This
inherent capacity pertains to each human so long as he is a
rational agent in the minimal sense of having purposes he
wants to fulfill and being able to control his behavior
accordingly while knowing the particular circumstances of
his action.152
The author understands this statement to imply that there are degrees of personhood (in
the traditional meaning of the word, wherein rationality remains the singularly defining
element) and therefore degrees of rights-bearing status. This position exists in the status
of a ward under limited guardianship where the guardian has only those powers granted
by the court, based on limited areas of incapacity in the ward, rather than complete
powers. Others agree that traditional personhood may exist in degrees.
Philip Pettit, Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and Human Values at
Princeton University, defines a person as someone who, while engaged in discourse, can
maintain an independent position, free of coercion.153 The author understands Pettit’s
notion of a free individual to be one who merits moral consideration and rights. Pettit
says:
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Freedom in the agent…has three aspects. It covers, first,
the freedom of the action performed by an agent on this or
that occasion; second, the freedom of the self implicit in the
agent’s ability to identify with the things thereby done,
rather than having to look on them as a bystander; and
third, the freedom of the person involved in enjoying a
social status that makes the action truly theirs, not an action
produced under pressure from others. So construed,
freedom in the agent has a social as well as a psychological
aspect…154
The author sees “the freedom of the self” as descriptive of the “rational,” “the freedom of
the action” as descriptive of the “chooser,” and “the freedom of the person” as descriptive
of a human in a social context maintaining autonomy under conditions of coercion. Pettit
clarifies:
To predicate freedom of an agent, in particular of
something an agent did, is to suggest that at least three
different sorts of things hold. The first is that an agent can
be rightly held responsible for what he or she did; if the
action was free then there can be nothing against thinking
that the agent should have to answer for it. The second is
that the action freely chosen is one that the agent can own,
thinking: this bears my signature, this is me. And the third
is that the agent’s choice was not fully determined by at
least certain sorts of antecedents…155
Like Gewirth, he posits that there might be degrees of “fitness to be held responsible.”
Pettit states:
…freedom as we ordinarily conceive of it can come in
degrees or be missing completely. We may think that
someone is not responsible for anything—is not a
responsible agent—or is not responsible in any sense for a
certain action, or is responsible but only in diminished
measure, or is responsible but under mitigating
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conditions…We may think that an agent, say someone out
of their mind, is not free in any sense…Or we may think
that the freedom of an agent to choose that option was
reduced but not entirely removed, whether by virtue of
diminished capacity or mitigating circumstances.156
Though Pettit posits that, due to a continuum of capacity for “fitness to be
responsible,” a large percentage of people with intellectual impairment qualify for his
concept of personhood status, he is seemingly uncomfortable with excluding the
percentage who remain outside of consideration. He states,
Babies and some other human beings may not actually have
this ability but they can count as persons and selves in the
extended sense that they share a common nature—our
nature as humans—with those who can.”157
To the author, this statement ineffectively evades the fact that “proper fitness to be
responsible” cannot be a fully inclusive requirement for rights-bearing status. By his
aside, which deviates from his overall position, Pettit seems to acknowledge the
unacceptability of excluding even a small portion of the human family from rights
practice, but his solution seems cursory. He needs to clarify what constitutes “our nature
as humans” and if “babies and some other human beings” are persons, what aspects of
their nature, beyond rationality, pertain.
The author has been questioned on two fronts. The first is in the assumption that
participation necessarily leads to rights. The second is in the assertion that participation
of any kind is of equal value, and leads to equal substantive rights. Certainly, in realworld scenarios, communities of people neither afford rights to all participants, nor are
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non-hierarchical in their valuing of contribution. States, in which slavery exists, deny
rights to slaves despite the economic value of their contribution. Around the world,
women’s contributions are assigned a relatively lower value in the hierarchy of
contribution and caste systems distribute substantive rights based on birth status without
regard for either quality or amount of participation. Yet, the intent of justice as fairness is
not to describe the extant state of freedom and justice, but to provide a template for a
“realistic utopia.” In a Rawlsian construct, designers, veiled from their individual
circumstances, are expected to choose to design a society under the constraints of the two
principles of justice. The lexically prior principle of equal liberty states that “each person
is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.” This principle is predicted based on
the assumption that designers will desire a system of substantive democracy where, even
if unequal natural talents lead to somewhat unequal acquisition of economic goods, an
unequal distribution of basic liberties would be unacceptable. A Rawlsian system of
justice has no place for systems of exploitation, caste, or patriarchy.
If it is asserted that people contribute to their society unevenly and that someone
who contributes without intent or work, should not enjoy the same level of rights as the
great composer, statesman, scientist, or innovator, the author asks, “Who will make the
determination of what is more or less valuable?” These elite decision makers would
either represent the interests of the powerful or the interests of the majority. Neither
scenario is compatible with a Rawlsian vision. In the original position, there would be no
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hierarchy of designers and while majority rule might hold sway at a constitutional or
legislative level, it could never override the principles of justice.158
The author acknowledges that one can only enjoy freedom, as in the goal of
human rights, to the degree that the capacity for enjoyment exists; however, society must
afford everyone equal human rights without regard for rationality. There is a difference
between withholding rights because a judgment exists that one is not within some
definition of personhood and affording rights, without prejudice, which one can then
enjoy as his abilities and associations (support systems) allow. In order to expand useful
associations, people with severe intellectual impairment must achieve the status of
valuable citizens. Theory need not abandon the notion that a criterion delineates socially
valuable players, only that what is considered valuable utilize a larger definition of
contribution than rationality alone. For the sake of clarity, this work will define a
contribution as an act that furthers the social good of human fulfillment. One might
contribute consciously or, as this work purports, without intent. What sorts of
contribution, beyond the conscious fulfillment of duties, is necessary for human
flourishing? The author asserts that among these, the affective bonds of relationship are
essential and possible without intent.
Richard McCormick, professor of bioethics at Georgetown University, in
discussing the nature of personhood, suggests that this is the case, stating, “The meaning,
substance, and consummation of life is found in human relationships…life is a value to
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be preserved only insofar as it contains some potentiality for human relationships.”159
The author welcomes a relational option for defining personhood, and points out that
relationship generally exists between a parent and his or her severely intellectually
impaired child—even one so impaired as to only acknowledge the parent with a smile.
Certainly, many people who lack rationality, but are abundantly able to express emotion
can reciprocate relationship. People with intellectual impairment might be empathetic,
playful, trusting, and loving.
A second variety of extra-rational contribution exists in the joy felt when another
reflects our own human appreciation for beauty, such as exquisite musical harmony.
Humans need to “share a moment” or find common ground with others. When professor
Kittay listens to Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy” with her severely intellectually impaired
daughter, Sesha, and describes Sesha’s radiance as “excitement of her entire soul,” is her
observation affected by the human bond she feels when her daughter’s reaction to beauty
mirrors her own?160 If so, does Sesha’s reaction enrich her mother’s experience? It is an
amazing thing that humans generally agree on what is beautiful. When humans share an
experience, that sharing affirms connection, affirms collaboration in something larger
than self. Experiences of beauty, while sometimes having an intellectual element to
them, are predominantly emotional in nature. Thus, Kittay’s joy in seeing Sesha
enraptured by Beethoven demonstrates Sesha’s contribution to her mother’s flourishing.
Could it be that experiencing common reactions to beauty, or even to ugliness, with
159

R.A. McCormick, “To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern Medicine,” in Quality of Life: The
New Medical Dilemma, ed. James J. Walter and Thomas A. Shannon (Mahwah, New Jersey: Paulist Press,
1990), 30, 32.
160

Eva Feder Kittay, Love’s Labor, 151.

117

another human being helps to remove one’s sense of “specialness and separateness?”161
Can this encourage community?
The author thinks that a person’s value and contribution stem not from what he or
she experiences, rather from the experiences his or her existence makes possible for
others. He would argue that contribution could exist in the betterment of an individual
and/or society, without the contributor’s active initiation. Certainly, consideration of the
circumstances of people with severe impairment benefits all human beings because all
human beings stand at the threshold of impairment and might be moved into that realm
by something as subtle as a bursting blood vessel or a texting driver. Being in
relationship with a person with severe impairment, whether as an advocate, parent, family
member, teacher, classmate, friend, or physician, can act as a catalyst for personal growth
and fulfillment. Patience, perspective, tenacity, and appreciation of small achievements
and just outcomes are qualities developed through experiences with disability.
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Chapter Four
A Challenge to Rawls and an Introduction to the Capabilities Approach
Correcting the oversight of previous theories is…not a
matter of simply applying the same old theories to a new
problem; it is a matter of getting the theoretical structure
right.—Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice

Nussbaum and Amartya Sen critique social contract theory in general and justice
as fairness specifically on many grounds, but for the purposes of this work, as
exclusionary to people with severe impairment. They offer an alternative, and in some
ways unrelated, model, which they refer to as the capabilities approach. Nussbaum,
from a philosophical perspective and Sen, from one of comparative economics,
individually and collaboratively develop a neo-Aristotelian definition of what it is to be
human, an enumeration of what humans must be capable of to enjoy a minimum
threshold of flourishing, and ideas on how these capabilities might be achieved through
the marriage of the basic “innate equipment of individuals,” community participation in
the development of that basic equipment, and social supports to fill in the gaps, missing
for all people. Since capabilities theory sees humans as interdependent and unbound to a
requirement of autonomy, those with severe cognitive impairment can fulfill many
capabilities, as support from others can bridge gaps in natural endowments. The
development of the capabilities approach attempts to remediate the deficits of social
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contract theory, which Nussbaum believes developed as a result of the social
sequestration of people with disabilities and their subsequent lack of inclusion in political
theory. 162
Historically, during the chronological parameters of social contract theory
development, people with severe physical and intellectual impairment were excluded
from most community activity. In the wealthy classes, they were sequestered within
family homes, but generally they lived within asylums and institutions, perhaps laboring
in work houses, where adults with impairment produced products through menial,
repetitive tasks for a pittance, and children languished with low expectations and
insignificant education. This sequestration model persisted into the middle of the
twentieth century, with remnants evident into the present day.
A lawsuit was filed in 2010 on behalf of an inmate at the Colorado State
Penitentiary at Cañon City. Troy Anderson, a forty-year-old who has spent twenty-three
of those years in prison, has been diagnosed since early childhood with a variety of
mental health problems including Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Bipolar
Disorder, Intermittent Explosive Disorder, Antisocial Personality Disorder, cognitive
disorder, and seizure disorder, all likely the result of an organic brain syndrome.
Anderson has been held in administrative segregation, essentially solitary confinement,
for ten years with only five hours a week for showers and recreation, which takes place
within an indoor day hall, with no view of the outside and no access to the outdoors. He
is allowed two books per year. Officials justify his sequestration on the basis of his
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potentially dangerous behavior. Anderson has demonstrated improvement in his
conditions when he takes prescribed psychiatric medications. Prison psychiatrists, the
latest in a long line of mental health professionals, have prescribed these medications, but
the prison system, in the persons of Warden Susan Jones and Aristedes Zavaris,
Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections, has refused to administer
the medications prescribed by its own doctors. Without the medications, Anderson
cannot control or improve his actions and so the withholding of treatment assures that he
cannot demonstrate good behavior that would not only allow him to join the general
prison population, but ultimately shorten his sentence. The law firm of Fox and
Robertson, in conjunction with the University of Denver Civil Rights Clinic, has filed a
complaint, citing violations of his Eighth (cruel and unusual punishment) and Fourteenth
(due process and incorporation doctrine) Amendment rights.163
In a different instance of sequestration, in 2008, Alex Barton, a kindergarten
student with a suspected autism spectrum disorder was sent to the principal’s office for a
class disruption. According to his mother, when he returned to his classroom, his teacher,
Wendy Portillo, forced Alex to stand in front of his fellow students while they
enumerated what they did not like about him. The students were then asked to vote on
whether Alex could stay in the class. Fourteen of the sixteen students voted to expel
him.164 Though these cases seem unrelated, both people with disabilities were
unsupported in ways, which, if implemented, might have manifested in acceptable social
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interaction. Instead of providing Barton with testing, paraprofessional support, or an
acceptable discipline plan—instead of providing Anderson with prescribed medications
and therapy, these struggling individuals were shunned, separated, and punished.
Specifically in these cases and in the severely impaired population as a whole,
physical and attitudinal barriers have discouraged community participation. Under these
circumstances, per Nussbaum, it is no wonder that contract theorists in general fail to
address exclusionary concepts like rational choosers, rough equality, reciprocity and
mutual advantage. All traditional contract theories rely on the inherent rationality of
participants, which allows for an understanding of the contract and the bargaining
required in its development as well as an understanding of one’s ends and the best means
for their achievement. Yet, as Nussbaum points out:
A satisfactory account of human justice requires
recognizing the equal citizenship of the mentally disabled...
It also requires recognizing the many varieties of disability,
need, and dependency that ‘normal’ human beings
experience, and thus the very great continuity between
‘normal’ lives and those of people with lifelong mental
disabilities.165
According to Nussbaum, Rawls’s specific use of a Kantian conception of persons
as autonomous and rational precludes participation by people with severe cognitive
impairment. Kant understands rationality, which allows moral judgment, to be the
attribute, which separates man from animal and makes humans worthy of the
considerations of justice. Nussbaum criticizes Rawls’s endorsement of Kant as
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foundational to justice as fairness. In loading his theory in such a way, she believes it can
never be inclusive. She discusses Kant’s notion of a bifurcated citizenry:
Kant acknowledges that there will be citizens in the society
who are not active contracting parties and who are not
characterized by independence. …All such people ‘lack
civil personality’ because they are not independent. This
thought leads Kant to distinguish between ‘active’ and
‘passive’ citizens. Active citizens (who I understand to be
the group who are also framers of the social contract) have
the right to vote on account of their independence…
Members of the other group…have no right to vote, to hold
political office, even ‘to organize, and to work for the
introduction of particular laws.’ 166
The author would like to point out that Rawls incorporates the notion of active
and passive citizens in a more nuanced way than does Kant. Nuanced in the sense that
while there are individuals who meet the criteria for entitlement to equal justice and those
who do not, just as in Kant’s theory, instead of making judgments, as Kant does, about
the irrational nature of whole groups of people (women, children, people with
impairment), Rawls looks at the individual person’s capacities.
Nussbaum asserts that Rawls’s moral persons are:
…distinguished by two features: first they are capable of
having (and are assumed to have) a conception of their
good (as expressed by a rational plan of life); and second
they are capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) a
sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and to
act upon the principles of justice, at least to a certain
minimum degree.167
Thus, those who occupy the least rational end of the rational to non-rational continuum
fail to merit status for Rawls, and while he does not see this as a significant problem, it
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certainly prohibits justice as fairness from consideration as a universal theory of justice.
But Rawls is not Kant and while his citizens must demonstrate a capacity for reasoning,
his understanding of social unions does leave an opening for the expansion of qualifiers
and the notion that a society benefits from diversity.
In singularly revering the skills made possible by the ability to reason while
failing to recognize the importance of non-rational human capacities, Kant does
leave people who lack rationality without both respect and a place as a contributor
within social structures. Rawls, however, while not fully developing the concept,
understands that the community is a force multiplier—richer, more textured, with
greater understanding and grasp of the issues, greater in the tasks it can accomplish
and the support it can give its members, greater even than the most endowed
member within its ranks standing alone. He offers the best reason for living in
community. Rawls says:
It is a feature of human sociability that we are by ourselves
but parts of what we might be. We must look to others to
attain the excellences that we must leave aside, or lack
altogether. The collective activity of society, the many
associations and the public life of the largest community
that regulates them, sustains our efforts and elicits our
contribution. Yet the good attained from the common
culture far exceeds our work in the sense that we cease to
be mere fragments: that part of ourselves that we directly
realize is joined to a wider and just arrangement the aims of
which we affirm.168
In this important statement, Rawls reveals an Aristotelian position and the
promise of inclusion for people with impairment if society can grasp the value of these
individuals. The author will always acknowledge that the ability to see and solve
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problems—to view a desired future and plot a course to its fulfillment is essential in
designing and governing a society. But the author fails to understand why the rational
designers cannot be joined in their efforts by others, who contribute understandings of
human interdependency, the beauty of relationship, the benefits of diverse experience,
and the vulnerability inherent in the human condition. The author wonders whether the
rational human is better off hiding from the inevitability of the loss of physical and
mental functioning—hiding from the fact that later today she might lose the ability to
walk or even think clearly. Does the thinker really benefit from pretending he knows the
future and the expectation that he will maintain health and corporeal perfection? The
understandings of the designers, if informed by reality and the acceptability of that
reality, will acknowledge human vulnerability and further develop supports that remove
the fear, loneliness and uncertainty that accompany impairment if individuals are isolated
and marginalized. Without the inclusion of people who demonstrate every variant of the
human condition, designers cannot possibly envision and build a society imbued with the
ability to anticipate what tomorrow will bring for everyone, even the leaders, innovators,
and valedictorians. So, the inclusion of people with severe impairment becomes not only
a moral imperative, but beneficial practice for even the most self-interested.
Nussbaum demonstrates her understanding of the holistic human as she critiques
the Kantian perspective of a schism within human nature. Kant sees the rational and
moral powers of a human being in conflict with his animal nature, which creates a
constant tension. Nussbaum points out that while Rawls does not subscribe to this
dualistic view, his acceptance of the Kantian “person,” whose rationality Kant views as
the sole vehicle to freedom and autonomy, inevitably leads to an empirical “split between
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our rational and moral powers and the other aspects of the human animal.”169 Nussbaum
points out that disrespecting the animal aspects of a human being forces us to wrongly
see human dignity as similar to the dignity of God and angels (Kant’s other rational
beings) instead of a unique, and rather heroic, dignity developed within the animalistic
parameters of mortality and vulnerability.170 She further says that the Kantian split
“wrongly denies that animality can itself have a dignity; thus it leads us to slight aspects
of our own lives that have worth and to distort our relation to the other animals.”171
Thirdly, Nussbaum points out that separating rationality from human animal nature
makes us think of the core of ourselves as self-sufficient,
not in need of the gifts of fortune; in so thinking we greatly
distort the nature of our own morality and rationality,
which are thoroughly material and animal themselves; we
learn to ignore the fact that disease, old age, and accident
can impede the moral and rational functions, just as much
as the other animal functions.172
Finally, Nussbaum believes that perceiving humans as split entities encourages the
erroneous notion that our “core” is outside of time. She says,
Thinking in this way, we may forget that the usual human
life-cycle brings with it periods of extreme dependency, in
which our functioning is very similar to that enjoyed by
people with mental or physical disabilities throughout their
lives.173
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Nussbaum believes that had Rawls completely rejected Kant’s duality of the
rational and the animal nature within humans, he would have more effectively
approached an inclusive theory.174 The author wishes to point out that Rawls does
provide for the inclusion (based on rationality) of most people on the impairment
spectrum in that he requires a minimum degree of rationality rather than Kantian
“independence,” while acknowledging that his Kantian foundation prevents a fully
inclusive perspective.175 He feels less ambivalent than Nussbaum, however, in his
assertion that modifications to justice as fairness can occur without its loss of identity.
For this to occur, more than just its Kantian essence must be modified, however.
Nussbaum observes that Rawls’s adherence to Humean doctrines, which limit
where justice can operate, necessitates his qualification that designers be “roughly equal.”
She notes that the contract tradition requires rough equality among participants in order
to justify their equal treatment. She questions whether rough equality of “power and
capacity” must necessarily be linked to moral equality. Nussbaum thinks these can be
delinked so that regardless of unequal endowments, humans remain morally equivalent
and hence equally deserving of moral recognition.176 She points out that Rawls, in
contrast to earlier contract theorists, “…distinguishes between these two types of
equality” yet regrets that he continues to require both from his participants.177

174

Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 66.

175

John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 183.

176

Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 31.

177

Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 31.

127

Nussbaum presents a powerful critique of Rawls, but can her desire for moral
equivalency escape the broader rationality problem and the ways it affects social
perceptions of value, which prohibit full inclusion. Nussbaum identifies with the liberal
political tradition and considers the capabilities approach as “another member of this
family” of “liberal conceptions.”178 In Sex and Social Justice, she says:
At the heart of this tradition is a twofold intuition about
human beings: namely, that all, just by being human, are of
equal dignity and worth, no matter where they are situated
in society, and that the primary source of this worth is a
power of moral choice within them, a power that consists in
the ability to plan a life in accordance with one’s own
evaluation of ends (italics the author’s). To these two
intuitions—which link liberalism at its core to the thought
of the Greek and Roman Stoics—the liberal tradition adds
one more, which the Stoics did not emphasize: That the
moral equality of persons gives them a fair claim to certain
types of treatment at the hands of society and politics.
What this treatment is will be a subject of debate within the
tradition, but the shared starting point is that this treatment
must do two closely related things. It must respect and
promote the liberty of choice, and it must respect and
promote the equal worth of persons as choosers (italics the
authors).179
This language seems to the author to be ambiguous, simultaneously offering universality
and tying moral equality to the ability to choose. Nussbaum bases her position on
separating moral equivalency from equality of power on the works of Hugo Grotius.
While this is her response to Hume and rough equality, it is unfortunate that Grotius, too,
bases his notion of moral equivalency on human rationality.180
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In her later work on Rawls and impairment, Frontiers of Justice: Disability,
Nationality, Species Membership, Nussbaum distances herself from her earlier statement.
She says, “…any child of human parents has the fully equal dignity that belongs to every
human being.”181 The author assumes that this statement, with which he agrees, stems
from her understanding that humans and relationship are deeply interwoven, instead of
this being an argument based on DNA, yet if she criticizes Rawls for a reliance on Kant,
she must be criticized equally for identification with the reason-centric Grotius. Either
moral equivalency is based on a person’s ability to choose and people without that ability
are moral outliers, or another reason for moral equivalency must be articulated. Moral
equivalency is the basis for personhood and with that status, an expectation that other
persons are obligated to reciprocate agreed upon goods, among these, rights and supports
toward the development of capabilities.
In Women and Human Development, Nussbaum describes her frustration with
“the language of rights,” stating that a lack of clarity obscures understanding. She states,
“People differ about what the basis of a rights claim is: rationality, sentience, and mere
life have all had their defenders.”182 Instead of discussing claim rights, Nussbaum
formulates a list of capabilities unique to her version of the theory, which need not be
claimed by an offended individual, rather facilitated by the individual’s government,
community, family, allies, or the individual herself. These “functionings” include basic
capabilities (things with which a person is born that provide functional abilities like
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hearing and sight), internal capabilities (things that a person is born with the potential for,
but which must be developed like intellect and mobility), external capabilities (social,
cultural, and political circumstances, which support human flourishing), and combined
capabilities (successfully developed internal capabilities existing within an environment,
which allows and encourages their expression).183 Nussbaum’s comprehensive list
represents what is necessary for each human being to achieve a minimum threshold of
flourishing. She sees the capabilities as achievable through a variety of supports,
including statute, natural supports (such as help from family and friends), education
toward the goal of developing just social norms, economic empowerment tools (such as
microfinance), and political participation. She includes:
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of
normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life
is so reduced as to be not worth living.
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health,
including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished;
to have adequate shelter.
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from
place to place; having one’s bodily boundaries treated as
sovereign, i.e. being able to be secure against assault,
including sexual assault, child sexual abuse, and domestic
violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and
for choice in matters of reproduction.
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use
the senses, to imagine, think, and reason—and to do these
things in a ‘truly human’ way, a way informed and
cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no
means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and
scientific training. Being able to use imagination and
thought in connection with experiencing and producing
self-expressive works and events of one’s own choice,
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religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use
one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of
expression with respect to both political and artistic speech,
and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to search for
the ultimate meaning of life in one’s own way. Being able
to have pleasurable experiences, and to avoid nonnecessary pain.
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and
people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care
for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to
grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger.
Not having one’s emotional development blighted by
overwhelming fear and anxiety, or by traumatic events of
abuse or neglect. (Supporting this capability means
supporting forms of human association that can be shown
to be crucial in their development.)
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of
the good and to engage in critical reflection about the
planning of one’s life. (This entails protection for the
liberty of conscience.)
7. Affiliation.
A. Being able to live with and toward others, to
recognize and show concern for other human
beings, to engage in various forms of social
interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of
another and to have compassion for that
situation; to have the capability for both justice
and friendship. (Protecting this capability means
protecting institutions that constitute and
nourish such forms of affiliation, and also
protecting the freedom of assembly and political
speech.)
B. Having the social bases of self-respect and non–
humiliation; being able to be treated as a
dignified being whose worth is equal to that of
others. This entails, at a minimum, protections
against discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
sexual orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity, or
national origin. In work, being able to work as a
human being, exercising practical reason and
entering into meaningful relationships of mutual
recognition with other workers.
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8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and
in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational
activities.
10. Control over One’s Environment.
A. Political. Being able to participate effectively
in political choices that govern one’s life;
having the right of political participation,
protections of free speech and association.
B. Material. Being able to hold property (both
land and movable goods), not just formally but
in terms of real opportunity; and having
property rights on an equal basis with others;
having the right to seek employment on an equal
basis with others; having the freedom from
unwarranted search and seizure.184
The author assumes Nussbaum intends universal inclusion in the capabilities
approach, since she critiques Rawls as exclusionary, yet he finds many of the capabilities
unachievable for people with impairment. He will never have complete bodily health and
may not realize a “normal” lifespan. People with sensory deficits will be challenged in
ways that statute, natural supports, education, and political participation cannot mitigate.
People with severe cognitive impairment will never reason or require liberty of
conscience or freedom of expression. The author lauds Nussbaum’s list, but imagines
that the person with severe impairment was not the citizen she envisioned during its
creation.
While most of us would prefer to live to a “normal” age, it is even more important
to live each day with knowledge of the respect of our neighbors—to be understood to be
valuable and contributory, no matter the form of the contribution. While each of us
184
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would prefer not to cough or limp, to breathe independently instead of with artificial
respiration, to live without surgeries and medication, what is more important is that our
neighbors respect us despite the evidence of our imperfections and that professionals treat
us like people first with preferences, points of view, and the need to control what is done
to our bodies. All of these things are necessary to reach a status of “moral equivalency.”
Nussbaum’s list is valid and comprehensive for a human being without impairment, but it
neglects a primary good which must be delivered by a just society—that of acceptance
through the acknowledgement of the equal potential value and contributory power held
by all human beings. People might lose the respect of society through the performance of
intentional anti-social acts, but no one should live without respect from the moment of
their birth or throughout a blameless life.
Sen offers a list of less detailed, but equally complex (in terms of implementation)
capabilities. He includes “economic opportunities, political freedoms, social facilities,
transparency guarantees, and protective security.”185 Ingrid Robeyns, professor in
Practical Philosophy at Erasmus University, critiques Sen in particular and the
capabilities approach in general as being impossible to implement. Referencing Robert
Sugden, she says:
…given the rich array of functionings that Sen takes to be
relevant, given the extent of disagreement among
reasonable people about the nature of the good life, and
given the unresolved problem of how to value sets, it is
natural to ask how far Sen’s framework is operational. Is it
a realistic alternative to the methods on which economists
typically rely—measurement of real income, and the kind
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of practical cost-benefit analysis which is grounded in
Marshallian consumer theory?186
She continues:
The capability approach in practice comes in a variety of
forms, in part because of the wide scope of the approach,
but also because the approach is radically underspecified:
there are a number of theoretical lacunae that can be filled
in a variety of ways. How one makes these specifications
depends in part on the kind of theory (for example, a theory
of justice, or a theory of welfare economics) or the kind of
application (for example, a critique on existing social
practices, or a measurement exercise), but it also depends
in part on particular normative and epistemological
assumptions.187
The capabilities approach and, incidentally, resourcist approaches, as well, could equally
depend on normative assumptions that are either emancipatory or stifling. Only the
original position assures that they be freedom-and-justice-enhancing. Furthermore,
nowhere in Nussbaum or Sen’s offerings is the intrinsic contribution and value of people
with severe impairment addressed. Nussbaum talks about justice towards this population
being a good in and of itself, but does not talk about any intrinsic value within the person
with impairment.
In order to fully gain value, such that a new mother of a baby with impairment no
longer mourns the birth of her baby, such that a young man after acquiring a spinal cord
injury no longer contemplates suicide, such that an old woman who needs help to toilet
no longer writes a letter to the Hemlock Society, and such that a doctor no longer fails to
treat a curable disease in a intellectually impaired man, it is the duty of the theorist to
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make a convincing argument for the actual—not euphemistic—contribution made by
people with severe impairment. Despite her call for moral equivalency, Nussbaum does
not venture into this realm. Her demand that humans have “the social bases of selfrespect and non–humiliation” which includes being “treated as a dignified being whose
worth is equal to that of others” assigns rather than observes value.
The author, even as he argues for the inclusion of non-rational acts of contribution
within the rubric of reciprocity, acknowledges that relational acts and catalytic
circumstances, either produced or encouraged by people with severe cognitive
impairment, cannot, on their own, maintain the institutions of justice, democracy,
philosophy, or politics. He does argue and believe that alongside traditional duties, extrarational contribution benefits humankind and must be acknowledged for its additional
value. He thinks that justice as fairness can absorb this perspective and maintain its
identity.
But, as it stands, people with severe impairment are understood to be excluded
from justice as fairness not only because of the rationality problem, but also because they
cannot meet the test of rough equality. Nussbaum notes that Rawls must incorporate the
Humean concept of “rough equals” to deal with the contract problem of bargaining. If
extraordinarily vulnerable people find themselves in the bargaining position, they are apt
to be coerced into positions of further disadvantage, even perhaps slavery.188 This is
especially true of people with severe cognitive impairment. Even if they could form some
concept of their ends, they would be disadvantaged in a situation of competitive
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bargaining by a lack of understanding as to how differing means might, or might not, lead
to their chosen ends. But, is traditional bargaining essential to justice as fairness?
Norman Daniels, Mary B. Saltonstall Professor of Population Ethics at Harvard
University, takes issue with the idea that once in the original position, bargaining in any
competitive sense would take place. If this is true, references to whether or not people
have the capability of successfully bargaining are moot. He says:
Rawls rejects the idea that the contract involves bargaining.
Instead, moral claims about the fundamental equality of
citizens, as well as their freedom, shape the design of his
contract situation. He places contractors behind a veil of
ignorance that blinds them to the specifics of their own
situation. The result is that contractors must be impartial
and cannot help but avoid judgments that might be biased
in favor of people with their actual talents, skills,
capabilities, or needs. So forceful is the restriction on
knowledge of differences that any sense of bargaining away
disagreements is eliminated…It would clearly be unfair
criticism to lump Rawls with those squarely in the
bargaining tradition.189
The issue of rationality needed for bargaining aside, Rawls hints that people with
unusually extreme support needs, even those with the ability to reason, might be too
expensive to be welcome at the bargaining table; thus people, like the author, who have
need of a much higher than typical consumption of goods, despite the presence of
arguable rationality, might be too far from being “rough equals” in terms of goods
consumption to qualify under a system of mutual advantage. Since, for Rawls, the
circumstances of justice mimic the state of nature, “undesirables” would be prevented
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from entering the original position. Specific information about what constitutes
undesirability is elusive. In responding to Sen and Kenneth Arrow’s observations about
human variation, including impairment, Rawls says,
…Let us…ask whether a variation places people above or
below the line: that is whether it leaves them with more or
less than the minimum essential capacities required to be a
normal cooperating member of society.”190
One of the variations Rawls discusses is “a variation in physical capacities and skills,
including the effects of illness and accident on natural abilities.” Would Rawls agree
with an interpretation that one’s extraordinary degree of need for economic goods, as in
the case of people with severe physical impairment, would be a consideration in whether
one could participate? Nussbaum is sure of Rawls’s position. She says:
…the idea is that people will get together with others and
contract for principles of justice only in certain
circumstances in which they can expect mutual benefit and
in which all stand to gain from the cooperation. To include
in the initial situation people who are unusually expensive,
or who can be expected to contribute less than others to the
well-being of the group, would go contrary to the logic of
the whole exercise. If people are making a bargain for
mutual advantage, they will want to get together with those
from cooperation with whom they expect to gain, not those
who will demand unusual and expensive attention without
contributing anything much to the social product, thus
depressing the level of society’s well-being.191
Nussbaum is correct that Rawls (and not just the more egoistic contract theorists
like David Gauthier whom she later quotes) acknowledges and entertains the economic
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reasoning behind deferring decisions about the economic needs of people with
extraordinary circumstances. Rawls states:
…the variations that put some citizens below the line as a
result of illness and accident (once we allow for these) can
be dealt with, I believe, at the legislative stage when the
prevalence and kinds of these misfortunes are known and
the costs of treating them can be ascertained and balanced
along with total government expenditure.192
While Sen comments on Rawls’s “pervasive sympathy for the disadvantaged” including
his recommendation for “special correctives” for people with impairment, he questions
whether justice can be achieved in light of their postponement. He says:
These corrections come not in setting up ‘the basic
institutional structure’ of the society at the ‘constitutional
stage’, but as something that should emerge later on in the
use of the institutions thus set up, particularly in the
‘legislative stage’. This makes the reach of Rawls’s
motivation clear enough, and the question to be asked is
whether this is adequate as a way of rectifying the partial
blindness of the perspective of resources and primary goods
in Rawlsian principles of justice.193
Sen continues in pointing out the most important problem inherent in postponement to
the legislative phase—the fact that the basic institutions set up in the original position are
“not at all influenced” by the special issues of those with impairment.194 The author has
to acknowledge that in deferring justice for people with extraordinary economic needs to
a legislative phase, Rawls does deny the person, whose existence requires extreme
societal economic support, participation in the original position and whatever corrections
192
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are made at the legislative phase will only be patches on a basically flawed fundamental
structure. This brings to the author’s mind the image of retrofitting a structure to comply
with the ADA instead of designing the building, from its inception, with all possible users
in mind.
Nussbaum assumes that people in the original position would know that they are
not severely impaired and hence not veiled from that possibility for two reasons. First,
they would know because Rawls’s endorsement of Hume’s “circumstances of justice,”
which require rough equality among contractors would prevent the participation of all
severely impaired individuals, and second because the pool of desirable partners in the
contract would not include the burdensome. Thus, in Nussbaum’s interpretation, no one
with severe impairment would be allowed to participate, and so would never be found
under the veil.
She is frustrated with Rawls’s reticence to allow participation by all those with
physical impairment. She says, “So: let the parties in the Original Position not know
what physical disability they may or may not have. Then, and only then, will the resulting
principles will (sic) be truly fair to people with disabilities.”195
Nussbaum finds three reasons for Rawls’s inability to make this adjustment. One
argument for why Rawls is unable to accept people with extraordinary physical needs
under the veil is related to the intersection of statistical knowledge allowed in the original
position and the assumed assertion of mutual advantage, in the traditional sense of that
term, as discussed above. She correctly states that people in the original position have
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basic knowledge of the world, including statistics about the prevalence of types of
impairment. She worries that since they would know that only a small percentage of
humans have particular impairments, the rarity of which require extraordinary economic
mitigation, they would be unwilling to expend community resources on beings so
expensive and with such little likelihood of economic reciprocation.196
Nussbaum further explains that society’s public spaces are designed with
statistical probabilities surrounding impairment in mind. She describes “normal”
impairments, which are addressed regularly in community design. Mitigation of
limitations that are ordinary is widely accepted. No one expects a human being to
levitate ten feet to enter an elevated building. But because that mitigation is based on
statistical probabilities, stairs are built, which cater to how the vast majority of people rise
to higher ground. The height of a step is designed with a typical gait in mind. A handrail
is added only if a typical person would need one for safety. An elevator replaces stairs
only if a typical person would become winded in a circumstance of having to climb many
stairs. The typical American, having lived with the Americans with Disabilities Act for
many years might find this argument antiquated, but on an international scale, it makes
sense.
Her point finally comes down to economics. She states:
The real issue for the contractarian, however, is the relative
rarity of the non-‘normal’ impairments (defined as not
‘normal’ just by reference to their relative rarity); this rarity
entails that expensive and difficult arrangements will have
to be made to make work and public space fully accessible
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to people who have them, enabling them to be ‘normally’
productive.197
Nussbaum’s argument only holds when people with extraordinary impairment are
denied access to the original position, for surely, if the possibility for impairment exists in
the minds of the participants, infrastructure would be of universal design. Cost would be
a factor only in the re-design of current structures. Nussbaum’s descriptions of the costs
of restructuring public spaces for individuals with impairment are based on present
reality, which the author thinks originally developed less from an expense perspective
and more from the fact that people with impairment have been socially isolated for so
long that their needs were, in the past when public spaces were designed, not considered
at all. In any original design choices, if participants, whether people with impairment or
people who might become impaired in the future, or people prescient enough to imagine
that their children or grandchildren might have impairment, have a choice between stairs
and a ramp, which cost about the same to create in the original installation, or between
two typical bathroom stalls or one wide stall, which have similar bottom lines, or between
a sloping shower floor that allows water to run to the drain or a shower stall with walls
that contain the water, which have no significant cost differential, why wouldn’t they
choose the more universal design? It is only in retrofitting the public spaces of the past,
designed for a populace less heterogeneous than today’s that expense becomes a problem.
So, this concern of Nussbaum’s is moot in incipient circumstances and only possibly
valid in circumstances where the original position is to be used as an ongoing
perspective. Even in the latter case, it would be valid only if participants are screened for
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ultimate goods consumption at the door and hence excluded from the original position or
if included participants are risk takers to the degree that they are willing to risk the access
of their future selves and those of their children and grandchildren.
In any configuration of participants in the original position, all would be veiled
from their own circumstances. If, under these conditions, they are given statistical
information that leads them to conclude that they are extremely unlikely to be severely
impaired and if that influences them to take a risk and come to a consensus on the
parameters of goods distribution, which leads to an unjust result, then justice as fairness
would have failed and it would be revealed that if it is a system of pure procedural
justice, which guarantees a just outcome if the system is loaded fairly, then the basic
assumptions need to be reconsidered. The inclusion of statistical information about the
prevalence of any expensive conditions that result in increased poverty would not load
the system fairly if it is acknowledged that people might be willing to accept a risk if it is
small and that people are driven to participate initially only if the system is guaranteed to
be economically mutually advantageous, but the remedy seems simple. The exclusion of
statistical information in the original position eliminates the contaminating aspect of the
loading process. So, the author would argue that statistical information about the
prevalence of severe impairment, which might encourage gambling on whether one might
or might not be affected, must not be available under the veil.
Still, the author is not willing to assume that mutual advantage can only be
described in economic terms. As the author has discussed, many forms of contribution
exist beyond those based on economic reciprocity. While Nussbaum seems to
acknowledge extra-rational contribution to some extent, she still sees relationships
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between people lacking impairment and people with severe impairment to be
“asymmetrical.” Because she doesn’t completely share the author’s position that nonrational people make extraordinary contributions, she cannot see any common ground
between social contract theory and the inclusion of people with severe impairment.198 If,
on the other hand, value is observed and acknowledged, there is no incompatibility with
mutual advantage arguments. The author contends that leaving people with severe
impairment out of the recipe results in a much less rich, flavorful, and nuanced social
cake. Nussbaum sees only a less just cake. She sees inclusion as a valuable moral good
in and of itself, separate from any social benefit of reciprocal exchange. She says:
…why can’t Rawls simply adopt a more moralized
conception of the benefits of social cooperation, one that
includes the goods of inclusion, respect for human dignity,
and justice itself as among the benefits the parties are
seeking out of their social cooperation?...We choose to
respect and include the disabled because it is good in itself
to do so, whether it is economically efficient or not.
Benefit should not be understood in purely economic terms,
for there is the great good of justice itself to be considered.
This reply is clearly in tune with one deep strand in
Rawls’s thinking, and it is the sort of reply he makes often
when he is talking about the idea of overlapping consensus
and why the agreement of citizens in a well-ordered society
is no mere modus vivendi.199
So, Nussbaum acknowledges Rawls’s interest in the “great good of justice itself,” and the
author is in complete agreement. But, Rawls also speaks to the good of social unions. The
author contends that the more homogenous a society, the more “special cases,” outliers,
and challenges are banished, the more the person next to you reflects your own image,
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the less benefit will be realized from Rawls’s social unions. Only diversity of viewpoint
and experience will manifest in enrichment. This perspective does not seem to be so
removed from Rawls’s intention and is missed by Nussbaum.
Nussbaum’s second line of reasoning, as to why Rawls cannot accept people with
extraordinary needs in the original position, stems from her assertion that because justice
as fairness evolves from the contract tradition, it cannot free itself from traditional
contractarian notions of mutual advantage. Nussbaum quotes Gauthier,
The primary problem is care of the handicapped. Speaking
euphemistically of enabling them to live productive lives,
when the services required exceed any possible products,
conceals an issue which, understandably, no one wants to
face.”200
He continues, “Such persons are not party to the moral relationships grounded by a
contractarian theory.”201 So, now the addition of expensive people to the already exiled
non-rational population is clearly observed. Rawls did state, in the previously quoted
statement that care of the impaired would be deferred to a later, legislative stage.
Gauthier takes a much more completely exclusionary position. Nussbaum’s inclusion of
such an ugly statement in her critique of Rawls is unfair and does not capture the spirit of
his intent.
In her final explanation of why Rawls cannot include people with severe
impairment in the original position, she cites his desire to have a simple economic
measuring stick for determining who is the least advantaged for the purpose of
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distributing goods per the difference principle. To prioritize “thing-like items, above all
wealth and income” is to simplify the task.202 Complicating the process with having to
measure non-quantifiable goods such as physical abilities seems to Nussbaum to muddy
the waters.203 She does acknowledge that Rawls identifies self-respect as “the most
important” of the primary goods and thus has moved in the direction of complex
(possibly the most complex) goods. She does not then proceed from that admission to
suppose that extra-economic goods might find a place within justice as fairness, stating
instead that if Rawls were to embrace a complex and heterogeneous definition of goods
he would face two problems. She enumerates,
…first, how to balance one such good against another
without giving way to ‘intuitionistic’ tradeoffs…second,
how to think about social productivity in new multivalued
terms, something that would cause a profound alteration in
the whole logic of his contractarianism.204
Sen, for his part, criticizes Rawls’s focus on economic primary goods for its
failure to assure that equality of well-being follows from the egalitarian distribution of
these goods. Sen says:
...in the difference principle, Rawls judges the opportunities
that people have through the means they possess, without
taking into account the wide variations they have in being
able to convert primary goods into good living. For
example, a disabled person can do far less with the same
level of income and other primary goods than can an ablebodied human being.205
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He continues:
If people were basically very similar, then an index of
primary goods might be quite a good way of judging
advantage. But, in fact, people seem to have very different
needs varying with health, longevity, climatic conditions,
location, work conditions, temperament, and even body
size (affecting food and clothing requirements). So what is
involved is not merely ignoring a few hard cases, but
overlooking very widespread and real differences. Judging
advantage purely in terms of primary goods leads to a
partially blind morality…Indeed, it can be argued that there
is, in fact, an element of ‘fetishism’ in the Rawlsian
framework. Rawls takes primary goods as the embodiment
of advantage, rather than taking advantage to be a
relationship between persons and goods.206
Sen references a study by Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman which finds that slaves in
the pre-Civil War United States enjoyed economic well-being comparable to free
agricultural laborers of the time. Nonetheless, they pursued the opportunity to escape
bondage when possible. The impetus to freedom was separate from and greater than the
economic status attached to it.207
Nussbaum might say that, in this example, dignity is defined by the achievement
of freedom and that, if economic goods fail to deliver freedom, they fail, as well, to
deliver dignity. The author understands that Nussbaum draws an important distinction
between justice as fairness and the capabilities approach around the etiology of dignity.
While Rawls’s participants are understood to derive their dignity from their Kantian
nature—in that they are reasonable and rational, Nussbaum’s participants derive their
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dignity from their achievement of the capabilities. These can be facilitated in many
diverse ways, but do not necessarily rely on the individual autonomous person’s inherent
characteristics. Since the capabilities can be facilitated by others, people who lack
rationality may achieve dignity through assistance.208
Nussbaum and Sen, believing Rawls’s distribution of economic goods to fall short
of assuring the complex array of needs-fulfillment essential to human flourishing, instead
choose to determine final goals and then work backward to find both economic and noneconomic means to those ends. Sen says,
The motivation behind Rawlsian reasoning, in particular his
emphasis on advancing human freedom, is quite compatible
with—and may be better served by—a direct concentration
on the assessment of freedom, rather than counting the
means towards achieving it.209
The capabilities approach is wedded to a way of looking at human need that goes beyond
resources to visualize ways humans utilize resources. One way of looking at capabilities
is to use the metaphor of eating food for nutrition. A typical person can eat a variety of
wholesome foods and be nourished while a person with an enzyme deficiency or a
metabolic insufficiency can eat the same diet and be malnourished. In the same way, one
person might be able to flourish with basic economic goods, if other components of the
capabilities are provided in her political, cultural, and social environment, while another
person lacking an environment which nurtures and develops gifts, which is neither
culturally egalitarian nor politically supportive, might receive the same, or even more
abundant basic economic goods and fail to flourish.
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The author understands that not all goods needed to secure human flourishing are
fundable and that it is indeed important to consider the part human relationship plays in
the achievement of capabilities necessary to achieve this status. Nonetheless he finds
Nussbaum and Sen’s criticism of Rawls’s econocentrism unnecessarily harsh. First, if it
is assumed that all participants are original designers, then impediments to freedom, such
as slavery, misogyny, or segregation, which Sen and Nussbaum consider outside of
economic mitigation, would not be built into the norms formulated in the original
position in the first place.
Second, because many impediments to full flourishing seen within the disability
community can be successfully mitigated economically and when goods such as
consumer directed care can be purchased, distribution of economic goods leads to dignity
and self-respect. If an unorthodox understanding of the difference principle is embraced,
and the uneven distribution of economic goods is allowed, such that people with
impairment might receive a disproportionately large share, this might lead to a
maximization of opportunity and increased justice might be possible within a Rawlsian
economic framework. The author thinks it is reasonable to view the principle of equal
liberty as mandating this unequal distribution of goods, if that is necessary for the
achievement of equal levels of functioning. Money can be viewed as potential energy,
capable of becoming a myriad of needed goods. As long as people with impairment (or
their allies) are allowed control over the expenditure of the money, self-respect can be a
foreseeable outcome.
While it is true that all aspects of well-being cannot be measured and compared,
many needs can be calculated in terms of what it takes economically to maximize
148

opportunity. Even in cases of intellectual impairment, where it is acknowledged that the
ability to reason cannot be purchased, the disproportionate distribution of economic
goods toward the end of maximizing the benefits of excellent care giving, selfdetermination focused education, augmentative communication and other technologies
that mitigate deficits, and support for community living all have an economic component.
Discrepancies in fortune would have economic consequences due to Rawls’s allowance
that “the distribution of wealth and income” will be “determined by the natural
distribution of abilities and talents.”210 So, when Rawls focuses on the distribution of
economic goods alone it is because so many non-economic goods ultimately can be
accessed through the proper expenditure of money and because many non-economic
goods would be addressed in the original position. These would be inclusive of social
attitudes. Thomas Pogge, Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at
Yale says of Rawls:
He…emphasizes the political liberties and their fair value
as a crucial primary good that allows citizens, together, to
shape the social and natural conditions that shape their
lives. In these ways, a sophisticated resourcist view does
take account of social conditions and of their potentially
differential impact on persons and groups…211
Here Pogge defends Rawls’s attention to needs, which cannot be addressed in an
economic fashion. Here he speaks to the power of the original position.
If a priority-based conception of justice is to be maintained, however, the problem
remains of determining economic distribution based on a measurement of who is the least
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well off. In a model that only considers rough equals, disparities would be minimal, but
once people with impairment are considered, disparities move beyond the realm of
income inequalities into another more challenging comparative realm. This new problem
might be addressed by introducing a hybrid conception of justice, which maintains the
difference principle and prioritizes the distribution of goods to the least advantaged while
determining who is the least advantaged by measuring the amount of primary goods
necessary to reach a sufficient level of capability. An examination of one’s “functioning”
or need and its ability to be addressed through the distribution of economic goods may be
seen as the social support for individual development featured in Nussbaum’s model.
Rawls states that competition for careers must be open to talents and abilities without
regard for social or economic standing. Nussbaum understands that the talents and
abilities of which Rawls speaks often require external supports to fully manifest. Thus,
for example, before “careers open to talents and abilities” can be competed for fairly,
there must be development of innate equipment. Since it seems impossible to determine
what a full development of a person’s innate talents and abilities might be, it becomes
necessary to draw a line at a sufficient level of development.
Sen discusses the meaning of a sufficient level of development:
Equality between persons can be defined either in terms of
attainments, or in terms of the shortfalls from the maximal
values that each can respectively attain. For ‘attainment
equality’ of achievements, we compare the actual levels of
achievement. For ‘shortfall equality’, what are compared
are the shortfalls of actual achievements from the
respective maximal achievements… Shortfall equality
takes us in the direction of equal use of the respective
potentials, whereas attainment equality is concerned with
equal absolute levels of achievement (no matter what the
maximal achievements are).
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If human diversity is so powerful that it makes it
impossible to equalize what is potentially achievable, then
there is a basic ambiguity in assessing achievement, and in
judging equality of achievement or of the freedom to
achieve. If the maximal achievement that person 1 can
have—under the most favourable circumstances—is, say,
X, while person 2 can maximally manage 2X, then equality
of attainment would leave person 2 invariably below his or
her potential achievement…
In the case of serious disabilities, attainment equality may
be hard to achieve, and it may be particularly tempting to
opt for shortfall equality. There might well be a good
argument in that direction, but I would like to argue that it
is not the case that the choice is made clear-cut simply by
the non-feasibility of attainment equality. It can be argued
that even when a disabled person cannot, in any way, be
given the freedom to enjoy the same level of the
functioning in question,…there is nevertheless a good
case—based on fairness—for trying to maximize his belowpar functioning ability, rather than settling for the same
shortfall (absolute or proportionate) as others have from
their—much higher—maximal functioning.212
Aside from the fairness argument, maximizing function for people with
impairment might have the social benefit of reducing the costs of their supports. A
sufficient level of functioning might be defined as the level attained when society has
provided the resources to maximize function and a plateau has been reached over the
course of a significant period of time.
This approach to development rarely happens in the case of people with severe
impairment, as assumptions of inability and the corresponding belief that spending
money toward this end is futile, override even minimal development of natural capacities.
What it takes to support development toward the end of maximizing self-determination
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must be assured and, for the purposes of resource allocation, can be translated into an
economic rubric. For example, if a child with impairment requires a classroom aide to
benefit from her education, then the salary of that aide can become part of the unequal
distribution of economic goods. If she requires someone to sign for her, a
communication device, an electronic tablet with appropriate applications, a physical
educator trained in integrative strategies, or occupational therapy, these, too, can be
provided for economically. As Rawls states, “…at the basis of the parties’ reliance on
primary goods is their recognition that these goods are essential all-purpose means to
realize the higher-order interests…”213 Other needs like appropriate teacher expectations,
peer respect, and acceptance of unequal distribution of economic goods would be
addressed in the original position through the choosing of the principle of equal liberty, if
people with impairment are included participants. Thus, a certain blending of justice as
fairness with a capabilities approach might prove helpful. Other contract theorists have
appreciated the broader perspective offered by capabilities and have looked at their
incorporation into justice as fairness.
Henry Richardson, student of Rawls and professor of philosophy at Georgetown
University, offers an expansion of Rawlsian theory, which acknowledges Nussbaum’s
contribution and incorporates the notion of capabilities into justice as fairness. He begins
by acknowledging Nussbaum’s criticism of Rawls’s postponement of justice for those
beyond the typical range of capacity. Among the general reasons against postponement
that Nussbaum adduces are the following:
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1. The pervasiveness of dependence and disability: Each
of us enters life as a dependent infant lacking the
capabilities of a fully cooperating member of society,
almost all of us get seriously ill at some point, and
many of us will be infirm and dependent again in old
age.
2. The universality of care: Correspondingly, care-giving
work by parents (most often mothers), doctors and
nurses, and by one’s children or the state is an essential
feature of human life.
3. The continuum of disability: Each of us has capabilities
that are defective in one way or another. There is a
continuum (although not a clearly ordered one) in this
regard.
4. The moral imperative to avoid drawing a dichotomy
between the disabled and the non-disabled: Given the
appalling history of social treatment of those with
serious disabilities, it would be wrong to approach these
issues with an ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality.214
Richardson also is wedded to the notion of the original position and the veil of ignorance.
He says:
Rawls’s OP powerfully unites some fundamental
convictions we have about morality, justice, and the
appropriate constraints on developing principles.
Its veil of ignorance represents a vivid way of combining
common-sense thoughts about being in someone else’s
shoes with a kind of impartiality that neutralizes arbitrary
inequalities of advantage. Its combination of the veil with
the mutually-disinterested rationality of the parties aims to
express something of the spirit of universal benevolence,
but with more definite results. Because it captures ideals of
empathy, impartiality, equality, rationality, and
benevolence in these ways the OP represents a morally
compelling viewpoint for us to consider as we begin to
tackle the challenging issue of justice regarding
disability.215
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In order to address issues of impairment without postponement to a legislative
stage, people with severe impairment must be represented in the original position. People
in the original position are trustees for every conceivable individual in society.
Richardson states this in agreement with Rawls.216 In addition to the ten stipulations
placed upon the original position by Rawls, Richardson adds three more.217 First, he
insists on the “inclusion of all those with disability.” He states,
The parties are to assume that the persons they represent
include persons of all levels of ability and disability, in
such proportions as general knowledge about humans and
human society would indicate.
This “implies that each of the parties is ignorant about the level of disability of the person
on whose behalf it is to choose” and recognizes the above mentioned reasons for
addressing impairment in the original position. Second, the parties in the original position
must be given “the fundamental facts regarding disability” including
…that disability is a pervasive and unavoidable feature of
human life…, that care-giving work is an essential feature
of human life… and that all humans have capabilities that
are defective in some regard, there being a continuum of
disability.
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Finally, individuals in the original position must accept “that it would be wrong for
principles of basic justice to invoke a simple dichotomy between ‘the disabled’ and ‘the
non-disabled.’”218 Richardson in no way suggests that non-reasoners will be among the
choosers in the original position, only that they will be represented. He says, “…the
parties choose as trustees on behalf of the ‘unknown’ persons they represent…The
severely mentally disabled of course cannot reason about principles of justice…”219
Thus, when Richardson speaks of “inclusion” he means inclusion as representee, not
representor.
Richardson wonders what principles of justice might develop in the original
position if people with severe impairment were represented. He begins by offering
Rawls’s principles of justice from Political Liberalism:
1. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate
scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which
scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and
in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only
those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value [the
‘First Principle’].
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two
conditions:
A. first, they are to be attached to positions and
offices open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity [the ‘equal opportunity’
principle]; and
B. second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of
the least advantaged members of society [the
‘difference principle’].220
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Richardson calls attention to a statement made by Rawls, which argues for
Rawls’s acceptance of an additional, lexically prior principle, which might be added
before the above stated principles of justice. Rawls states:
…important aspects of the principles are left out in the brief
statement as given. In particular the first principle covering
the equal basic rights and liberties may easily be preceded
by a lexically prior principle requiring that citizens’ basic
needs be met, at least insofar as their being met is necessary
for citizens to understand and to be able fruitfully to
exercise those rights and liberties. Certainly any such
principle must be assumed in applying the first principle.221
According to Richardson, people in the initial choice situation would have four
possible choices when developing principles of justice. He suggests that parties who
conceive of the good in terms of “rights, liberties, opportunities, income, wealth, and the
social basis of self-respect, understood as the self-respect of the equal citizen” would
choose the original Rawlsian principles, without modification as above.
Parties who understand the good as an amalgam characterized by “rights,
liberties, opportunities, income, wealth; by fundamental self-respect; and by the
capabilities” would choose, as a lexically prior principle, in addition to Rawls’s two
principles of justice, a Nussbaum-influenced, Richardson-revised option, which addresses
human needs in terms of capabilities. It states, “The basic institutions of society are to be
arranged so as to assure, so far as reasonably possible, that each citizen reaches a
threshold level of capability in each of the ten basic types of human capability.”
People who consider the capabilities approach as the best vehicle for the
satisfaction of human needs would choose Richardson’s procedural construction of
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Nussbaum’s capabilities approach which states, “The basic institutions of society are to
be arranged so as to assure, so far as reasonably possible, that each citizen reaches a
threshold level of capability in each of the ten basic types of human capability.”
A second principle, devised by Richardson to be lexically prior, but inclusive of
Rawls’s principles of justice which addresses human needs satisfaction in terms of
primary goods, states, “The basic institutions of society are to be arranged so that, so far
as reasonably possible, each citizen is assured a decent minimum of opportunity, income,
wealth, and self respect.” Richardson is unable to define any group whose motivations
would lead them to choose this principle to precede Rawls’s principles of justice.
Because his perspective is that human needs cannot be satisfied by primary goods alone,
he states:
As the facts of disability highlight, it does not seem
plausible to interpret basic needs in terms of the primary
goods. Accordingly, in relation to the motivational
assumption, (this option) stands at an unstable point,
attempting to recognize basic needs without drawing on an
account of central human capabilities.222
The author is in complete agreement with the value added by the capabilities
approach in that he agrees with the notion that focusing on the outcome of societally
initiated action is essential and that failure to assure that the distribution of goods or the
organization of assistance and dissemination of information delivers the desired human
flourishing is folly. He also would like to address the seemingly impossible expectation
that a government assure inclusive and democratic norms, tolerant and mature attitudes,
or beneficial relationships. In defense of Rawls’s primary goods position, the distribution
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of economic goods such that people with impairment are able to purchase appropriate
transportation and personal care assistance, such that public spaces are rendered barrierfree, such that technology supports their employment, and such that educational supports
are in place, will lead to increased inclusion and visibility in the community. This, in
turn, will lead to an increased comfort, tolerance, and maturity in society that will, in
addition to the distribution of economic goods, improve the capabilities of people with
impairment. Richardson, himself, makes a statement, which references his addition of
the clause “as far as is reasonably possible” in his principles of justice as stated above.
He says:
The hedge embodied in the clause about what is
‘reasonably possible,’ in this principle seems the price we
have to pay within Rawls’s contractarian scheme for
refusing to postpone issues about disability to the
legislative stage in which the parties know the level of the
resources of the society in which the persons they represent
reside.223
It seems to the author that this statement acknowledges the role economic goods play in a
society’s facilitation of goods, even heterogeneous goods which lead to the capabilities.
What does Nussbaum think of Richardson’s effort? She says, “…my basic
response to Richardson’s paper is: ‘Yes. That’s right. If you really changed all that, we
would be in business.’”224 She goes on to state that while Richardson’s offering has
merit, it cannot claim identification with justice as fairness or even the social contract
tradition as a whole. She says:
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What I think needs bringing out very clearly, since
Richardson is mining Rawlsian ideas for insight on this
question, is how dramatically one must depart from
classical social contract doctrine in order to have an
adequate answer to questions about justice and disability.
One has to give up, that is, two parts of the tradition to
which Rawls attached much importance: the idea of the
‘circumstances of justice’ as involving similar physical and
mental powers, and the related idea of mutual advantage as
the goal of the contract.225
Nussbaum points out another departure in Richardson’s assumption that identifies
individuals in the original position as trustees for people with impairment. She says:
Of course Richardson is as aware as I am that Rawls
himself did not make that move: the parties are trustees for
citizens’ in the Well-Ordered Society, who are
characterized, in rather idealized terms, as ‘fully
cooperating members of society over a complete life,’ a
characterization that, as Rawls explicitly says, excludes
people with severe disabilities, both physical and mental.226
She also takes issue with Richardson on his translation of her theory into a
procedural model. She says:
The part of Richardson’s argument in which he compares
the simple Nussbaumian view to mixed views is difficult
for me to assess, since I think and argue, that there is a
great difference between procedural and outcome-oriented
views and so I feel that it is not quite sufficient to treat the
simple Nussbaumian view as if it were one more example
of a procedural view.227
In Frontiers of Justice, she says:
The deepest difference between the capabilities approach
and Rawlsian contractarianism lies in its basic theoretical
225
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structure. Rawls’s approach, like most social contract
doctrines, is a procedural approach to justice. In other
words, it does not go directly to outcomes and examine
these for hallmarks of moral adequacy. Instead it designs a
procedure that models certain key features of fairness and
impartiality, and relies on these procedures to generate an
adequately just outcome.228
Nussbaum fails to take into account Rawls’s use of “reflective equilibrium.” In A
Theory of Justice, Rawls describes a method for assuring that the principles chosen in the
original position will facilitate the desired outcome. He says:
We can note whether applying these principles would lead
us to make the same judgments about the basic structure of
society which we now make intuitively and in which we
have the greatest confidence; or whether, in cases where
our present judgments are in doubt and given with
hesitation, these principles offer a resolution which we can
affirm on reflection. There are questions which we feel
sure must be answered in a certain way. For example, we
are confident that religious intolerance and racial
discrimination are unjust. We think that we have examined
these things with care and have reached what we believe is
an impartial judgment not likely to be distorted by an
excessive attention to our own interests. These convictions
are provisional fixed points which we presume any
conception of justice must fit. But we have much less
assurance as to what is the correct distribution of wealth
and authority. Here we may be looking for a way to
remove our doubts. We can check an interpretation of the
initial situation, then, by the capacity of its principles to
accommodate our firmest convictions and to provide
guidance where guidance is needed.
In searching for the most favored description of this
situation we work from both ends. We begin by describing
it so that it represents generally shared and preferably weak
conditions. We then see if these conditions are strong
enough to yield a significant set of principles. If not, we
look for further premises equally reasonable. But if so, and
these principles match our considered convictions of
228
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justice, then so far well and good. But presumably there
will be discrepancies. In this case we have a choice. We
can either modify the account of the initial situation or we
can revise our existing judgments, for even the judgments
we take provisionally as fixed points are liable to revision.
By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions
of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our
judgments and conforming them to principle, I assume that
eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation
that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields
principles which match our considered judgments duly
pruned and adjusted.229
Rawls does not, as Nussbaum suggests, design “a procedure that models certain key
features of fairness and impartiality,” and then rely “on these procedures to generate an
adequately just outcome” without putting that procedure through vigorous challenges,
revisions, and review.
Nussbaum goes on to give the argument for her preference for an outcome-based
approach. She says:
Defenders of outcome-oriented views are likely to feel that
procedural views put the cart before the horse: for surely
what matters for justice is the quality of life of people, and
we are ultimately going to reject any procedure, however
elegant, if it doesn’t give us an outcome that squares well
with our intuitions about dignity and fairness.230
The author points out that Rawls would agree as evidenced by his attention to reflective
equilibrium. The procedural framework, furthermore, once identified, allows each
citizen, who lacks hindsight with its ex post facto information at the outset of an inquiry,
an established method for arriving at just decisions. Outcome-based evaluations depend
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on results. Without a procedural framework, how are policies initially formulated and
should not nascent principles aim for maximal justice?
Nussbaum also notes that, in order to accommodate people with severe
impairment, Richardson’s notion of self-respect must differ in a profound way from that
of Rawls. Rawls’s notion of self-respect is entwined with the idea of the “self-confidence
of the equal citizen. Thus it presupposes the development and exercise of both moral
powers and therefore an effective sense of justice.”231 Richardson, on the other hand,
defines self-respect as “an attitude that ‘is necessary for all people, no matter what their
level of ability or disability, to have a sense that their life is worth living.’”232
Nussbaum’s rebuttal to Richardson brings this work to a critical question—one
that needs attention as a prelude to the author’s attempt to formulate his revised model.
What is the essence of justice as fairness? What must a revised version incorporate if it is
to be recognized as basically Rawlsian?
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Chapter Five
A Response to Rawls’s Challenge on Impairment
Ain’t it strange the way we’re ignorant
How we seek out bad advice
How we jigger it and figure it
Mistaking value for the price…—Paul Simon, So Beautiful
or So What

Will the inclusion of people with severe cognitive and physical impairment in the
original position alter justice as fairness beyond recognition? Would Rawls acknowledge
the revised version as within his vision? Although he postpones consideration of people
with severe impairment until the legislative phase, Rawls states that justice as fairness is
to be seen as a preliminary model, simplified initially for the general case, but with the
understanding that impairment will be grappled with in a future, more developed version.
Unfortunately, Rawls died before a thorough review of the theory was addressed.
Critiques from other philosophers regarding the problem of impairment, mentioned in the
earlier part of this work, were made, in general, after his death. Contemplation of what
Rawls would agree to or reject if he were alive today is speculative at best. He left a
body of work and stated perspectives, which speak for him. Anything added, subtracted,
or revised can be said to be neo-Rawlsian at best. With that understanding, it nonetheless
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is possible to consider revision in light of Rawls’s known mission and positions. In
Political Liberalism Rawls states:
Since we begin from the idea of society as a fair system of
cooperation, we assume that persons as citizens have all the
capacities that enable them to be cooperating members of
society. This is done to achieve a clear and uncluttered
view of what, for us, is the fundamental question of
political justice: namely what is the most appropriate
conception of justice for specifying the terms of social
cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal,
and as normal and fully cooperating members of society
over a complete life?
By taking this as the fundamental question we do not mean
to say, of course, that no one ever suffers from illness and
accident; such misfortunes are to be expected in the
ordinary course of life, and provision for these
contingencies must be made. But given our aim, I put aside
for the time being these temporary disabilities and also
permanent disabilities or mental disorders so severe as to
prevent people from being cooperating members of society
in the usual sense. Thus, while we begin with an idea of
the person implicit in the public political culture, we
idealize and simplify this idea in various ways in order to
focus first on the main question.
Other questions we can discuss later, and how we answer
them may require us to revise answers already reached.233
Thus, Rawls is open to revision and seems to have intended a review and possible
adjustments to justice as fairness. Between the time of Rawls’s original writing and
today, disability activism has forced open previously closed doors and, like other civil
rights movements, has made its agenda unavoidable. But, in addition to the obvious
primary concern for inclusive justice, the author questions whether justice can be
achieved for anyone without a comprehensive consideration of possible scenarios that
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might affect, and probably will affect in some way, any participant during the course of
her complete life. He suggests that the exclusion of people with severe impairment from
the original position, along with consideration of their circumstances, is among those
components requiring revision. At this point, the author would like to re-envision the
activity in the original position and see how this revision might appear.
It is agreed that choosers, in the original position, will be rational individuals
acting as trustees for every possible member of society. They will be veiled from their
individual circumstances, characteristics, and beliefs, in Rawlsian fashion. But they will
also be conscious that impairment will most likely play some role in every life and that
that there is a 15.3 % chance globally that moderate or severe impairment will affect
one’s future self or one’s children and grandchildren.234 From that perspective, rational
choosers will determine whether their own self-interest compels them to consider the
issues of impairment in the original position.
People in the original position, while they know that they themselves are not
severely impaired in that moment, have no knowledge of the circumstances of their
children or grandchildren. Nor do they know what their future cognitive and physical
status will be. This author assumes that a person, under the veil, will represent the
interests of progeny and one’s future self, who might have impairment, based on seeing
them as extensions of self. Rawls discusses a related concept in his notion of “heads of
families.” He says:
The question arises, however, whether the persons in the
original position have obligations and duties to third
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parties, for example, to their immediate descendants. To
say that they do would be one way of handling questions of
justice between generations. However, the aim of justice as
fairness is to try to derive all duties and obligations of
justice from other reasonable conditions. So, if possible,
this way out should be avoided. There are several other
courses open to us. We can adopt a motivation assumption
and think of the parties as representing a continuing line of
claims. For example, we can assume that they are heads of
families and therefore have a desire to further the wellbeing of at least their more immediate descendants. Or we
can require the parties to agree to principles subject to the
constraint that they wish all preceding generations to have
followed the very same principles. By an appropriate
combination of such stipulations, I believe that the whole
chain of generations can be tied together and principles
agreed to that suitably take into account the interests of
each. If this is right, we will have succeeded in deriving
duties to other generations from reasonable conditions.235
The author believes that a person, under the veil, will represent the unknown and
unknowable circumstances of future generations and his own future self, not only as an
obligation or duty, nor even from the perspective of a concerned patriarch or matriarch,
but as a self-interested contractor. This belief is rooted in the notion that self-concept
extends beyond the present self with its physical, intellectual, and emotional components.
People are passions and beliefs as much as body-delimited selves. People find meaning
in working toward goals, which will far outlive their existences. The author does not
want to argue whether people do anything from a selfless perspective or whether every
action is undertaken for a personal reward, but he can say with certainty that beyond any
altruistic motive, there is additionally an expectation of personal gain, even if
psychologically veiled, in every action. It makes a person feel good about himself to
teach at-risk children. A person feels that in working toward a cure for cancer, her own
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medical battle has meaning. Often good deeds are done simply because internalized selfexpectations make a failure to perform inconceivable. Acting through a strong sense of
empathy means that if others suffer, the empathizer also suffers. Thus, a person may act
in ways that affect other people and things beyond what can immediately be identified as
self-interest, but it is because they self-identify in some important way with the objects of
their actions and so their actions represent rational self-interest. So, rational choosers in
the original position can represent those with severe cognitive impairment in the same
spirit they represent themselves, yet the important question of self-representation still
needs to be explored.
How can principles of justice be developed by participants who fail to meet the
criteria of rationality and reasonableness? The author acknowledges that designing a just
society requires both the ability to reason and the willingness to universalize decisions,
but insists that all people, including those with severe cognitive impairment, be selfrepresented in the original position by having a participatory role in the formation of
basic social structures, even if the representation is not in classically active ways (rational
bargaining).
When the author first encountered his hepatologist’s shocking perspective on the
question of treatment, the doctor was bewildered to hear that the author would choose to
undergo chemotherapy for his hepatitis C infection. He assumed the author’s life was of
such a poor quality that the difficult and painful struggle to save it would be declined.
Frankly, the doctor’s perception of how the author felt about his life was so intensely
inaccurate that it raised the question of how non-impaired participants in the original
position can represent an impaired perspective without any personal experience.
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Another story about a non-verbal adolescent with autism named Jonathan Lerman
provides additional insight into misconceptions. Jonathan often behaved so
inappropriately that his parents frequently received calls from school requiring their
intervention. They were surprised when one day Jonathan’s aide summoned them for a
joyous reason. Jonathan had found some charcoal and pastels and was drawing. He was
creating figures, which were so emotive that they revealed, according to his parents,
“…the inner thoughts and feelings of a child whose emotions we could only speculate
about until then. In that instant, we went from knowing that we had a significantly
handicapped child to realizing that we had an extraordinarily gifted child.”236 Caren and
Alan Lerman state, “It has long been widely believed that children with autism do not
comprehend the emotional states of others and, indeed, may be extremely limited in their
ability to understand or experience their own emotional states.”237 But Jonathan’s artistic
breakthrough demonstrates that, at least for him, and perhaps for many non-verbal people
with autism, intense feelings exist in an unexpressed state. Through his art, Jonathan
provides:
…a window into his heart. He brings us to the core of his
being and shows us the anguish and triumphs he
experiences. People come alive in his drawings, their
emotional expressions delineated by his bold beautiful
lines. Jonathan’s portraits have an intensity that is
extraordinary. His observations are so acute, telling us he
knows far more than we realize and allowing us to confront
the lonely isolated world he inhabits.238
236

Caren and Alan Lerman, afterword to Lyle Rexer, Jonathan Lerman: Drawings by an Artist with Autism
(New York, New York: George Braziller, Inc., 2002), 126.
237

Caren and Alan Lerman, afterword to Lyle Rexer, Jonathan Lerman: Drawings, 126.

238

Caren and Alan Lerman, afterword to Lyle Rexer, Jonathan Lerman: Drawings, 126.

168

Somehow, the authentic experiences and circumstances of people with severe
impairment must inform the choices made in the original position. The testimony of
family and allies provides some valid information. But, if decisions in the original
position are left to those who can reason, and the nature of decision-making affords no
possible alternative, how can people with severe cognitive impairment have a direct
influence on the design of their society? Political participation, at first glance, appears to
require advanced reasoning capability, but demonstration of extraordinary needs of
individuals with impairment alone can catalyze new societal questions, which ultimately
lead to answers, just as much as the cognitive input of a reasoning individual.
In 2002, the Colorado Legislature considered a cost-saving proposal to eliminate a
Medicaid benefit that situates a private duty nurse within the home of a person with
severe impairment, who is dependent on medical technology, such as a ventilator, to live.
Many of these clients have cognitive involvement as well. This program frees
individuals from the hospital setting and allows them to live with their families, within
the community. It also saves Medicaid monies as home-based private duty nursing is less
expensive than hospital-based care. Failing to appreciate this fact, some legislators
sought to eliminate the program for the over one hundred patients, mostly children, which
it serves. Family members and advocates, accompanied by about twenty children
arrived at the Colorado Capitol building to testify against the elimination of the program.
The voiceless children’s gurgling suction machines and sighing ventilators testified and
their argument proved undeniably compelling. The program survived. Were not these
children essential, active participants in a political outcome that affected their wellbeing
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even though they were not rational bargainers?239 Were they not active participants,
providing self-representation, despite not having prepared any material, spoken one word,
or understood the nature of the agenda?
Any revision that removes the exclusivity of the criterion of rationality from
justice as fairness involves such a departure, not only from traditional readings of Rawls
but from contract tradition and even much of traditional political theory in general, that
the origins of the mandate must be reviewed and dissected to investigate whether its
inclusion is so crucial to justice as fairness that its modification will render the theory
unrecognizable. Why did Rawls insert the criterion of rationality into justice as fairness?
The author thinks, in part, that Rawls’s work, as part of a continuum of contract
theories—collections of philosophical narratives that define a participant as a thinking
being—simply fell into place with some unnecessary vestiges that must fall away with
the reconsideration of the theory as it pertains to impairment.
Rawls speaks at length of Kant’s influence, and while Kant’s extreme position on
the singular essentiality of rational thought must be replaced, important Kantian concepts
must be maintained, even in an inclusive theory. The author wishes to maintain the
Kantian position that autonomy is a primary good and should be maximized to the
greatest extent possible. Autonomy should not be a requirement for participation, but the
author would argue that its maximal acquisition is the foundation for self-respect for
every human being.
Rawls’s integration of Kant’s categorical imperative in the device of the veil of
ignorance is essential to justice as fairness, and when Rawls discusses Kant’s influence in
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the fortieth section of A Theory of Justice, he emphasizes the importance of Kant’s ethic
of reciprocity. Yet, Kantian theory states that non-reasoners fall outside the parameters
of people to whom rational citizens have a moral obligation to justice due to their
inability to reciprocate. This perspective cannot be carried into an inclusive theory and
so it is not the valuing of reason that is problematic in Kant, but rather the lack of valuing
of all other human characteristics.
The historical association of qualification for participation with the ability to
reason speaks to a perennial desperation in humans to self-define as separate from other
animals—having transcendence and dominion over the animal, both without and within.
Kant carries ratio-centrality to a rare extreme. The rational aspect of humans is described
as godlike. Humans can contemplate and ascertain God’s will but, in accordance with the
Enlightenment project, make decisions independent of God. Human reason allows action
with intent, thus identifying responsible actors. It allows a person to understand and
accept the duties required of a citizen, reciprocating and cooperating with others, thus
enabling community. The author agrees that reason is the generator of responsibility,
motivation, and execution, but valuable extra-rational traits are essential to community as
well and must also be considered when determining the qualification of participants. The
author does not believe that the essence of justice as fairness relies on a Kantian
categorization of citizens into distinct passive and active participants. In real life, these
differentiations do not exist so cleanly and people move up or down the continuum of
rational decision-making at different times of their lives and even in different choicemaking circumstances. Active citizenship is a fluid status that defies distinct
categorization. Only those at the furthest end of non-rationality on the rationality
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continuum have no instances in their lives of active choice-making. The author wishes to
replace Kant’s position that demands rationality as a criterion for “civil personality” and
hence moral consideration and rights-bearing status with a criterion of contribution.
Rawls does define his participants as “fully cooperating” but the author would
like to make the argument that cooperation, defined as humans interfacing with one
another to the betterment of both, is very similar to participants making contributions,
which enhance the wellbeing of individuals and community. Both establish relationships
based on mutual advantage, though the latter may lack intent. The author would define
contribution as a human act, sometimes intentional and sometimes without intent, which
enhances social wellbeing in a variety of ways. One can be socially cooperative by
participating in the mutual protection of body, property, and freedoms through
submission to an independent legal authority, by lending one’s unique skills to the
accomplishment of projects requiring diverse abilities, or by participating in the
economic and political life of society—all classical interpretations of contribution. He
would also say, however, that one makes a social contribution by lending one’s unique
perspectives and experiences to the social fabric and acknowledging the value in like
contributions made by others. A person might contribute by sharing, through words or
demonstration, his life experience to broaden society’s awareness of what the infinite
possibilities of human existence encompass. In the case of a person with severe
impairment, that sharing exposes the listener to an experience, which potentially could
become any human’s story, and in this case, the story can generate fear and denial. Thus
an intransigent problem emerges.
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Rawls is right when he posits that humans are risk-averse. Their seemingly
daring, imprudent, and rash behavior is due not to their risk-taking natures but rather to
their propensity for willful ignorance. The veil of ignorance is necessary to ensure that
“no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of
natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances,” but, if people were willing to
acknowledge that humans are universally susceptible to impairment and that it inevitably
touches every life, perhaps the very truth of corporeal fragility would manifest in justice
for people with impairment, even without the veil.240 But, because people with severe
impairment have been sequestered by those who prefer not to acknowledge reality, the
artificial device of the veil remains essential. People with severe impairment, allowed
full access to community, are finally at their most valuable to broader society when they
force the risk-averse human to accept how little separates the handsome, brilliant,
valedictorian from the confused and dependent example of one’s worst fears. Finally, all
are people with human needs housed within vulnerable objects of entropy. Only the
familiarity born of inclusion will penetrate the fear-generated denial of the essential
universality of vulnerability inherent in the human condition.
If people with severe impairment are excluded from the original position, all of
the possible human circumstances and characteristics will not be considered and the
completed design will leave the entire citizenry vulnerable in each person’s potential for
severe impairment and the inherent challenges that status entails if unaddressed by
fundamental social policy. When Rawls states that the exclusion of a tiny portion of
people from the original position is not a “serious practical problem,” he neglects to
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acknowledge that the exclusion extends to the entire citizenry in potential
circumstances.241 Attention to the circumstances of people with severe impairment in the
original position, coupled with the universal potential for each person in society acquiring
this status in their lifetime is the primary reason inclusion of people with severe
impairment is mutually advantageous. But, there are many other ways integration
enhances social wellbeing.
Excluding people with severe impairment, in an effort to live only among clones
(rough equals), denies society the opportunity to grow and transcend. If a person’s
circumstances involve poverty, prejudice, injustice, or dependence and if that person’s
community identifies with those circumstances, acknowledging and accepting the
inconveniences, expenditures, and guilt while still pushing toward ever increasing justice
instead of imposing isolation—that is societal transcendence. This transcendence leads to
successes, achieved with difficulty, which lead to an increased sense of power, both
personal and societal, and so to an increased confidence in tackling the next challenge.
Living with diversity also helps to erase assumptions and build true
understandings in their place. If true understandings hold sway, Peter Singer will accept
the disability community’s perspective as more valid than his assumption-ridden own.
Jerry Lewis will no longer hold pity parties perceiving instead the shared humanity of
people with muscular dystrophy more than their brokenness. Care theorists will
understand that reciprocity of a kind does infuse the relationship between caregiver and
care recipient and that many important insights can be gleaned from the experience.
People can focus on finding the real villains instead of scapegoating those who are
241
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benignly different. In the long run, reality is always superior to delusion. Delusion leads
to lost opportunities and wasted time. More importantly, delusion leads to false
hierarchies and these, ultimately, only benefit those in the temporarily loftiest position.
Contributions made to society by people with severe impairment also include the
enhancement of experience garnered by those who, by living with people for whom
achievement comes with great difficulty, appreciate, rather than take for granted, each
small aspect of any good. What is valuable is not the good itself, but rather, the
experience of the good. People will experience a richer manifestation of a good if it is
not taken for granted. This is related to an Iranian citizen risking life and limb to vote as
opposed to an American citizen being “deterred” by a rainy day or a busy schedule.
Resisting difference is also denying the benefits of exposure to diverse ways of
thinking, problem solving, and finding meaning. An older sister observes her
intellectually impaired brother in his total immersion with watching a beetle, or
vacuuming the carpet, or eating ice cream and realizes how encumbered her life is with
concern over the future, her image, competition, and the expectations of others. He has
unintentionally provided her with an alternative perspective.
Finally, does society value maturity? The road from infancy to adulthood is
generally characterized by an evolution from egocentricity to empathy and sacrifice. It
follows that the idealization of pure pleasure or happiness, where people with severe
impairment are seen as a negative influence on the wellbeing of society, embodied by
Singer’s perspective, lacks maturity in its basic metric of wellbeing. If full inclusion,
with awareness of the valuable contributions made by people with severe impairment,
comes to pass, society will have the opportunity to move beyond immaturity into a
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position of evolved development. The possible benefits could be extraordinary. Thus,
the author feels that the concept of mutual advantage need not be eliminated from justice
as fairness in this process of revision. Inclusion of people with severe impairment is
completely compatible with mutual advantage. Hume says,
Men being naturally selfish, or endowed only with a
confined generosity, they are not easily induced to perform
any action for the interest of strangers, except with the view
to some reciprocal advantage, which they had no hope of
obtaining but by such a performance…All this is the effect
of the natural and inherent principles and passions of
human nature; and as these passions and principles are
inalterable, it may be thought that our conduct, which
depends on them, must be so too, and that it would be in
vain, wither for moralists or politicians, to tamper with us,
or attempt to change the usual course of our actions, with a
view to public interest.242
Even if it is acknowledged that generosity and self-sacrifice are part of human
nature, since their application is neither universal nor ubiquitous, it remains important to
assume cooperation only if it can be established that both parties will gain from the
transaction, as Hume suspects. The author, in establishing the value of extra-rational
contribution, has justified the maintenance of mutual advantage in justice as fairness.
Despite the continued applicability of mutual advantage, Hume’s influence in other ways
has a deleterious effect on Rawls’s effort as pertains to people with severe cognitive
impairment.
Rawls mentions his incorporation of Hume’s circumstances of justice into his
theory. He discusses that justice can only operate in conditions of relative scarcity, being
unnecessary in conditions of abundance and unsustainable in conditions of extreme
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scarcity with the inherent desperation anticipated. This portion of the circumstances of
justice continues to make sense, even with the inclusion of people with severe
impairment. The second aspect is problematic. As discussed above, Hume assumes that
humans will need to be rough equals in order to withstand the opposing interests of other
bargainers. Rawls incorporates this notion saying:
…although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual
advantage, it is typically marked by a conflict as well as an
identity of interests. There is an identity of interests since
social cooperation makes possible a better life for all than
any would have if each were to try to live solely by his own
efforts. There is a conflict of interests since men are not
indifferent as to how the greater benefits produced by their
collaboration are distributed, for in order to pursue their
ends they each prefer a larger to a lesser share.243
Rawls continues, saying, “These individuals are roughly similar in physical and mental
powers; or at any rate, their capacities are comparable in that no none among them can
dominate the rest,” in order to prevent coercion or violence as an outcome of this
propensity.244 With these statements, Rawls conforms to Hume and is unable to conceive
of justice in a society peopled with wildly diverse abilities. For this reason among others,
there are no people with impairment in Rawls’s original position.
Confusion exists in that Rawls speaks of the original position as both a starting
point and a point of ongoing deliberation. It may represent the hypothetical point in time
where society is starting from scratch and developing the principles of social cooperation
but it does not describe the civilizing of a people leaving the state of nature as does
Hume’s contracting scenario. Justice as fairness, according to Rawls, also has an
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immediate and ongoing nature and is meant to be seen as a template for each social
decision made in the course of a lifetime. In justice as fairness, once under the veil
(either as an original position or a state of mind assumed for the purposes of ongoing
decision making) each participant acts as a trustee for the interests of all. When the
original position is assumed for the purpose of assuring ongoing justice, the state of
nature is long dissolved and humans are already in community, using the template of the
principles of justice to develop and maintain the most just social system possible.
While Rawls does not deliver an anthropological account of people leaving the
state of nature, problems involving the circumstances of justice and their incorporation
into justice as fairness would only occur in a timeframe between the state of nature and
the original position and then only if Rawls’s theory is considered a contemporary
manifestation of earlier contract theories where mutual advantage is seen in a narrow,
classical context. From this position, contractors might be unwilling to enter into
community with people whose value has not necessarily been ascertained and whose
expense would defy mutual advantage. Once, however, in the original position, given
information about the prevalence of impairment and the mutually advantageous nature of
including the impairment perspective, designers will invite participation and
representation of those previously excluded. If the original position is taken as an
ongoing perspective and participants are inclusive of people with impairment, who
already have a seat at the table, it seems that Humean constraints surrounding rough
equality are unnecessary vestiges of earlier contract theory, where decision making only
pertains to the initial choice situation.
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Once designers are veiled and faced with the reality, through given information,
(the author imagines designers restrained in seats with eyelids mechanically held open as
in A Clockwork Orange, so adverse to reality are they) that every single human being,
without exception, is vulnerable to impairment in their lifetime, that their children or
grandchildren, at that very moment, may exist in an impaired state, and that consideration
of the interests of impaired citizens mirrors potential self-interest, the author believes that
rough equality will hold no sway. What good is rough equality in the moment when that
equality (in the case of impairment) is so ephemeral?
Rawls, however, also displays an interest in the agreed-upon design maintaining
stability after the veil is lifted. In Political Liberalism he considers:
…how the well-ordered democratic society of justice as
fairness may establish and preserve unity and stability
given the reasonable pluralism characteristic of it. In such
a society, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine cannot
secure the basis of social unity, nor can it provide the
content of public reason on fundamental political questions.
Thus, to see how a well-ordered society can be unified and
stable, we introduce another basic idea of political
liberalism to go with the idea of a political conception of
justice, namely, the idea of an overlapping consensus of
reasonable comprehensive doctrines.245
A political conception of justice is a publically agreed upon model for adjudicating
between the interests of liberty and equality. Rawls comments on the fact that citizens in
society, hold “deeply contested ideas about how the values of liberty and equality are best
expressed in the basic rights and liberties of citizens so as to answer to the claims of both
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liberty and equality.”246 The goal of justice as fairness is to provide a model of just
adjudication. In the original position, divested of all personal identity and acting as
trustees for all humans with their varied characteristics, designers come to consensus
easily, but once unveiled, their diverse doctrines, faiths, cultural histories and
philosophies reemerge. Per Rawls:
Religious and philosophical doctrines express views of the
world and our life with one another, separately and
collectively, as a whole. Our individual and associative
points of view, intellectual affinities, and affective
attachments, are too diverse, especially in a free society, to
enable those doctrines to serve as the basis of lasting and
reasoned political agreement. Different conceptions of the
world can reasonably be elaborated from different
standpoints and diversity arises in part from our distinct
perspectives.247
Despite the many diverse positions found in the unending line of doctrines, which
populate the world and even the community, Rawls believes, in the tradition of Rousseau
and the general will, that there will be overlapping consensus on the principles of
justice—those ideas that all reasonable and rational people will agree upon. He confirms
that justice as fairness will not be bent “to existing unreason” where “doctrines that are
not only irrational but mad and aggressive” might interfere with consensus.248 Thus,
Rawls believes that the product of the original position—the principles of justice—
comprising the lexically prior principle of equal liberty and the difference principle,
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conceived by Rawls without the participation of people with severe impairment, will
survive the unveiling.
But, it must now be considered whether Rawls’s principles of justice derived from
the original position and the assumption that an overlapping consensus of reasonable
comprehensive doctrines will manifest in maintenance of those principles—can survive
the addition of a group of people with extraordinary needs and highly divergent
experiences—people with severe impairment. The author believes they can. In fact, the
application of the principles of justice to people with severe impairment might be
maintained without regard to the mandate of reasonableness. It is important to note that
impairment has the unique feature of demanding universal attention, even once the veil is
lifted and the designers become aware of their individual circumstances. Once aware of
their actual circumstances, they might know that they will never be female, never be a
refugee, never be untouchable or inescapably impoverished, never be a person of color or
adhere to an outcast doctrine, but they will never know that they are immune to
impairment. Not under the veil, and not once the veil is lifted.

181

Epilogue

Early in 2004, my father received the John Evans Adjunct Professor of the Year
Award from the University of Denver. The award’s recipient is determined through
student lobbying, and provides testimony of his commitment to young people and their
appreciation of his passion. He was always eager to do whatever it took to engage his
students whether that required clowning, which generally involved a relinquishment of
all personal dignity, individual tutoring, or recording his lessons on tape for students with
learning disabilities. He was charismatic and beloved. He never missed one class for
illness. but that was not to say he was never ill, only that he lived in an optimistic bubble
of belief that acknowledging illness meant you were ill, while ignoring the occasional
cold or flu translated into health. He would often joke that he planned to live to be one
hundred and twenty.
On Easter evening some three years later, my mother, who was working in a
separate part of the house from my father, heard the phone ring. On the line was my
sister-in-law in Rhode Island, who blurted out that my father must be located
immediately because something was very wrong. He had called my brother’s home by
pushing the redial button on his cell phone, even as he was lying on the floor, unable to
move his right side or speak with any clarity or volume. He had literally been felled by a
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severe hemorrhagic stroke and was immediately rushed to the hospital. During the
ensuing weeks, while he was comatose in the intensive care unit, the hospital received so
many phone calls, inquiring about his status, so many crying and concerned visitors, that
they asked whether he was a celebrity.
During those catastrophic weeks, my known father died and a new one was born.
The new one can no longer beat everyone at Scrabble or remember most of his former
life. He cannot lead the Seder or make his famous haroset. He cannot tell his outrageous
stories or romp with the dogs through the snow. I will now never fully know the
specifics of my ancestry, which was a matter of ongoing discussion before the stroke and,
while my father still remembers much of the ancient history he loved, he is often fuzzy
and unsure. The man, who packed forty-three boxes of books for a move to his current
home, can no longer read.
Five years post-illness, he is rarely visited or called. People quickly got on with
their lives and it is frustrating to try to communicate with him. It is also possible that he
reminds people of their own vulnerabilities. When I ask my mother how she soldiers on
day after day, knowing she feels angry, scared, abandoned, and exhausted, she tells me
she just pays attention. Through the harshness, there are moments of learning and
enjoyment. Yes, she is angry that he didn’t face the possibility that uncontrolled high
blood pressure could severely alter so many lives. Yes, she would like to sleep more and
work less. Yes, she struggles with the weight of overwhelming responsibility. But she
chuckles when she overhears my father teaching Hebrew to his physical therapist, forced
to make his partially paralyzed mouth articulate in order to assure correction of
mispronounced words. She is pleased that she has maintained the garden when she sees
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him outside, watching a hummingbird drinking from the butterfly bush or waiting for the
bluebird fledglings to fly from the birdhouse that was his Father’s Day present. She is
astounded by the grace with which her formerly hyperactive husband has accepted such a
quiet and slow new life. The stroke also left him with severe sensory integration
problems. He struggles with the sensation of water during a shower. During one
frustrating moment, as she watched him grimacing as he rinsed his soapy face, she
inquired, “Whatever happened to the man who swam in the ocean with me?” “He
drowned,” was the sarcastic response. The remodeled husband provides the occasional
witticism.
In many ways this father is not the familiar childhood father. A comparison
between the two invites a sense of loss because much of the previous father is gone. It is
as if he has entered a time machine and returned to the culture and customs of his
orthodox Jewish childhood, a place in time far prior to his mellowing and my birth. He
speaks primarily German and Hebrew, both initial languages, lying untouched on the
unaffected right side of his brain. His desk used to resemble a demolition site, while now
he is obsessive about order and will spend a great deal of time cleaning a sink or picking
dog hair off a chair. He is unparalleled at spot-the-differences games where the player
compares two seemingly identical pictures and finds the tiny discrepancies and he excels
in perfectly matching socks just out of the dryer. Not just in pairing the blue ones and
brown ones, but in identifying the two that are older from the newly purchased pair of the
same color. He is a different man—a man reincarnated within the same lifetime. The
new man is still a man, however. He still wants to be recognized and respected. He still
wants to have choices, make decisions, and be useful, and despite a severe cognitive
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deficit, he can do these things and through their doing, live a life of self-respect and
value.
I need to confess an important fact. When I began this work, six years ago, it
was more of an intellectual exercise than the work of an advocate. I struggled, and still
struggle, when interfacing with people with severe cognitive impairment. My own
substantial physical impairment provides no level of familiarity or comfort in the nonrational world. In writing the chapter titled “Fear of Difference, Avoidance, and the
Legacy of Isolation,” I was exploring my own unease. With the onset of my father’s
illness, cognitive impairment came home, yet, even in this very personal case, I still stand
on unfamiliar and sometimes uncomfortable ground. I often question my maturity in the
matter, but maybe I simply lack adequate experience. While I certainly do not consider
myself a champion of those with cognitive impairment, I do believe that my
acknowledgement of personal deficiency prevents any return to disengagement. The
journey of developing comfort and acknowledging common humanity moves forward.
The same journey must occur with political theory as pertains to people with severe
cognitive impairment. Society must move forward to comprehensive justice, inclusion,
and community.
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